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Note
United States v. Morrison: Federalism Against the
Will of the States
Jil L. Martin*
[W]ith the Court's decision today, Antonio Morrison... has 'won the
states' rights plea against the states themselves.' 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Violence directed at women, particularly in the forms of rape and
domestic abuse, is a nationwide problem that impacts the lives of
seventy-five percent of America's female population. 2  Statistics
regarding women's safety paint a bleak picture. In 1994, Congress
enacted the Violence Against Women Act (the "VAWA") as a
comprehensive response to this issue.3  One provision of the VAWA,
section 13981, created a civil rights remedy in federal court for victims
of violence motivated by gender bias. 4 Congress relied on its commerce
power and its enforcement authority under the Fourteenth Amendment
to support section 13981. 5 However, individuals charged with violating
the VAWA have questioned these .bases of authority. One victim of
gender-motivated violence, Christy Brzonkala, chose to pursue the
* J.D. expected January 2001. I would like to dedicate this article to my wonderful parents
and brother, without whose love, patience, and support, it could not have been written; and to
M.J.T., whose memory inspires me.
1. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1773 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting R.
JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 160 (1941)). Justice Souter further
remarked that, "[i]t is, then, not the least irony of these cases that the States will be forced to
enjoy the new federalism whether they want it or not." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
2. See id. at 1761 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25 (1993)); see
also infra Part II.A. I (outlining congressional findings on the subject of violence against women).
3. See Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13931-14040 (1994); see also infra Part
II.A.2 (discussing the scope of the Violence Against Women Act).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c); see also infra Part II.A.2 (highlighting the civil rights remedy
made available under section 13981).
5. See S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 54 (1993); see also infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the
constitutional and historical sources of power relied upon by Congress in enacting section 13981 ).
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
constitutionality of section 13981 all the way to the Supreme Court.
Her efforts ended on May 15, 2000, when the Court rendered its
decision in United States v. Morrison.6  Continuing to advance its
current notions of federalism, the Supreme Court determined that
Congress lacked sufficient constitutional authority to enact section
13981, and overturned the statute.
7
This Note will explore the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence
since the Constitution's ratification, particularly emphasizing the
Supreme Court's 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez,8 on which the
Morrison decision was firmly based.9 It will also review the original
intent of the Fourteenth Amendment and the development of its
interpretation through Supreme Court precedent.1° The procedural
background of United States v. Morrison entails three lower court
opinions, each of which will be reviewed, followed by an analysis of the
Morrison decision itself." In so doing, this Note will demonstrate both
the Morrison Court's consistent interpretation with its opinion in Lopez,
as well as its inconsistencies with prior case law. 12 It will also examine
the Court's decision in light of Fourteenth Amendment precedent.
13
Finally, this Note will discuss the social and legal impact of United
States v. Morrison, concluding that future civil rights legislation, under
the Supreme Court's current conception of federalism, is unlikely to be
sustained. 14
II. BACKGROUND
The VAWA represents the result of four years of congressional
hearings and debate. 15 During this time, Congress learned just how
6. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000); see also infra Part III.B (discussing the
disposition of United States v. Morrison).
7. See id. at 1759; see also infra Part III.B (reviewing the Court's analysis of the two
constitutional bases on which Congress relied for authority to enact section 13981).
8. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
9. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1748-54; see also infra Part II.B (detailing the historical
progression of Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
10. See infra Part II.C (discussing the evolution of the interpretation and application of the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
11. See infra Parts IIL.A.2-3 & I1I.B (reviewing the progression of Christy Brzonkala's civil
claim through the federal court system).
12. See infra Part IV (comparing and contrasting United States v. Morrison with United States
v. Lopez and other prior Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
13. See infra Part IV (discussing the Court's opinion in United States v. Morrison in the
context of prior interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
14. See infra Part V (outlining the likely practical impact of the perspectives expressed in
United States v. Morrison).
15. See infra Part II.A.1 (tracing the research compiled by Congress regarding violence
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pervasive gender-motivated violence is throughout the nation and
crafted a wide variety of approaches to address this serious problem.
Relying on its commerce power, as well as its Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement authority, Congress enacted a civil rights remedy as one of
this spectrum of approaches.' 6  To effectively evaluate the
constitutionality of this remedy, it is necessary to understand the history
of each of these constitutional provisions and the jurisprudence that has
shaped their interpretation. This information, combined with Congress'
factual findings, constitutes the necessary basis for determining whether
Congress created a valid remedy or overstepped its constitutionally
defined limits.
A. The Development of the Violence Against Women Act
In enacting the VAWA, Congress first evaluated the seriousness of
violence toward women. Based on these findings, Congress drafted a
multi-strategy plan to address the problem. 17 Congress called on its
authority under both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment to support this multi-strategy plan, known as the Violence
Against Women Act.18
1. Congressional Findings
The VAWA represents Congress' response to a "national tragedy"
that impacts millions of American women on a daily basis.' 9 Senator
Joseph R. Biden, Jr. first introduced the Act in 1990.20 The VAWA was
signed into law by President Clinton on September 13, 1994, following
four years of congressional research, hearings, and debate. 21  During
those four years, Congress heard testimony from numerous experts,
including judges, law professors, physicians, prosecutors, rape victims,
against women).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994); see also infra Parts II.A.2-3 (discussing the VAWA's
civil rights remedy and the authority cited by Congress for its actions).
17. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the wide range of strategies adopted by Congress to
combat the problem of gender-motivated violence).
18. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 13931-14040 (1994); see also infra Part II.A.3 (highlighting the
congressional powers upon which enaction of section 13981 was based).
19. See Brief of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1,
United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29) [hereinafter Biden Brief]
(citing S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 39 (1991)).
20. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 37 (1993)).
21. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1760 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); Biden
Brief, supra note 19, at 1, 3; Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality
Meet: The Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1
(1996).
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and survivors of domestic violence. 22  These experts testified that
violence in the form of rape and domestic abuse is the leading cause of
injury to American women between the ages of fifteen and forty-four.23
In the United States, a woman is raped every six minutes, and another is
beaten every fifteen seconds.24 Nearly 500,000 girls currently attending
high school will be raped before they graduate,25 and 125,000 female
college students can expect to be raped during any given year. 26 In all,
three out of every four women in America will be victims of violent
crime at some point during their lives. 27
Congress reviewed the information gathered through its research and
identified several detrimental links between violence against females
and the nation's economy. First, because of gender-based violence,
women are less likely to seek employment during evening and
overnight hours, as well as positions with employers located in
"dangerous" areas.28 In addition, victims of sexual assault and domestic
violence are more likely to be fired from, or forced to quit, their jobs
because of the amount of time they must take off from work to
recuperate from their injuries or to avoid the embarrassment of being
seen bearing the physical marks of domestic abuse. 29  Furthermore,
22. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 1, 3; see also Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1760 & nn.4-6
(Souter, J., dissenting) (citing specific examples of such testimony).
23. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1761 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38
(1993)). This makes injury due to such violence more prevalent than automotive accidents,
cancer deaths, and muggings combined. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993).
24. See Women's Panel Raises Anti-Violence Measure, STAR-LEDGER NEWARK, Feb. 25,
1993, at Al. Women in the United States are at least three times more likely to be victims of rape
than are European women. See Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 537 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (citing
Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice,
102d Cong. 62 (1992)).
25. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1762 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 101-545, at 31
(1990)).
26. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 101-545, at 43 (1990)).
27. See id. at 1761 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 25 (1993)).
28. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 n.70 (1993); Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 9 (citing S.
REP. No. 101-545, at 54 (1990)). During one hearing, the Senate was informed that women "tend
to choose their jobs with one eye looking over their shoulder about their safety. They can't work
late like men can work; they can't work overtime; they can't take jobs in localities that are
considered to be dangerous." Brief of Petitioner United States at 24 n.9, United States v.
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29) [hereinafter Brief of United States] (quoting
Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 241 (1991) (testimony of Professor Burt Neuborne)).
29. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1762 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 102-197, at 53
(1991)); Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 8-9 (citing S. REP. No. 101-545, at 37 (1990)).
Absenteeism caused by gender-based violence costs employers an estimated three to five billion
dollars each year. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1763 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No.
103-138, at 41 (1993); S. REP. No. 101-545 (1990)); Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 9 (citing
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gender-motivated violence prohibits women from participating in basic
commercial activities such as grocery shopping, going out to dinner, or
using public transportation.30 Finally, Congress found that as many as
fifty percent of all homeless women and children are without a place to
live because they are fleeing domestic violence. 31 -Overall, Congress
determined that violence against women costs the government at least
three billion dollars each year.
32
In addition to findings regarding the occurrence of gender-based
crimes and their effect on the economy, Congress gathered information
regarding the status of state criminal and civil laws related to gender-
motivated violence. As part of its VAWA research, Congress reviewed
twenty-one gender-bias studies conducted by state task forces. 33 Those
studies revealed that the majority of states either did not have marital
rape statutes34 or only prosecuted it when factors not required for other
Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 240 (1991) (testimony of the Nat'l Fed'n of Bus. and Prof'l Women)).
30. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 5. For instance, fear of rape and other gender-motivated
crimes has been shown to discourage as many as seventy-five percent of women from going to
see a movie at night, alone. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1762 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing S.
REP. NO. 102-197, at 38 (1991)).
31. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1761 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 101-545, at 37
(1990)). Congress was informed that homeless women, because of their homeless status, are
unable to purchase goods, including those that travel in interstate commerce, that they might
ordinarily have purchased. See Brief of United States, supra note 28, at 25-26 (citing Domestic
Violence: Terrorism in the Home: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs and
Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. 30 (1990)).
Congressional testimony further revealed that some victims of domestic violence resort to
committing property crimes to be able to provide the goods needed by themselves and their
children. See id.
32. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1762 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 33
(1990)). The source of these costs has been traced to medical costs and expenditures on criminal
justice, as well as other social costs. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993).
33. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 22 (citing S. REP. No. 103-138, at 49 & n.52 (1993); S.
REP. No. 102-197, at 34, 43-44 & n.40 (1991)); Brief of the States of Arizona, Alaska, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, and the
Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Puerto Rico, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners'
Brief on the Merits at 16, United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29)
[hereinafter Amici Brief of the States] (citing S. REP. No. 103-138, at 45 n.29, 46 n.35, 49 n.52
(1993); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 43 n.40 (1991)).
34. According to the Model Penal Code, rape is defined as:
(1) Rape. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is guilty of
rape if:
(a) he compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily
injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone; or
(b) he has substantially impaired her power to appraise or control her conduct by
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rape claims were present.35 In addition, some states provided immunity
from prosecution, through interspousal tort immunity statutes,36 to
former husbands and boyfriends charged with sexual assault.37
Congressional experts also testified that this tendency to protect
perpetrators of violent acts against women is not a modern concept.
Centuries of laws that classified women as the chattel of their spouses
have promoted a widespread belief in the culpability of the victim,
whereby women are presumed to have done something to merit the
violence they suffered.38 Through orders of protection, state law does
administering or employing without her knowledge drugs, intoxicants or other means
for the purpose of preventing resistance; or
(c) the female is unconscious; or
(d) the female is less than 10 years old.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (1985) (emphasis added). Marital rape statutes are those that
hold a husband liable for the same non-consensual conduct as a traditional rape statute. The State
of Illinois has a marital rape statute:
(a) The accused commits criminal sexual assault if he or she:
(1) commits an act of sexual penetration by the use of force or threat of force; or
(2) commits an act of sexual penetration and the accused knew that the victim was
unable to understand the nature of the act or was unable to give knowing consent; or
(3) commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was under 18 years of age
when the act was committed and the accused was a family member; or
(4) commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was at least 13 years of age
but under 18 years of age when the act was committed and the accused was 17 years of
age or over and held a position of trust, authority or supervision in relation to the
victim.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13 (West 1998).
35. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 20 (citing S. REP. No. 103-138, at 47 & nn.42-44, 55
(1993); S. REP. No. 102-197, at 45 & nn.49-50 (1991)). As of September 10, 1992, all states
except North Carolina and Oklahoma recognized some form of marital rape as a crime. See S.
REP. NO. 103-138, at 47 n.42 (1993). The additional factors required in other states include
accompanying acts of violence such as kidnapping or use of a weapon. See id. at 47. Further,
many states have refused to prosecute marital rape where the woman was unconscious, asleep, or
physically or mentally ill. See id.
36. Interspousal tort immunity grants each member of a married couple immunity against
prosecution by his or her spouse for torts he or she may commit against that spouse. The State of
New Jersey has one example of an interspousal tort immunity statute:
37:2-5. Right of husband and wife to contract with or sue each other.
Nothing in this chapter contained shall enable a husband or wife to contract with or to
sue each other, except as heretofore, and except as authorized by this chapter.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-5 (West 1996).
37. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 20 (citing S. REP. No. 102-197, at 45 n.50 (1991)).
Although during the five years since the VAWA's enactment, several states have declared their
interspousal tort immunity statutes to be unconstitutional, such decisions do not provide relief for
victims of gender-motivated violence who live in states where these doctrines have yet to be
judicially reviewed. See id. at 21.
38. See id. at 19-20, 23 (citing S. REP. No. 102-197, at 47 (1991)). One result of this belief is
that numerous states refuse to prosecute cases of acquaintance rape. See id. at 23 (citing S. REP.
NO. 102-197, at 47 (1991)). Acquaintance rape, similar to marital rape, occurs when the sexual
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provide women with a means to control their own safety against known
assailants. However, even when women have successfully obtained
protective orders, in an attempt to stem the abuse they were enduring,
frequent lack of enforcement by state officials has nullified the
protection sought.39
Congress also made numerous findings regarding the shortcomings of
state law enforcement efforts in the area of gender-based crimes. Four
years of congressional hearings and debate uncovered a national
perception that crimes against women are second-class, and not worthy
of the attention given to other violent crimes, such as murder. n°
Congress cited estimates that there are as few as one arrest for every
100 domestic assaults each year. 41  Furthermore, perpetrators of rape
have only a twenty-five percent chance of being arrested, prosecuted,
and convicted.42 Of those actually convicted of rape, nearly twenty-five
percent never serve time in prison, and another twenty-five percent
receive local jail sentences averaging eleven months. 43  Congress
learned that this attitude of minimizing the importance of gender-
motivated violence extends beyond law enforcement officials to the
general public. For example, a survey of jury verdicts revealed that less
than one percent of all rape victims have collected civil monetary
damages." Additionally, a survey of judges in Colorado indicated that
assault is committed by an individual known by the victim. In Minnesota, for example, the state
task force on gender issues in the courts found that a 1975 reform of the state's sexual assault
statute failed to be of any benefit to the ninety percent of rape victims who knew their attackers.
See Amici Brief of the States, supra note 33, at 19. The task force further reported that gender-
based stereotypes about acquaintance rape play a significant role in this failure. See id.
39. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 24 & n.25 (citing specific examples of police refusal to
enforce orders of protection). Among the examples cited by Senator Biden was the situation
described in a letter to Representative Olver, in which a domestic violence victim recounted that,
despite having obtained thirteen restraining orders against her husband, the state failed to charge
him for even one of the 200 violations of those orders he committed. See id. at 24 n.25 (citing
139 CONG. REC. 31, 291-92 (1993) (statement of Representative Olver)). Even more dramatic
was the story of Tracy Motuzick, who obtained an order of protection against her husband that the
police refused to enforce. Tracy suffered thirteen stab wounds and a broken neck at the hands of
her husband, leaving her paralyzed, during the time that the order of protection was in place. See
id. (citing Women and Violence: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong. Pt. 2, at 99 (1990) (testimony of Tracy Motuzick)).
40. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993); see also Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 538
n.4 (N.D. I11. 1997) (quoting testimony of Burt Neuborne, before the House of Representatives,
that "women have been subject to gender-based violence for so long and on such a scale in our
society that we have difficulty perceiving the enormity of its impact").
41. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1762 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing
S. REP. No. 101-545, at 38 (1990)).
42. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 101-545, at 33 n.30 (1990)).
43. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993)).
44. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 102-197, at 44 (1991)).
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forty-one percent believe juries perceive sexual assault victims as less
credible than other crime victims. 45  In the aggregate, Congress
determined that these findings revealed a general bias against equal
enforcement of laws criminalizing gender-motivated violence.
46
These disturbing examples of enforcement problems were noticed by
some state officials, who proactively supported a national solution.
Most notably, the VAWA was supported by the attorneys general of
forty-one states.47 These attorneys general recognized that prevailing
attitudes in state law enforcement could not be overcome through state
legislation.48 They believed that the uniformity of national regulation,
coupled with the protections against bias inherent in the federal judicial
system, was needed to properly address this costly and pervasive
problem. 49 The cause of action provided by section 13981 responds to
the needs of the states as expressed to Congress, without preempting or
interfering with state laws. 5
0
In total, the years of hearings and studies led Congress to conclude
that gender-based violence impairs a woman's ability to obtain and
maintain employment on an equal level with men. 51  Congress heard
testimony that gender-based violence "permeates every aspect of
women's lives. It alters where women live, work, and study, as they try
to be safe by staying within certain prescribed bounds." 52  Experts
confirmed that the effect of gender-based violence is to prevent its
victims, primarily women, from full participation in the nation's
economy. 53 Further, Congress determined that state legal systems have
45. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 102-197, at 47 (1991)).
46. See Brief of Petitioner Christy Brzonkala at 42, United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740
(2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29) [hereinafter Brzonkala Brief].
47. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 971 n.14 (4th
Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Brzonkala I], vacated and reh 'g en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000). The attorneys general, in a
letter to the Senate, wrote, "[o]ur experience as attorneys general strengthens our belief that the
problem of violence against women is a national one, requiring federal attention, federal
leadership, and federal funds." Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong.
34-36 (1993) (letter from State Attorneys General).
48. See Amici Brief of the States, supra note 33, at 2, 15-16.
49. See Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 31, 46. The federal courts have a number of
safeguards against bias, including presidential appointment instead of popular election, Senate
review in advance of confirmation, and lifetime appointment. See id. at 31.
50. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 14; infra Part II.A.2 (discussing Congress' efforts at
avoiding interference with state laws).
51. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 4.
52. Id. at 12 (quoting Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 253 (1991) (statement of Dr. Leslie R. Wolfe)).
53. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 788 (W.D. Va.
[Vol. 32250
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institutionalized traditional prejudices against victims of gender-based
violence, 54 creating obstacles within the system that prevent such
victims from obtaining the same justice available to victims of other
serious crimes. 55  These obstacles deny victims of gender-motivated
violence equal protection of the laws. 56
2. Breadth of Coverage
In enacting the VAWA, Congress employed multiple strategies in a
comprehensive approach to combat the problem of violence against
women.57 These strategies include a civil rights remedy, appropriations
for safety improvements in public areas, a mandate that full faith and
credit be given to an order of protection in any state, and a criminal
statute.
The first strategy chosen by Congress was the enactment of a new
federal civil cause of action, section 13981. Section 13981 gives
victims of gender-motivated violence the right to sue their attackers in
federal court.58 Congress enacted this remedy to overcome the
inequality found in many state judicial systems, which denied victims of
rape and domestic abuse equal protection of the laws. 59 Section 13981
puts the ability to secure restitution directly into the hands of the
victims, in a forum that will not deny them the equal protection to
which they are entitled. 60 The civil rights remedy is also an anti-
discrimination statute. 61 As such, it was promulgated by Congress, in
part, to break down the barriers that continue to prohibit women from
fully participating in the national economy. 62
1996) [hereinafter Brzonkala 1], aff'd en banc 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (quoting S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993)).
54. For example, as late as 1990, raising awareness as to the evils of female battering was still
regarded by many as an issue reserved for feminist extremists. See Nourse, supra note 21, at 2.
55. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 5.
56. See id.
57. See Brief of United States, supra note 28, at 3.
58. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 3. This provision was codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994); see also infra note 72 (setting forth the text of 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981(c), (d), (e)(1)).
59. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 5; supra Part II.A.I (discussing studies that
demonstrated inconsistent application of state domestic violence and abuse laws).
60. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 5.
61. See Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 26; infra Part II.A.3 (describing Congress'
authority to enact the VAWA as anti-discrimination legislation).
62. See Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 26.
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Congress took great pains to ensure that section 13981 would not
interfere with state laws.6 3 The civil rights remedy was crafted, through
numerous bipartisan revisions, to complement state remedies, not
displace them.64 Unlike other federal statutes that have been invalidated
by the Supreme Court, section 13981 does not duplicate the criminal or
civil laws of any state, nor does it interfere with state programs designed
to curb gender-motivated violence. 65 After the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts expressed concerns that section 13981 would
overburden the federal court system, the Senate negotiated bipartisan
amendments to narrow the remedy's scope. 66 Such amendments
included providing state courts with concurrent jurisdiction67 to enforce
section 13981 and prohibiting removal 68 to federal court of any section
13981 claim initially filed in state court. 69 Additionally, Congress
prohibited the federal courts from having supplemental jurisdiction70
63. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 15.
64. See id. at 5. The definitions of actionable offenses under the VAWA were derived from
existing state laws, and therefore section 13981 creates a remedy that is consistent with state law.
See Amici Brief of the States, supra note 33, at 21.
65. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 14 (comparing 42 U.S.C. § 13981 to the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, which was declared unconstitutional in United States v. Lopez). In the words
of one Senate leader, "[d]espite some misconceptions, this measure does not make every sexual
assault or rape a Federal offense. Rather, it recognizes that there is a proper role for the Federal
Government in assisting the States in fighting violence against women." Id. at 16 (quoting 139
CONG. REC. 30, 107 (1993) (statement of Senator Hatch)).
66. See id. at 15. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts had predicted that section
13981 would "'significantly affect the courts and their administration"' by generating more than
53,000 new tort cases annually, of which 13,450 were predicted to be federal court filings. Id.
(quoting Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 15-16 (1991)).
67. Concurrent jurisdiction is, "[tihe jurisdiction of several different tribunals, each authorized
to deal with the same subject-matter, person or thing at the choice of the suitor." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 291 (6th ed. 1990). By providing for concurrent jurisdiction, Congress not only
provided a choice of forum for victims of gender-based violence, but also preserved the states'
participation in adjudicating such matters.
68. Removal is the procedure by which a civil claim, originally filed in state court, can be
transferred to federal court in the district and division where the state action is pending. See 28
U.S.C. § 1441 (1994). Removal requires that the federal courts have original jurisdiction over the
claim. See id.
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 1445(d) (1994); Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 15. Section 13981(e)(3)
provides: "Concurrent jurisdiction: The Federal and State courts shall have concurrent
jurisdiction over actions brought pursuant to this part." 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(3) (1994).
Additionally, section 1445(d) provides: "A civil action in any State court arising under section
40302 of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 may not be removed to any district court of
the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1445(d).
70. Supplemental jurisdiction is the procedure by which a federal court having original
jurisdiction over the claim before it can assume jurisdiction over all other claims in that particular
matter, provided that the additional claims "are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the
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over cases containing a section 13981 claim that also involved issues of
family law, such as divorce or child custody.7' Congress further limited
the impact on state law by clarifying the types of crime that qualify for
the civil rights remedy, namely, those felonies motivated not merely by
gender, but by an animus against the victim's gender.72 Through these
United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994).
71. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 16. Section 13981(e)(4) provides:
(4) Supplemental jurisdiction
Neither section 1367 of title 28 nor subsection (c) of this section shall be construed, by
reason of a claim arising under such subsection, to confer on the courts of the United
States jurisdiction over any State law claim seeking the establishment of a divorce,
alimony, equitable distribution of marital property or child custody decree.
42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4) (1994).
72. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 15-16. Sections 13981(c), (d) and (e)(l) provide:
(c) Cause of action
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence motivated
by gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) of this
section shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other
relief as a court may deem appropriate.
(d) Definitions
For purposes of this section-
(1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a crime of violence
committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to
an animus based on the victim's gender; and
(2) the term "crime of violence" means-
(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the person
or that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct presents a
serious risk of physical injury to another, and that would come within the
meaning of State or Federal offenses described in section 16 of Title 18,
whether or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal charges,
prosecution, or conviction and whether or not those acts were committed in
the special maritime, territorial, or prison jurisdiction of the United States;
and
(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described
in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the person who takes
such action and the individual against whom such action is taken.
(e) Limitation and procedures
(1) Limitation
Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action under subsection (c)
of this section for random acts of violence unrelated to gender or for acts that
cannot be demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, to be motivated by
gender (within the meaning of subsection (d) of this section).
42 U.S.C. § 13981(c), (d), (e)(l) (1994). Congress chose the word "animus" to define the
motivational standard under section 13981 as a middle ground between the two extremes of
malice and disparate impact. See Nourse, supra note 21, at 29-30. Animus is a word that
explains the perpetrator's choice to commit acts of violence, while not pulling into section
13981's reach any action of a category of actions that disproportionately affects women. See id.
at 30-31. Animus can be established by statements made by the perpetrator at the time of the
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careful limitations, Congress endeavored to maintain a sense of
"cooperative federalism," not allowing section 13981 to supplant
existing or future state laws. 73
In addition to section 13981, the VAWA includes other titles that
further reflect the multi-strategy approach envisioned by Congress to
address issues of violence directed at women. The second strategy
provides for capital improvements to public transportation systems.74
Title I of the VAWA, the Safe Streets for Women Act, generates a ten
million dollar appropriation to the Secretary of Transportation to fund
installation of lighting, security cameras, and security phones in such
areas as parking garages, subway stations, and bus stops.75 Title II, the
Safe Homes for Women Act, embodies Congress' third strategy. This
provision, among other things, closes a loophole associated with orders
of protection by requiring every state to give full faith and credit to a
protective order issued by another state. 76  The fourth strategy is set
forth in the Equal Justice for Women in the Courts Act.7 7  This title
incident, patterns of behavior exhibited by the perpetrator, and by the circumstances of the
incident itself. See id. at 31.
73. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 5.
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 13931(a) (1994) ("There is authorized to be appropriated not to exceed
$10,000,000, for the Secretary of Transportation... to make capital grants for the prevention of
crime and to increase security in existing and future public transportation systems.").
75. See id.; S. REP. No. 103-138, at42 (1993). Section 13931(b)(1)(A)-(D) provides:
(b) Grants for lighting, camera surveillance, and security phones
(1) From the sums authorized for expenditure under this section for crime
prevention, the Secretary is authorized to make grants and loans to States and
local public bodies or agencies for the purpose of increasing the safety of public
transportation by-
(A) increasing lighting within or adjacent to public transportation systems,
including bus stops, subway stations, parking lots, or garages;
(B) increasing camera surveillance of areas within and adjacent to public
transportation systems, including bus stops, subway stations, parking lots, or
garages;
(C) providing emergency phone lines to contact law enforcement or security
personnel in areas within or adjacent to public transportation systems,
including bus stops, subway stations, parking lots, or garages; or
(D) any other project intended to increase the security and safety of existing
or planned public transportation systems.
42 U.S.C. § 1393 1(b)(l)(A)-(D) (1994).
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 43 (1993). Section 2265 provides:
(a) Full faith and credit.- Any protection order issued that is consistent with subsection
(b) of this section by the court of one State or Indian tribe.., shall be accorded full
faith and credit by the court of another State or Indian tribe... and enforced as if it
were the order of the enforcing State or tribe.
18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (1994).
77. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 13991-14002 (1994).
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provides for the completion of studies on the nature and extent of
gender bias in the federal courts, as well as for training of state and
federal judges on the issues of sexual assault and domestic violence. 78
Finally, the fifth strategy employed by Congress is a specific criminal
statute. Section 40221(a) 79 of the VAWA provides a federal remedy for
crimes of abuse committed during interstate travel or crimes that have
been committed by persons traveling across state lines in order to
commit acts of abuse. 80  In all, these various approaches reflect
Congress' intent, under its constitutional authority, to provide a
comprehensive range of solutions to a national problem.
78. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 13992, 14001 (1994); S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 46 (1993). Section
13992(1)-(6) provides:
Training provided pursuant to grants made under this part may include current
information, existing studies, or current data on-
(1) the nature and incidence of rape and sexual assault by strangers and nonstrangers,
marital rape, and incest;
(2) the underreporting of rape, sexual assault, and child sexual abuse;
(3) the physical, psychological, and economic impact of rape and sexual assault on the
victim, the costs to society, and the implications for sentencing;
(4) the psychology of sex offenders, their high rate of recidivism, and the implications
for sentencing;
(5) the historical evolution of laws and attitudes on rape and sexual assault;
(6) sex stereotyping of female and male victims of rape and sexual assault, racial
stereotyping of rape victims and defendants, and the impact of such stereotypes on
credibility of witnesses, sentencing, and other aspects of the administration of justice.
42 U.S.C. § 13992(1)-(6) (1994).
79. This strategy is codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2261(a)(1)-(2) (West 2000).
80. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2261(a)(1)-(2). Section 2261 provides:
(a) Offenses.-
(1) Crossing a State line.- A person who travels across a State line or enters or
leaves Indian country with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate that person's
spouse or intimate partner, and who, in the course of or as a result of such travel,
intentionally commits a crime of violence and thereby causes bodily injury to
such spouse or intimate partner, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
(2) Causing the crossing of a State line.- A person who causes a spouse or
intimate partner to cross a State line or to enter or leave Indian country by force,
coercion, duress, or fraud and, in the course or as a result of that conduct,
intentionally commits a crime of violence and thereby causes bodily injury to the
person's spouse or intimate partner, shall be punished as provided in subsection
(b).
Id. This provision has not met with the same Commerce Clause challenges as section 13981,
because courts have recognized that it clearly falls within one of the three recognized areas of
congressional regulation: channels of interstate commerce. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S.
Ct. 1740, 1752 n.5 (2000).
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3. Congressional Authority to Enact the VAWA
After four years of hearings and the enumeration of extensive
congressional findings, Congress determined that gender-based violence
substantially affects interstate commerce by preventing women from
full participation in day-to-day commercial activities. 81  Congress
viewed this as sufficient grounds for enacting the VAWA civil rights
remedy under its Commerce Clause authority. 82  This constitutional
provision enumerates to Congress, not the states, the authority to
regulate those activities affecting commerce among the states.83
Congress also found authority for enacting the VAWA under the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 84  The Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified shortly after the end of the Civil War to
address continuing state discrimination against the newly freed slaves. 85
81. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 4. It is interesting to note that the VAWA was enacted
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, in which the requisite level of a
regulated activity's effect on interstate commerce was finally clarified as being "substantially
affects" rather than merely "affects." See 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995). Yet, before it was clear that
such a high threshold for interaction was necessary to pass judicial scrutiny, Congress determined
that gender-motivated violence "substantially affects" interstate commerce. See Brzonkala 11, 132
F.3d 949, 967 n.10 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated and reh'g en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000). The House of Representatives
summarized the findings that it relied on to justify congressional authority for the VAWA under
Article I, Section 8:
[C]rimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on
interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from
engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business, and
in places involved in interstate commerce; crimes of violence motivated by gender
have a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, by diminishing national
productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the
demand for interstate products ....
Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 7 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994)). The
Senate further found, "Gender-based crimes and the fear of gender-based crimes restricts
movement, reduces employment opportunities, increases health expenditures, and reduces
consumer spending, all of which affect interstate commerce and the national economy. Gender-
based violence bars its most likely targets-women-from full [participation] in the national
economy." Id. at 7-8 (quoting S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993)).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994); Brief of United States, supra note 28, at 22-27. The
Commerce Clause appears in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution, among the list of
enumerated congressional powers. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("[The Congress shall have
Power] ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes;"). See infra Part lI.B for an analysis of Congress' Commerce Clause authority.
83. See infra Part lI.B (discussing further the scope of authority over commerce enumerated to
Congress).
84. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994); Brief of
United States, supra note 28, at 36-38. See infra Part II.C for an analysis of Congress' authority
under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
85. See infra Part II.C.1 (exploring social reforms enacted in the post-Civil War era).
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The Amendment provides that all persons are to be granted equal
protection of the laws. 86 Each of the Civil War Amendments 87 contains
an enforcement clause, which grants Congress the authority to enact
legislation necessary to enforce the provisions of the Amendment.88
Since the ratification of the Civil War Amendments, Congress has
passed federal laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race,
national origin, and even sexual orientation. 89 However, no legislation
has been enacted to prohibit violence that is gender-motivated. 90 In
enacting the VAWA, Congress relied on the Supreme Court's holding
in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson91 to conclude that violence
motivated by gender is a form of discrimination. 92  Finding no
distinction between those types of discrimination already recognized by
federal legislation and violence motivated by gender, Congress was
compelled to provide victims of gender discrimination the same type of
relief already available to other discrimination victims. 93 Additionally,
congressional findings that gender bias had caused state courts to treat
gender-based crimes less seriously than other crimes constituted a
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). Equal protection demands that the protections of a
state government be applied equally among its citizens. A state "may not.., selectively deny its
protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection
Clause." DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3 (1989)
(citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
87. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV (abolishing slavery, providing for due process and
equal protection of the laws, and establishing voting rights, respectively); see infra Part II.C. 1
(discussing the impact of the Civil War Amendments).
88. See infra Part II.C. 1 (describing the authority granted to Congress by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Enforcement Clause).
89. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 48 (1993) (noting that "society declared that it would not
tolerate attacks against persons because of their race, religion, or national origin").
90. See id. There is little doubt that violence motivated by race or sexual orientation impacts
its victims any differently than does gender-motivated violence. See id. In each case, the victim
is chosen merely because of his or her class status, not by virtue of who they are as persons or
what they might have said or done. See id. These victims not only are injured physically, but
they are also traumatized emotionally, often to the point of being unable to continue leading
normal lives. See id.
91. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
92. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 51 (1993) (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986)). In Meritor Savings Bank, the Court stated:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of
one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial
harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a
gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make
a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.
Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1982)).
93. See generally, S. REP. No. 103-138, at 48 (1993) (discussing the purpose of a civil rights
remedy for gender-motivated crimes).
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denial of equal protection to victims of such acts.94  This disparate
treatment could not be dismissed by Congress as merely negligent or
accidental.95 Congress concluded that because state judicial systems
were failing to provide victims of gender-motivated violence with equal
protection of the laws, it had the authority to legislate enforcement of
the Fourteenth Amendment.96
B. The Commerce Clause
Congress relied on the Commerce Clause as one of the constitutional
bases for its authority to enact the VAWA.9 7  A full understanding of
the Commerce Clause, or any other constitutional provision, requires
review of its origins, as well as its historical interpretation. Little is
known of the Framers' original intent regarding the Commerce
Clause.98  However, Commerce Clause jurisprudence is both
voluminous and dynamic.99 This jurisprudence was most recently
reviewed in the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez.100
1. Original Intent and Delineation of Powers
The U.S. Constitution is divided into seven articles, the first three of
which deal with the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the
federal government, respectively. 01 In Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution, the Framers enumerated which regulatory powers would
be the responsibility of the federal government through Congress. 10 2
The Tenth Amendment, coupled with traditional rules of statutory
interpretation, dictates that those powers not enumerated as the domain
94. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 5.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 26 (citing S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 55 (1993)).
97. See supra Part II.A.3 (highlighting Congress' determination that gender-motivated
violence had a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
98. See 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 4.3, at 412 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that the Constitutional
Convention did not conduct a specific debate over Congress' authority to regulate commerce, and
therefore, no direct history exists as to the meaning of the word "commerce"); infra Part II.B.I
(discussing further the original intent of the Framers regarding congressional authority over
commerce).
99. See infra Parts II.B.2-4 (tracing the complex development of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence).
100. See infra Part H.B.4 (reviewing the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Lopez).
101. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, & II.
102. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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of the federal government belong to the states. 10 3 Among those powers
granted to Congress is the regulation of commerce. 104
Clause 3 of Section 8 specifically provides for Congress to regulate
three areas of commerce: that with foreign nations, that with Indian
tribes, and that among the several states. 10 5 According to Alexander
Hamilton, one of the primary purposes for this provision was to restrain
the "interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States," which
had proven, under the Articles of Confederation, to be "serious sources
of animosity and discord."' 1 6  The Framers hoped that the national
commerce power would help bring an end to such contentious
policies. 10 7 While the provisions for congressional regulation of
commerce with foreign nations and with Indian tribes have presented
few issues of scope since their drafting in 1787, the same is not true for
the provision regarding commerce among the several states.10 8
From the earliest days of this nation, questions have been raised as to
the breadth of the Constitution's grant of power over commerce among
103. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
104. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
105. See id.
106. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton). The Constitutional Convention was
convened in Philadelphia in 1787. Its purpose was to shore up the cracks in the Articles of
Confederation. See THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION FOR AND AGAINST: THE FEDERALIST AND
ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 3 (J. R. Pole ed., 1987) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
FOR AND AGAINST]. The government under the Articles, as a result of the anti-monarchical
feelings of the time, heavily favored state sovereignty, with a very minimal emphasis on central
government. See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 18 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). As a prime example,
the Articles of Confederation did not provide for an executive branch of government. See id. at
19. Any legislative action required the approval of at least nine of the thirteen state delegations,
while changes to the Articles themselves could only be made by a unanimous vote of all thirteen
state legislatures. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, arts. X & XIII. This structure, which
successfully sustained the Confederation during the Revolutionary War, began to result in
confusion following the War's end. See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra, at 20. Among the
various problems, states were squabbling over economic sanctions imposed on competing
products from other states and over tariffs charged by neighboring states. See id.; I ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 98, § 4.3, at 413. Additionally, some states were coining their own money,
maintaining their own navies, and, most startlingly, deciding whether the terms of the Treaty of
Paris, which formalized the end of the Revolutionary War, would be binding on them. See THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra, at 20. George Washington, the President of the Constitutional
Convention, described the government under the Articles as, "'a half-starved, limping
government, that appears to be always moving upon crutches, and tottering at every step."' Id.
(quoting WRITINGS, XXVII, 305-06 (J. L. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939)). Alexander Hamilton wrote that
the Articles had produced nothing but "'little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the
wretched nurseries of unceasing discord... .' Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
107. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 141 (13th
ed. 1997).
108. See I ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 98, § 4.1, at 399.
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the states. The key issue is determining the point at which the authority
of the states ends and the authority of the federal government begins. 10 9
This provision, however, was not debated during the Constitutional
Convention, and therefore, little exists from which to glean the precise
intent of the Framers regarding the commerce power. 110
Determining the precise nature of "commerce" has been a constant
theme throughout the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause opinions. 11
What constituted commerce in the late 1700s was much less complex
and sophisticated than that which constitutes commerce in the twentieth
century."12 Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause is not
limited to the nature and instrumentalities of commerce as they existed
in 1787.113 Rather, the power extends to all subjects and means of
commerce as they presently exist, whether or not they were anticipated
by the Framers in 1787.114
109. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 98, § 4.3, at 412-14.
110. See id. at 412. The doctrine of separation of powers is one of the integral components of
this nation's system of government. "Combining incompatible functions in one governmental
agency, or allowing one division to usurp powers expressly delegated to another is generally
deemed offensive to federal constitutional order... " 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law
§ 639 (1998). The Framers believed that although England's constitution did call for a separation
of powers, the executive, namely, the king, had gained too much power in the legislature. See
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION FOR AND AGAINST, supra note 106, at 13. Thus, all present at
the Constitutional Convention were aware of the need to safeguard against abuse of power. See
id. at 14. They accomplished this task in two ways: through the separation of powers among the
three branches of the federal government and by delegating certain powers to the federal
government while providing for all non-enumerated powers to be left to the state governments.
James Madison described this as a "compound republic," in which "different governments will
control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself." THE FEDERALIST NO.
51 (James Madison). This insight was echoed by Winston Churchill, almost 200 years later,
when he noted:
The men who founded the American Constitution embodied a separation of authority
in the strongest and most durable form. Not only did they divide executive, legislative
and judicial functions, but also by instituting a federal system, they preserved immense
and sovereign rights to local communities and by all these means they have preserved a
system of law and liberty under which they have thrived and reached the leadership of
the world.
Daniel M. Kolkey, The Constitutional Cycles of Federalism, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 495, 503 (1996).
The Framers saw this division between branches and between two governments as a means of
enhancing freedom. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). "In the tension between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty."
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991).
111. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 98, § 4.3, at 412.
112. But see discussion of Justice Thomas' concurrence in United States v. Lopez, infra note
243 (arguing for the Court to adopt a definition of commerce equivalent to that in 1787).
113. See 15A AM. JUR. 2D Commerce § 9 (1976).
114. See id.
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Some limitations do exist, however, on what may be regulated by
Congress. Congress lacks power to regulate anything that is not
"related to" commerce.115 This means that Congress is denied a general
police power to promote the health, safety, or welfare of the nation.116
The fact, however, that promotion of these purposes might result from
particular regulation does not make congressional action under the
Commerce Clause invalid. 117  In addition, Congress' regulation of
commerce cannot violate other provisions of the Constitution, such as
security against unreasonable searches and seizures,11 8 or deprivation of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 119
The Supreme Court's efforts to interpret the Framers' intent
regarding commerce among the several states began shortly after the
Constitution was ratified and continues to this day. The history of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is synonymous with the history of
federalism. 120 During this nation's 224-year existence, the focus of the
Supreme Court's Commerce Clause decisions has shifted approximately
every sixty-five years, varying its emphasis from that of states' rights to
that of a more centralized federal government. 121
2. Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: 1787 - 1937
The first century-and-a-half of Commerce Clause history is replete
with interpretive changes. 122 Although this period began with a very
broad interpretation of Congress' power under the Clause, it concluded
with the Clause providing a much more limited power. 123 During these
decades, the Court expanded and contracted the meaning of
115. See id. at § 10.
116. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 98, § 4.1, at 398.
117. See 15A AM. JUR. 2D Commerce § 10 (1976).
118. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ").
119. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law...."); 15A AM. JUR. 2D Commerce § 12 (1976).
120. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 98, § 4.1, at 398. Federalism is a term used to
describe the relationship between the federal government and the states. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 612 (6th ed. 1990).
121. See Kolkey, supra note 110, at 495. Justice Kennedy noted in his United States v. Lopez
concurrence, "[t]he progression of our Commerce Clause cases from Gibbons to the present was
not marked, however, by a coherent or consistent course of interpretation .... " 514 U.S. 549,
568 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
122. See infra Parts ll.B.2.a-b (reviewing the cyclical history of Supreme Court interpretation
of the Commerce Clause, applying alternating broad and narrow definitions of "commerce").
123. See infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing the Supreme Court's narrowing of Chief Justice
Marshall's initially broad definition of "commerce").
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"commerce" depending on the prevailing view as to the importance of
states' rights. 12
4
a. Broad Interpretation of "Commerce"
The history of Commerce Clause interpretation began in 1824 with
the landmark case of Gibbons v. Ogden.125  New York had granted
monopoly rights to operate steamboats on its waterways to the
partnership of Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton, which
transferred the monopoly to Aaron Ogden. 126  Shortly thereafter,
Thomas Gibbons began operating steamboats in violation of Ogden's
monopoly. 127  Gibbons' boats, however, were licensed under a federal
statute.128  The Supreme Court had to decide whether an injunction
granted by a New York state court was valid. 129 In finding the
injunction invalid, Chief Justice Marshall relied on the Supremacy
Clause, 130 holding that the federal statute under which Gibbons was
operating trumped the state-granted monopoly to Ogden. 13
1
In the course of his decision, Chief Justice Marshall announced an
extremely broad definition of commerce, declaring that commerce
included all "commercial intercourse." 132  He further stated that
congressional regulation of all commercial intercourse extended to
activities that occur within a state, provided the activity has some
commercial link to another state. 133 Strictly adhering to the language of
Article I, Section 8, Chief Justice Marshall did not go so far as to find
congressional authority over all commerce conducted within a state.
34
124. See infra Part 11.B.2.b (detailing the Supreme Court's efforts to distinguish between areas
subject to federal regulation and areas reserved for state control).
125. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553
(acknowledging Gibbons as the first case to define "commerce"); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253-54 (1964) (citing Gibbons as containing the first definition of
"commerce"). Chief Justice Marshall, who delivered the opinion of the Court, was a Federalist,
and therefore, supportive of a strong federal government. See Kolkey, supra note 110, at 496.
126. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1-2.
127. See id. at 2.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 2-3.
130. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... .
131. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 210-11.
132. See id. at 189-90.
133. See id. at 194-95.
134. See id. Chief Justice Marshall explained:
Comprehensive as the word 'among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that
commerce which concerns more States than one .... The enumeration presupposes
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However, in defining the limits of Congress' reach into the internal
commerce of a state, the Chief Justice created a very narrow category of
prohibited regulation.' 35 Chief Justice Marshall also did not accept the
argument that the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to the states those
powers not otherwise delegated to the federal government, acts as a
limit on the congressional commerce power. 136 Rather, Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion provided that the commerce power is plenary and
limited only by the language of the Constitution itself. 137  While the
Chief Justice established virtually no bounds to the commerce power,
this extremely broad interpretation was not destined to endure. 138
b. Gibbons' Broad Definition is Refined
In the years following Gibbons, the Court gradually shifted away
from Chief Justice Marshall's broad interpretation of the commerce
power. Relying more heavily on the language of the Tenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court began to interpret aspects of economic
activity as being either completely the domain of state law, or
completely the domain of federal law. 139  In order to preserve some
areas of business activity for state control, the Court began to require
that the object or practice being regulated have a direct effect on
commerce. 14° As a result, the Court distinguished between cases
involving questions of "manufacturing" and those involving questions
directly related to commerce. 141 The Court held that manufacturing, in
something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language or the subject
of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State.
Id. The designation of certain commerce as being internal to a state was seized upon by future
justices as a means of restricting federal regulation. See I ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 98,
§ 4.4, at 421.
135. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 98, § 4.4, at 416.
136. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 198-201; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
137. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196 ("This power, like all others vested in Congress,
is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations,
other than are prescribed in the constitution.").
138. The Court in Wickard v. Filburn described Chief Justice Marshall's definition of the
commerce power as having "a breadth never yet exceeded." 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
139. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 98, § 4.5, at 422.
140. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 569-70 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935) (stating that, in
evaluating the breadth of the commerce power as it relates to intrastate activities, there is a "well-
established distinction between direct and indirect effects").
141. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 98, § 4.6, at 424-25. The Court interpreted the
Tenth Amendment to reserve manufacturing to the states, while commerce was enumerated in
Article I, Section 8 as a congressional power. See id. at 426.
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any form, had only an indirect effect on commerce, and should,
therefore, be regulated by the states. 14 2 This was the first in a series of
formalistic notions developed by the Court to determine whether a
particular activity constituted "commerce." 14 3  Despite a brief lapse, 144
the "direct/indirect" distinction remained the decisive test throughout
the early 1900s of whether Congress could employ its commerce power.
At the same time that the Court was carefully distinguishing between
activities of production and activities of commerce, Congress passed
numerous laws to prevent the transportation of specific goods among
the several states. 145  This "policing" of the lines of commerce is
referred to as the "police power,"' 146 and it allowed Congress to regulate
intrastate activity indirectly. 147 Because use of the police power directly
regulated only interstate shipment of the undesirable objects, it was met
142. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding that mining is a form
of production, and therefore is not directly related to interstate commerce); United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (denying Congressional authority to regulate a sugar-refining
monopoly as it is related to manufacturing); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (finding state
statute prohibiting manufacture of liquor to be related to manufacturing, not commerce, and
therefore not within the regulatory reach of Congress). "Manufacturing" was interpreted as
anything that involved some means of production, such as drilling for oil, farming, fishing,
mining, etc., and was not limited to factory-based activities.
143. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 605 (Souter, J., dissenting).
144. There was a short period during which the Court shifted its emphasis to the size of the
effect on commerce created by a particular regulated activity. See The Shreveport Rate Case, 234
U.S. 342 (1914). The curious aspect of the Shreveport Rate Case, in light of the Court's
Commerce Clause mindset at the time, was that the regulation at issue set transportation rates for
shipping within the state of Texas, namely, completely intrastate commerce. Id. at 349-50.
However, the Court found that the setting of such rates had a "substantial economic effect" upon
interstate commerce, and thus deemed the rate setting as within Congress' commerce power. See
id. at 353-54.
145. See, e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (holding that the Mann Act, which
prohibited the transportation of women across state lines for immoral purposes, was
constitutional); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (holding that federal
seizure of adulterated eggs under the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 was appropriate); The
Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (holding that lotteries, in general, are "evil," and regulation of
the sale of lottery tickets across state lines is within the scope of Congress' authority).
146. The term "police power" is defined as:
An authority conferred by the American constitutional system in the Tenth
Amendment ... upon the individual states, and, in turn, delegated to local
governments, through which they are enabled to establish a special department of
police; adopt such laws and regulations as tend to prevent the commission of fraud and
crime, and secure generally the comfort, safety, morals, health, and prosperity of its
citizens by preserving the public order ....
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1156 (6th ed. 1990). Because the police power is used to regulate
the safety and health of local citizens, this term was adopted to refer to Congress' efforts to
regulate the safety and health of citizens nationally.
147. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 98, § 4.6, at 429.
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with broader approval by the Supreme Court than direct congressional
regulation of intrastate commerce. 1
48
However, while the Court was willing to extend the commerce power
to protect society from harm when it regulated interstate commerce, the
Court was not willing to allow these efforts at protection to encroach on
activities that should be regulated by the states, such as manufacturing.
Congressional attempts at legislation beyond indirect intrastate
regulation were not met with great success. 149 In Hammer v.
Dagenhart,150 the Supreme Court overturned a federal statute
prohibiting interstate transportation of items manufactured by
companies using illegal child labor. 151 Whereas the items prohibited
from transportation in Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States,152 Hoke v.
United States,153 and the Lottery Case1 54 were themselves part of the
undesirable conduct that Congress was attempting to inhibit, the goods
produced by the labor of children too young to be legally employed
were not, in and of themselves, undesirable. 155 In Dagenhart, the Court
held that it was the use of child labor that was wrong, not the goods
produced, and any evil that stemmed from child labor had already
occurred by the time the goods entered interstate commerce.
156
Dagenhart further maintained that illegal employment of children, as a
condition of manufacturing, was not directly related to interstate
commerce and, therefore, was not covered by the commerce power.
157
The Court feared that if it determined that illegal employment of
children was sufficiently related to interstate commerce to fall under
congressional authority, there would be no limit on Congress' control of
manufacturing. 158 However, the majority's argument in Dagenhart was
to be short-lived. In 1941, Dagenhart was overruled under the Court's
new attitude of judicial restraint. 159
148. See id.
149. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled in part by United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (holding that the Tenth Amendment limits congressional authority
to activities of commerce, and does not extend to activities of production).
150. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled in part by United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941).
151. See Dagenhart, 247 U.S. at 268, 276-77.
152. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
153. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
154. The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
155. See Dagenhart, 247 U.S. at 271-72.
156. Id. at 272; 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 98, § 4.6, at 430.
157. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. at 272; 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 98, § 4.6, at 430.
158. See Dagenhart, 247 U.S. at 276.
159. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941), rev'g in part Hammer v.
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3. Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: 1937 - 1995
The New Deal was a time of trial for the Supreme Court, 160 which led
to a significant change in the Court's Commerce Clause
interpretation. 161 The decades following the Great Depression reflect a
period in which the Court showed a great deal of deference to Congress
in its actions under the Commerce Clause. 162  This era of judicial
restraint lasted almost six decades, during which the Court refrained
from overturning a single act of Congress on Commerce Clause
grounds. 163 That era ended in 199 5 .'64
a. The Age of Judicial Restraint
This new era of judicial restraint was marked by the Supreme Court's
1937 decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.,165 which is considered a turning point in Commerce Clause
interpretation. 166  At issue was the constitutionality of the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 (the "NLRA"), which guaranteed all
employees the right to organize collectively and prohibited employer
interference with that right. 167  The NLRA also prohibited employers
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). For discussion, see infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's opinion in United States v. Darby).
160. In the early years of Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidency, the federal court system was
comprised predominantly of men who were stockowners and trustees. See WILLIAM
MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND THE DREAM 136 (1973). During the years from 1932 to 1937,
numerous aspects of the President's New Deal legislation were overturned by the Supreme Court.
See id. This infuriated FDR, who attempted to introduce legislation that would "pack the court,"
adding six new positions to the Supreme Court and ultimately diluting the anti-New Deal
majority. See id. at 15 1. The plan was defeated, but ultimately proved to be unnecessary. See id.
at 153. The Court began deferring to Congress in matters of economics, and one justice, Justice
Roberts, began to vote in favor of federal legislation. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 98,
§ 4.7, at 438-39. Also, over the next four years, FDR was able to appoint seven new justices to
the Court who favored deference to Congress. See id.
161. See infra Parts II.B.3.a-b (discussing examples of the Court's more expansive view of the
commerce power in the decades following the New Deal).
162. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 606 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting); GUNTHER
& SULLIVAN, supra note 107, at 141; infra Parts II.B.3.a-b (highlighting the Court's shift to the
"affects interstate commerce" test and the emphasis it placed on congressional determinations that
the regulated activity had such an effect).
163. See infra Parts II.B.3.a-b (illustrating the result of Supreme Court deference to
congressional determinations of effects on interstate commerce).
164. See infra Part II.B.4 (analyzing the Court's opinion in United States v. Lopez and the
resulting shift to a more restrictive interpretation of the Commerce Clause).
165. National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
166. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1767 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(asserting that National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. marked a distinct
change from the line of decisions that precipitated FDR's court-packing plan).
167. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 24.
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from refusing to bargain with a union chosen by its employees. 168  In
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court made a bold move by
abandoning the distinction between production and commerce,
returning to the broad definition of commerce espoused by Chief Justice
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden.169 As a result, industries that involved
manufacturing or production work, which had previously been deemed
outside the reach of the commerce power, now fell clearly within it.
The Court also modified the requisite link between regulated intrastate
activity and interstate commerce, rejecting the strict "direct/indirect"
relation test in favor of measuring whether the regulated activity had a
"substantial economic effect" upon interstate commerce.1 70
b. Expansion to Intrastate Activities
In decisions subsequent to Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court
clarified its new test for determining the validity of congressional
regulation of intrastate commerce. The Court emphasized that the size
of the effect on interstate commerce created by a regulated intrastate
activity was not a determining factor. 17 1  Rather, the important
requirement was that the regulated activity have some effect on
interstate commerce, be it relatively large or relatively small. 172
168. See id.
169. See id. at 40-41. The Court had once before repudiated the distinction between
manufacturing and commerce in 1911, declaring the approach to be "unsound." See United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 571 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Standard Oil Co. of
N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 68-69 (1911)). The Court again disavowed the manufacturing-
commerce distinction in 1942, with the explanation that "broader interpretations of the Commerce
Clause [were] destined to supersede the earlier ones." Id. at 573 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122 (1942)). This abandonment of the commerce-
production distinction reflected the Court's decision not to define the commerce power in terms
of the Tenth Amendment. See I ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 98, § 4.9, at 446.
170. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 606 (Souter, J., dissenting); 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note
98, § 4.9, at 446. The significance of the modifier "substantial" had been questionable in the
years following Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., and was directly addressed by Chief Justice
Rehnquist in United States v. Lopez. 514 U.S. at 559. This is one of what has been argued to be
multiple enhancements to Commerce Clause jurisprudence made by the Chief Justice through his
Lopez opinion. See infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice
Rehnquist's intimation of a new rule of law regarding congressional regulation of non-economic
intrastate activity).
171. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that a farmer's small
production of wheat for home consumption affected the price and demand for wheat nationally,
thus affecting interstate commerce); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942)
(holding that Congress had authority to regulate the price of milk sold intrastate because of the
effect on interstate commerce created by competition with this pricing).
172. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124 (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S.
110, 119 (1942)); GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 107, at 188. The case of Wickard v.
Filburn set forth the "cumulative effect" theory, whereby a single act may not be sufficient to
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Wickard v. Filburn173 represents possibly the most extreme example of
this doctrine. In Wickard, a farmer produced wheat in excess of the
quota allotted him and was assessed a penalty on the surplus. 174 The
farmer, Roscoe Filburn, protested that because the wheat he grew was
for his own personal consumption, it was outside the scope of the
Commerce Clause. 175  However, the Supreme Court determined that
this crop, even though not grown for interstate commerce, was within
congressional reach because it impacted the price and demand for wheat
in interstate markets. 176  Even though Filburn's personal crop
constituted a trivial amount of wheat in the scheme of the overall
market, the Court held that the "cumulative effect" of his actions, when
aggregated with those of other farmers doing the same thing, would
create a result that was far from trivial. 17
7
Through cases like Wickard, the Court opened the door for regulation
of purely local activities, provided they have an effect on commerce.
This doctrine was further illustrated in the 1964 cases of Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States178 and Katzenbach v. McClung.179
Both cases challenged the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.180 In passing the Civil Rights Act, Congress made findings that
people of all races had become increasingly mobile, traveling across
state lines for business and personal reasons. 181 The limited availability
of accommodations for African Americans (in the case of Heart of
Atlanta) and of restaurants that would serve them (in the case of
McClung) was found to have both a qualitative and quantitative effect
on the interstate travel of African Americans. 182 Clearly, the qualitative
effect was the impairment of an African American traveler's
convenience and pleasure during the trip. 183 The quantitative effect was
the discouragement of travel altogether created by these
inconveniences. 1"4 These combined effects on interstate commerce
have an effect on interstate commerce, but many such acts, when considered cumulatively, would
create the necessary effect. See 317 U.S. at 127-28.
173. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
174. Id. at 114-15.
175. Seeid. atll9.
176. See id. at 128.
177. See id. at 127-28.
178. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
179. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
180. See McClung, 379 U.S. at 298; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 243-44.
181. See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 252-53.
182. See McClung, 379 U.S. at 300; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 253.
183. See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 253.
184. See id.
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were found to be sufficient to enable Congress to regulate the conduct
of such purely local activities. 1
85
In addition to increasing Congress' reach into intrastate activities,
Heart of Atlanta articulated an expansion to the "affects interstate
commerce" test that is still valid today. 186  Known as the "rational
basis" test, it provides that courts will uphold federal legislation where
they can determine that Congress had a rational basis for finding that
the regulated activity affects interstate commerce. 187  Once this
determination is made, the courts will then evaluate if the means chosen
by Congress are reasonably adapted to the end it sought to
accomplish.18
8
In addition to the civil challenges embodied in Wickard and the 1964
cases, the Court also heard challenges to Congress' authority to enact
criminal laws under the commerce power. Relying on the "cumulative
effect" theory of Wickard, as well as the belief that some issues are
beyond the capacity of the states to regulate, the Court has upheld
aspects of federal criminal laws that prohibit entirely local activities. 189
In Perez v. United States,19 0 the Court reviewed the constitutionality of
Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, enacted by Congress to
combat extortionate credit practices.' 91 Applying the "affects interstate
commerce" test from Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court
determined that local loan sharking activities cannot be excised from
congressional regulation merely because they constitute a trivial
effect. 192 The Court concluded that local loan sharking not only altered
property ownership on a large scale, but was a tool of organized crime
that enabled those involved to finance their national operations. 193
Therefore, under the "cumulative effects" test, loan sharking was found
185. Seeid.at261.
186. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (acknowledging that the Court has
undertaken to determine whether there is a rational basis for finding that the regulated activity
affected interstate commerce since its decision in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.).
187. See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258.
188. See id. at 258-59.
189. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 147, 154 (1971) (holding that local loan
sharking activities could be reached by Congress through its commerce power).
190. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
191. See id. at 146-49.
192. See id. at 154 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968)) (asserting that if a
class of activities is within the realm of the federal commerce power, then the courts have no
authority to exclude from regulation what they perceive to be trivial examples of that class of
activities).
193. See id. at 155-57; 1 ROTuNDA & NOWAK, supra note 98, § 4.10, at 464.
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to have the necessary effect on interstate commerce.1 94 Furthermore,
Congress believed that the seriousness of the national problem
presented by organized crime was such that it could not be handled by
the states acting alone; the resources of the federal government were
needed to combat it. 195
c. Tenth Amendment Revisited
The Court also re-addressed the role of the Tenth Amendment in
regulation of intrastate activities. The Supreme Court explicitly
removed the Tenth Amendment as an independent limitation on the
breadth of the commerce power in United States v. Darby,196 an
interpretation that is still valid today. 197 Darby upheld the criminal
provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which made it a
crime to employ workers to produce goods for interstate commerce at
wages below those specified in the Act, or for hours beyond the
maximum provided by the Act.198 Whereas the Court in Dagenhart had
determined, under the Tenth Amendment, that terms of employment are
not directly related to interstate commerce, the Darby Court concluded
that Congress was entitled to choose the means by which to enforce its
regulation of interstate commerce, so long as those means do not violate
some other constitutional provision. 199 There would, however, be
another brief lapse in the Court's Tenth Amendment interpretation
before the holding of Darby was firmly established.
In 1976, the Supreme Court held that the Tenth Amendment
prohibited Congress from regulating minimum wages paid to state and
local employees through the Fair Labor Standards Act.200 In National
League of Cities v. Usery,20 1 the Court concluded that, although
minimum wages clearly affect commerce, their regulation by Congress
as applied to state and local employees impaired the states' autonomy to
194. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 157.
195. See id. at 150 (citing congressional debate by Senator Proxmire).
196. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), rev'g in part Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918).
197. Id. at 123-24. Despite the Court's 1976 shift away from this holding in National League
of Cities v. Usery, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority overruled National
League of Cities, thus restoring the Court's holding in Darby.
198. Id. at 125-26.
199. See id. at 114-15; supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
opinion in Hammer v. Dagenhart).
200. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
201. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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best determine how to allocate the funds they maintained for salaries. 20 2
The Court determined that the Tenth Amendment required states be left
alone to perform those functions not delegated to Congress.20 3 This left
open the question of how to precisely define a "state function." Justice
Blackmun's vote in favor of the majority echoed this question, as he
expressed concerns regarding "certain possible implications of the
Court's opinion."20 4 These concerns became important nine years later
when Justice Blackmun joined with the dissenters from National
League of Cities to explicitly overrule it in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority.20 5
The Garcia decision marked a return to the elimination of the Tenth
Amendment as a limitation on the commerce power. Under Garcia, the
Supreme Court concluded that congressional regulation of an activity
that would be within its purview if applied to a private citizen retains its
validity even where that activity is being performed by a state
government. 206  Therefore, where Congress passes a generally
applicable statute, the Tenth Amendment does not exempt a state's
actions from that regulation merely because the actor is a state.20 7 The
limits on this concept were clarified in New York v. United States,20 8
where the Court determined that congressional attempts to force a state
to adopt certain regulations, or to develop regulations in an area that the
state does not wish to regulate, are beyond the scope of the commerce
power. 209 Such attempts to force states to enact legislation that is not
part of a generally applicable statute impinges on the state's
sovereignty. 210
202. See id. at 846.
203. See id. at 842.
204. Id. at 856. In his majority opinion for Garcia, Justice Blackmun explicitly stated that this
distinction had been very difficult to identify in the years following National League of Cities.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 539 (1985), rev'g National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (providing that is had been "difficult, if not impossible, to
identify an organizing principle" to distinguish between functions that were "traditional[ly]
governmental functions" and those that were not).
205. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), rev'g National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). It is interesting to note that the same statute that was at
issue in National League of Cities was also at issue in Garcia, namely, the Fair Labor Standards
Act. Id. at 530; National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 836-37.
206. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47.
207. See id. A "generally applicable statute" may be defined as "a statute relating to the
whole community, or concerning all persons generally." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (6th
ed. 1990).
208. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
209. See id. at 178.
210. See id. at 177-78, 187-88.
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Today, the Court gives deference to Congress' determination that it
has authority to enact particular legislation under the Commerce
Clause. 211 Still applying the "rational basis" test from Heart of Atlanta,
the Court will only make two inquiries: whether there is a rational basis
to support Congress' finding that the regulated activity affects interstate
commerce, and whether "the means chosen by [Congress are]
reasonably adapted to the end" sought to be achieved.212 Despite this
test, the last addition to the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, United States v. Lopez, demonstrated a shift back toward
the more restrictive interpretation of the decades preceding Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.
4. The Return to Federalism: United States v. Lopez
With United States v. Lopez, the pendulum of interpretation began to
swing back in favor of states' rights. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored
the majority opinion in this five-to-four decision. 213  At issue was
whether a 1990 federal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act
("GFSZA"), was a constitutionally sound exercise of congressional
authority. 214  Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that, despite the
breadth of the definition given to "commerce" by Chief Justice Marshall
in Gibbons, there is an inherent limitation on the commerce power.215
Despite this early emphasis on limitations, however, the Lopez Court
upheld its prior position that legislation brought under the commerce
power should be reviewed using a "rational basis" approach.216
211. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981) (discussing the judicial role in Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
212. Id. (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,258 (1964)).
213. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). Chief Justice Rehnquist was
joined in his opinion by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. See id. at 550. Both
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion and the two concurring opinions, authored
respectively by Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas, contain excellent reviews of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence from Gibbons v. Ogden to the present day. See id. at 551, 568 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring), 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
214. See id. at 552. The GFSZA provided that anyone caught carrying a firearm within a
distance of 1000 feet from any public, private, or parochial school was guilty of a federal offense.
See id. at 551 & n.1.
215. See id. at 553; see also supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing inherent
limitation language in Gibbons v. Ogden relied on by both the majority and the concurrence in
Lopez).
216. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557. Under this form of analysis, Congress' legislative judgment
is given deference, provided that its legislative judgment was rational. See Biden Brief, supra
note 19, at 12 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 563, 568); see also supra Part II.B.3.b (discussing
the rational basis test from Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States).
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Before beginning his analysis of the GFSZA under the "rational
basis" test, the Chief Justice acknowledged that the case law following
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. had been unclear as to whether the
Commerce Clause required the activity being regulated to "substantially
affect" or merely "affect" interstate commerce. 217  In an explicit
commentary on Commerce Clause interpretation, he concluded that the
correct test was that of a "substantial effect.- 218
To determine if the activity being regulated by the GFSZA
substantially affected interstate commerce, the Chief Justice divided his
analysis into four areas: regulation of intrastate activities; jurisdictional
elements; congressional findings; and practical implications of
sustaining the Act. With regard to regulation of intrastate activities, the
Chief Justice pointed out that in previous cases upholding congressional
regulation of purely intrastate activity, the regulated activity was
economic in nature. 219  However, Chief Justice Rehnquist also quoted
217. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
218. See id. As a result, the broad test from Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. may be referred to
as the "substantially affects" test.
219. See id. at 559-60. The Chief Justice specifically made reference to Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146 (1971), Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). See id. Some have
viewed this section of the Chief Justice's opinion as stating a new rule of Commerce Clause
interpretation. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 833 (4th
Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Brzonkala III], aff'd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740
(2000) (stating that the reach of the commerce power strictly to intrastate activity that is economic
in nature is the "law of the land"). But see dissenting opinions of Justices Souter and Breyer,
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 603, 615. Justice Souter expressed his conviction that the majority's opinion
was a "misstep" and "not quite in gear with the prevailing standard." See id. at 614-15 (Souter,
J., dissenting). Acknowledging the lessons of history regarding Commerce Clause interpretation,
Justice Souter accused the majority of taking a backward glance at interpretive standards in place
during the years preceding Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. See id. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting).
He opined that, in doing so, the majority had created a ripple in the rational basis test, implying
an unequal application of that test depending on whether the regulated activity has an economic
or non-economic nature. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter did not express much
hope for the future of Commerce Clause jurisprudence under a resurrected categorization scheme.
See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). The Court has stated, in North American Co. v. Securities &
Exchange Commission, that Congress must be permitted "to act in terms of economic ...
realities," and that the determination of what constitutes commerce is a practical matter, not to be
determined by technical legal conceptions. 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946) (citing Swift & Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905)). Additionally, in his dissent, Justice Breyer addressed
this point by referencing the language of the Commerce Clause itself, which provides for
regulation of commerce among the several states. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). He maintained that this grant of power
includes the power to regulate intrastate activities so long as those activities significantly affect
interstate commerce. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Echoing the arguments of Justice Souter,
Justice Breyer criticized the majority's attempt to create a distinction between commercial and
non-commercial intrastate activity. See id. at 627 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Such a distinction
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language from Wickard v. Filburn, which provides that even where a
regulated intrastate activity is not economic in nature, it may still be
reached by the commerce power if it bears a substantial effect upon
interstate commerce. 220  Because the GFSZA was a criminal statute,
Chief Justice Rehnquist failed to see any effect it had on commerce, no
matter how broad a definition one used.22'
The Chief Justice next reviewed the GFSZA for a jurisdictional
element, which would allow a case-by-case analysis of whether the
particular firearm possession affects interstate commerce. 222  Chief
Justice Rehnquist indicated that such a limitation on the reach of the
GFSZA might have been sufficient to save it under the "substantially
affects" test.223 The Chief Justice then pointed to a lack of legislative
findings regarding the effect of firearm possession on interstate
commerce. 224  Such data, although not required of Congress, 225 can be
conflicts with the language of Wickard cited by the Chief Justice, as well as other passages. See
id. at 627-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer quoted Wickard's warning to the Court not
to review congressional action on the basis of "'formula[s]"' that would give "'controlling force
to nomenclature such as 'production' and 'indirect' and foreclose consideration of the actual
effects of the activity in question upon interstate commerce."' See id. (quoting Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942)). Justice Breyer also criticized the Chief Justice's
classification of McClung, Perez, and Wickard as cases involving intrastate economic activity,
because the Court did not focus on the economic nature of the regulated activity (or lack thereof)
in any of these cases. See id. at 628 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Instead, each focused on the
distinction between interstate and foreign commerce. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Most
importantly, Justice Breyer pointed out that the state of Commerce Clause jurisprudence had
remained stable for almost sixty years. See id. at 630 (Breyer, J., dissenting). During that time,
Congress had enacted countless statutes, many with jurisdictional provisions containing the
language "affecting commerce." See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Chief Justice's opinion in
Lopez created confusion over whether the meaning of that language in the statutes is now altered
to regulate only commercial activity, and not non-commercial activity. See id. (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Additionally, Justice Breyer questioned whether the majority's opinion meant that
the cumulative effect doctrine applied in Wickard is no longer applicable where there is no
jurisdictional element. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Such confusion could have far-reaching
implications.
220. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)).
"[Elven if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may
still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce .... " Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
221. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 562 (stating that such a jurisdictional limitation might narrow the field of
firearm possessions to those that have an explicit effect on interstate commerce).
224. See id. at 562-63. Congress had amassed data on firearm possession in school zones for
other purposes, but Chief Justice Rehnquist held that those previous findings were insufficient to
support the claims made by the United States in favor of the GFSZA. See id.
225. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971) (clarifying that Congress need not
make particularized findings to successfully legislate); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
304 (1964) (stating that the absence of congressional findings is not fatal to a statute's validity).
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useful to the Court in evaluating Congress' judgment about the effect of
the activity on interstate commerce. 226 Finally, concerning the practical
implications of sustaining the GFSZA, Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that such validation by the Court would remove all limits on
Congress' ability to regulate any actions of an individual. 227 Ultimately,
226. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. Just as legislative history can be used to infer congressional
intent, legislative findings can be used to infer Congress' justification for passing the legislation
in question. But see dissenting opinions of Justices Souter and Breyer, id. at 603, 615. Justice
Souter stated that any congressional findings, unless they did more than merely enumerate the
effect on interstate commerce that is implicit in the language of the GFSZA itself, would add
nothing to the record. See id. at 612 & n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting). He concluded that the
majority had expressed an interest in such findings because it needed assistance in performing a
difficult task: determining whether gun possession in school zones substantially affects interstate
commerce. See id. at 612 (Souter, J., dissenting). He conceded that the facts of the Lopez case
were such that the effect on interstate commerce was not readily apparent. See id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting). The role of Congress, according to Justice Souter, is not to correctly determine
whether the legislation it is enacting does, indeed, substantially affect interstate commerce but
merely to exercise reasonable judgment in so finding. See id. at 613 (Souter, J., dissenting). This
differs from the results yielded by congressional findings, which only show what Congress did
find, not what it rationally could find. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). In short, Justice Souter
opined that congressional findings can be helpful in a certain context, but should not be used to
replace, in any way, the rational basis test established in Heart of Atlanta:
[H]elp is welcome, and it not incidentally shrinks the risk that judicial research will
miss material scattered across the public domain or buried under pounds of legislative
record. Congressional findings on a more particular plane than this record illustrates
would accordingly have earned judicial thanks. But thanks do not carry the day as long
as rational possibility is the touchstone ....
Id. at 614 (Souter, J., dissenting). Reviewing the results of numerous studies and reports
available in the public sector, Justice Breyer, in his dissent, concluded that Congress could have
rationally found that the presence of guns in schools is not only widespread, but also has a
significantly negative impact on education. See id. at 619-20 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Education
and the national economy are historically joined; where there has been a widespread increase in
education, there has been a correlative increase in economic growth. See id. at 620 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Justice Breyer also cited statistics that show companies today are making decisions
as to where to locate their offices based on the availability of workers with basic education. See
id. at 622 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As a result of this inextricable link between education and
commerce, coupled with Commerce Clause precedent, Justice Breyer found that gun possession
in school yards bore the requisite effect on interstate commerce. See id. at 622-23 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
227. See id. at 564. The United States claimed that firearm possession within a school zone
has the potential of resulting in violent crime; violent crime, in turn, affects interstate commerce
in two ways. See id. at 563. First, violent crime creates substantial costs, which are spread
through the national economy via insurance claims and payments. See id. at 563-64. Second, the
threat of violent crime acts as a deterrent to travel. See id. at 564. The Government further
argued that firearm possession within a school zone poses a threat to the national educational
process, causing students to receive a lower level of education, ultimately weakening the national
economy. See id. In response to what he termed the Government's "costs of crime" reasoning,
Chief Justice Rehnquist first argued that such an attenuated tie to interstate commerce would
enable Congress to regulate all crime, not just that related to firearm possession within a school
zone. See id. He similarly dismissed the Government's "national productivity" argument, as he
found it to have the potential for granting Congress authority to regulate any area of national
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the Chief Justice was unable to find a nexus between the GFSZA and
interstate commerce, short of "pil[ing] inference upon inference." 228
Justice Kennedy's concurrence demonstrated his lack of complete
commitment to the Chief Justice's position. 229 Justice Kennedy began
his concurrence with an expression of concern that the Court exercise
"great restraint" before invalidating any act of Congress on the basis of
the Commerce Clause. 230  Noting the difficulty in translating the extent
of the commerce power from the economic world known to the Framers
to the modern, global economy of the twentieth century, Justice
Kennedy acknowledged that Commerce Clause jurisprudence
productivity, including child custody, divorce, and marriage. See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist
also argued that allowing Congress to regulate activities having an adverse effect on the
educational environment would lead to congressional authority to regulate education in general.
See id. at 565. But see dissenting opinions of Justices Souter and Breyer, id. at 603, 615. Justice
Souter interpreted the majority's arguments against the GFSZA as being either that the
relationship between commerce and those areas of traditional state concern impacted by the Act,
namely education and criminal law, is remote, or that congressional commerce power is
weakened when it impacts an area of traditional state concern. See id. at 609 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). He flatly renounced both arguments, observing that the latter had already been
explicitly rejected in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., where the
Court reaffirmed the plenary nature of the commerce power. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting)
(citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549-50 (1985); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824)).
Justice Breyer addressed the Chief Justice's suggestion that finding the GFSZA constitutional
would open the door for congressional regulation of education, family law, or any activity that
Congress determined had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See id. at 624 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). He believed that situations are few and far between in which the activity to be
regulated, on its face, has very little to do with commerce, but, when aggregated, has a significant
effect on commerce. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 567. But see dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer, id. at 615. In his dissent, Justice
Breyer pointed to several inconsistencies with prior case law created by the majority's decision.
See id. at 625 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He first contrasted the majority's decision to invalidate the
GFSZA with its decision to uphold regulation of loan sharking activities in Perez v. United
States. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer maintained that in Perez, the Court was
concerned about the cumulative impact caused by violence inherent in the use of loan sharks to
collect unpaid debts. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). This concern is analogous to the concern
that he believed the Court should have over the cumulative effect on education, and thus, on the
national economy, created by the threat of force inherent in guns in schools. See id. at 625-26
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also compared the facts of Lopez to those of Katzenbach
v. McClung, finding that in McClung, the Court concluded that discrimination caused both serious
social and economic harm on a national scale. See id. at 626 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice
Breyer called on the majority to give Congress the same degree of deference in Lopez as it had in
Wickard. See id. at 627 (Breyer, J., dissenting). It was that deference that allowed the Court to
see that homegrown wheat not only satisfied a demand which might otherwise be satisfied
through purchases on the open market, but also might find its way into the open market,
negatively impacting the price of wheat. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
229. Justice Kennedy was joined in his concurrence by Justice O'Connor. See id. at 568.
230. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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throughout that time had been anything but consistent.231 He referenced
the duty that the principle of stare decisis232 places on the Court to
continue in the direction plotted by all previous Commerce Clause
decisions and, specifically, not to redefine what constitutes
"commerce." 233 Justice Kennedy advocated the application of case-by-
case analysis under the Commerce Clause and condemned bright-line
rules as being too inflexible. 234
Justice Kennedy also addressed the Court's authority and
responsibility to review acts of Congress that threaten to upset the
balance between state and federal powers. 235  He maintained that this
responsibility is not as clearly established as the Court's authority to
preserve the separation of powers or the Court's power of judicial
review. 236  Referencing discussion of federalism in the Federalist
Papers, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the separation between state
and federal government can be maintained by the elective process,
which would clearly not include the federal judiciary.2 37  However,
finding that no specific procedures exist whereby the two elected
branches of government can be mandated to take the action necessary to
preserve this balance, Justice Kennedy concluded that judicial review is
essential to preserve the requisite separation. 238
231. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
232. This is a legal doctrine that "when court has once laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases,
where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the
same." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990).
233. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In saying this, Justice Kennedy
clearly disagreed with the position of Justice Thomas, whose concurrence argued for a return to a
1787 definition of "commerce." See infra note 243 (discussing Justice Thomas' concurrence in
Lopez).
234. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 573 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (acknowledging the Court's
"definitive commitment" to a "practical conception" of the Commerce Clause); see also id. at 574
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (decrying "content-based boundaries" without additional factual
analysis as an imprecise means of defining Commerce Clause limitations).
235. See id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
236. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
237. See id. at 576-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring). "[T]he people ought not surely to be
precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due." THE
FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison).
238. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated:
Although it is the obligation of all officers of the Government to respect the
constitutional design.., the federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional
structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to
intervene when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Calling on the Court's authority to preserve the federal balance,
Justice Kennedy declared that balance to be negatively impacted by the
GFSZA.239 Justice Kennedy saw the authority to deter gun possession
in school zones as clearly belonging to the states. 240 He further
concluded that the states are the best bodies to experiment with such
legislation, where the process of trial and error can be used to mold the
most effective means of deterrence.241 To Justice Kennedy, the GFSZA
supplanted state regulations already in place and prohibited states
without such legislation from enacting their own such laws.2 42  For
these reasons, he concurred with the majority's conclusion. 243
C. Preserving Equal Protection of the Laws
In addition to the Commerce Clause, Congress found support for its
authority to enact the VAWA under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Enforcement Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment was drafted in the
aftermath of the Civil War.2' The political influence in Congress was
239. See id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
240. See id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
241. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
242. See id. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
243. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). The most extreme position expressed in Lopez was
that of Justice Thomas' concurring opinion. See id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice
Thomas began his concurrence with a plea that the Court, at some future time, revisit its
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, claiming that the Court had "drifted far from the original
understanding of the Commerce Clause." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas reviewed
the historical definitions of "commerce" to support his position that the case law of the late 1800s
and early 1900s, which separated commercial activities from those of manufacturing and
production, was more in keeping with the original intent of the Clause. See id. at 586 (Thomas,
J., concurring). Justice Thomas stated, "[a]s one would expect, the term 'commerce' was used in
contradistinction to productive activities such as manufacturing and agriculture." Id. (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Thomas contended that this distinction pervaded the ratification process,
being used by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers, and again during various state
ratification conventions. See id. at 586-87 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas explained
that applying the term "commerce" in Article I, Section 8 to activities considered to be commerce
under a modem-day definition, rather than limiting the application to those activities that
constituted commerce in 1787, created textual and structural problems in applying the Clause.
See id. at 587 (Thomas, J., concurring). He further contended that the "original" meaning of
commerce does not support the "substantially affects" test developed in Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring). He argued that, if the Framers had wanted Congress to
have authority over any thing or activity that had a substantial effect on commerce, they could
have written such language into the Commerce Clause prior to the Constitution's ratification. See
id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas stood alone in his concurring opinion. See id. at
584 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's concurrence may be read as an indication of the
belief that likely prevented the other justices from signing on to Justice Thomas's opinion. See
supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Kennedy's emphasis on the
limitations that the doctrine of stare decisis places on the Court's actions).
244. See infra Part II.C. 1 (tracing the historical development of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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heavily weighted in favor of former abolitionists, who saw the southern
states' post-war treatment of newly freed slaves as a problem requiring
national attention.245  Congress responded to this problem with three
constitutional amendments.246  Following its ratification, questions
began to arise regarding the breadth of the Fourteenth Amendment's
reach.247 As with the Commerce Clause, the question of breadth has
continued to generate Fourteenth Amendment litigation to this day. 248
1. Social Reform in the Wake of the Civil War
The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, but not without
some difficulty.249 It was one of three Civil War amendments enacted
following the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863.250 The purposes of
these Amendments reflect the political landscape after the Civil War.251
In the years following ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, it
became clear that its prohibitions needed reinforcement. 252 During the
congressional hearings on the Fourteenth Amendment, testimony
revealed that newly freed slaves, as well as white persons, who
advocated unpopular views in the South, were continuing to experience
abuse by private individuals. 253  In 1865, Congress was controlled by
the Republican party, which had two primary objectives: securing civil
rights for all persons, including the newly freed slaves, and retaining its
congressional majority. 254  There was widespread concern that those
245. See infra Part II.C.1 (examining the nation's political climate at the time of the
Fourteenth Amendment's enactment).
246. See infra Part Il.C. 1 (describing the focus of each of the three Civil War Amendments).
247. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and the various
positions taken by the Supreme Court since the Amendment's enactment).
248. See infra Part II.C.2 (describing the current debate as to the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
249. See 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.7, at 312 (3d ed. 1999). The difficulty involved in the
ratification process is discussed, infra, notes 259-71 and accompanying text.
250. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 107, at 420. The three Civil War Amendments
consist of the Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing slavery, the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring
due process and equal protection for all citizens, and the Fifteenth Amendment, ensuring the right
to vote for all (male) citizens. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, and XV.
251. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 249, § 18.7, at 302. Justice Miller reported, in
his majority opinion from the Slaughter-House Cases, that the Civil War Amendments have "one
pervading purpose... we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment
of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions
of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him." 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872).
252. See RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN, AMENDING AMERICA 103 (1993).
253. See 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 19.2, at 4 (3d ed. 1999).
254. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 249, § 18.7, at 307. The return of the southern
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who had advocated the secession of the southern states would soon have
power in Congress equal to those who had labored to keep the Union
whole. 255  The nation's interest in issues of state sovereignty was at a
low point.-56  The Republican majority believed that the only way to
protect its reconstruction plans from presidential vetoes or
congressional repeals was to immortalize them in a constitutional
amendment. 257  Some theorize that the intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment drafters was not merely to establish a broad spectrum of
civil rights for all persons, but to grant Congress equally broad authority
to protect those rights and expand them, if necessary. 258 The job of
drafting an amendment that would accomplish these dual purposes was
not an easy one.
Drafting constitutional amendments that would be accepted by both
Democrats and Republicans, particularly in a post-civil war atmosphere,
required a great deal of compromise. 259  In addition to basic political
differences between the parties, the drafters had to address the strong
public opinion, particularly in the North, that post-war life should return
to normal as quickly as possible. 26° An initial draft, known as the
Bingham Amendment, was presented by Representative John Bingham
to the House of Representatives in February of 1866.261 This draft
amendment granted Congress the authority to enact any law necessary
to ensure equal protection and access to the full spectrum of privileges
states to the Union, and thus, to Congress, opened a large number of Senate and House seats for
which the Democrats were hungry to vie against the Republican majority. See BERNSTEIN, supra
note 252, at 104.
255. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 252, at 105. Because representation in Congress was based
on population, and those who, before the War, had been counted as three-fifths of a person per
Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution, were now to be counted as a whole person, southern states
would have increased representation over their pre-War status. See JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE
FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 156 (1956).
256. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 249, § 18.7, at 311.
257. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 252, at 105.
258. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 249, § 18.7, at 307. Other sources break these
intentions into four goals: 1) to guarantee each person a set of civil rights that could not be
defeated by state action; 2) to advance the legal status of former slaves; 3) to secure broad
enforcement powers for Congress over the provisions of the Amendment; and 4) to establish the
federal government as the authority over civil rights issues. See id. at 309-11.
259. See id. at 307-08. It has been said that proponents of the Amendment faced a tripartite
challenge: 1) preventing conservative and moderate supporters from withdrawing their support; 2)
managing not to alienate progressive and radical supporters; and 3) disproving the most extreme
criticisms of the Amendment's opponents. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 252, at 107-08.
260. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 249, § 18.7, at 308.
261. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997); Brzonkala I1, 169 F.3d 820, 864
(4th Cir. 1999), afd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
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and immunities for all citizens. 262 The draft was not warmly received,
provoking three days of debate. 263 The criticism was directed at the
disproportionate power granted to Congress, which could potentially
eliminate the need for state legislatures. 264 A new draft was prepared,
which was presented to the House of Representatives on April 30,
1866.265 This revision provided Congress with remedial, rather than
plenary, powers, limiting the breadth of congressional authority to the
protection of each citizen's access to privileges and immunities against
denial by the states. 266 Thus, through the revised draft, the necessary
compromise was reached.
The revised draft was approved by Congress on June 13, 1866.267
The Fourteenth Amendment, however, still had not been ratified by the
requisite three-fourths of the states in 1868.268 At this time, the states
that had seceded from the Union were not represented in Congress.269
A House committee concluded that those states must provide "adequate
security for future peace and safety" before being readmitted to the
Union.270  Congress ultimately resorted to extreme measures, making
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment a condition for each former
Confederate state's renewed representation in Congress.
271
As ratified, the Amendment consists of five sections. Section 1
contains the grant of three significant rights: to enjoyment of the
privileges and immunities due each citizen of the United States, to due
process, and to equal protection of the laws. 272 Section 5, also known as
the Enforcement Clause, grants Congress the authority to create
262. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. The text of the Bingham Amendment is as follows:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of
life, liberty, and property.
Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866)).
263. See id. at 520.
264. See id. at 520-21.
265. See id. at 522.
266. See id.
267. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 252, at 108.
268. See id. at 109.
269. See JAMES, supra note 255, at 156.
270. Id.
271. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 252, at 109.
272. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 249,
§ 18.7, at 303.
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legislation appropriate for protecting the rights contained in the
Amendment.273 These two sections are the most widely litigated, with
Section 1 being central to most civil rights litigation.274 Only one of the
Civil War Amendments, the Thirteenth, provides for congressional
regulation of private conduct.275 In contrast, state action is the key to
the Fourteenth Amendment.276 This distinction has raised a number of
questions concerning the precise scope of the Amendment.
2. The Development of Fourteenth Amendment Interpretation
Questions concerning interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Enforcement Clause often focus on whether the Clause encompasses a
broader range of activities than that explicitly referenced in Section 1.
Whereas Section 1 explicitly limits the reach of Fourteenth Amendment
legislation to state actions, the Enforcement Clause suggests that
Congress may regulate beyond this limitation, provided the legislation
is appropriate to ensure that the rights enumerated in the Amendment
are not abridged.277 Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has
substantiated this interpretation.
One of the earliest Supreme Court analyses of the Fourteenth
Amendment occurred in the Civil Rights Cases,278 where the Court
adopted a very narrow view of the Enforcement Clause. 279  The Civil
Rights Cases dealt with the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of
1875, which created a right of equal access to public buildings, places
of accommodation, and theaters. 280 Because the Civil Rights Act
clearly encompassed private action, as well as state action, its
273. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
274. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 249, § 18.7, at 303.
275. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude... shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."). Cf. U.S. CONST. amends.
XIV and XV ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws," and "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude.").
276. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 282 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
277. See 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 253, § 19.5, at 16 (quoting Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966)).
278. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
279. See id. at 11.
280. See id. at 9.
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constitutionality was challenged.281 The Court held that Section 5 "does
not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the
regulation of private rights," and therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment
is limited to the regulation of purely state actions.282  The narrow
holding of the Civil Rights Cases has been widely criticized in the
century since its publication.
Almost a century after the Civil Rights Cases were decided, six
justices openly challenged their validity in United States v. Guest283 and
opined that the Fourteenth Amendment could, indeed, be used to
regulate private conduct. 284 Their opinions, however, did not go so far
as to grant Congress unlimited authority. 285 The precedential value of
these six opinions in Guest is questionable, as three justices joined in
one concurrence and three joined in another, neither constituting a
majority opinion. 286  Guest concerned the validity of an indictment
brought under an 1870 federal statute that prohibited two or more
people from intentionally hindering another individual's free exercise of
any existing right or privilege.287 The case was brought on charges that
state actors and private individuals had conspired to prevent African
Americans from exercising their right to utilize the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce. 288  The majority opinion in Guest, authored by
Justice Stewart, cracked open the door to congressional regulation of
private conduct by holding that the regulation of conspiracies to inhibit
the exercise of constitutional rights is within Congress' authority. 289
Justice Stewart further declared that the states need not be exclusively
or directly involved in activity that is regulated by Congress. 290
281. See id. The text of the Civil Rights Act provided, in part, "[t]hat any person who shall
violate the foregoing section by denying to any citizen ... the full enjoyment of any of the
accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges in said section ... shall for every such
offen[s]e forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved thereby ... 
Id.
282. Id. at 11.
283. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
284. See id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring), 782 (Brennan, J., concurring); infra notes 292-97
and accompanying text (discussing the content of Justices Clark and Brennan's opinions).
285. See Guest, 383 U.S. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring), 782 (Brennan, J., concurring).
286. Additionally, support for the expansion of Enforcement Clause authority to purely
private conduct can be found in the majority opinion of District of Columbia v. Carter. 409 U.S.
418, 424 n.8 (1973) ("This is not to say, of course, that Congress may not proscribe purely private
conduct under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."). However, this support appears in a footnote
to the opinion, which, again, makes its precedential value questionable.
287. See Guest, 383 U.S. at 746-47; 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 253, § 19.2, at 5.
288. See Guest, 383 U.S. at 747.
289. See id. at 760.
290. See id. at 755.
20001
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
However, the Court stopped short of extending Fourteenth Amendment
authority carte blanche over private conduct.291
Where the majority opinion left off, the concurring opinions began.
Justice Clark's concurrence recognized congressional authority to create
legislation to combat all forms of conspiracy against individuals'
Fourteenth Amendment rights, regardless of whether a state or state
actor was a member of that conspiracy. 292  In his partial
concurrence/partial dissent, Justice Brennan explicitly stated that
Congress' authority under the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to
conspiracies involving state action.293  Justice Brennan further
maintained that the correct interpretation of the Enforcement Clause is
grounded in a "rational basis" inquiry.294 The nature of this inquiry can
be found in Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation of the Necessary and
Proper Clause295 in M'Culloch v. Maryland.296 The Chief Justice
described the correct application of the Necessary and Proper Clause as
follows: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. 2 97 Thus, both Justices
Clark and Brennan would have extended the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment to purely private conduct. Despite the limited impact of
291. See id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring), 782 (Brennan, J., concurring).
292. See id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring). Justice Clark was joined in his concurrence by
Justices Black and Fortas.
293. See id. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan was joined in his concurrence
by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas. Justice Brennan explained that to the drafters,
Congress, not the courts, was the appropriate body to create the necessary legislation to guarantee
the equality espoused by the Amendment. He argued that this view suggested the primary
purpose of the Amendment was to enhance the powers of Congress, not the judiciary. See id. at
783 n.7 (citing JAMES, supra note 255, at 184).
294. See id. at 783-84 (Brennan, J., concurring). The position affirmed by Justice Brennan
had been previously articulated by the Court in Ex Parte Virginia:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions
they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil
rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not
prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.
100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879).
295. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("[The Congress shall have Power] ... [t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.").
296. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see Guest, 383 U.S. at 783-84;
Brief of United States, supra note 28, at 43 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650
(1966)).
297. M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
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these two concurring opinions on future Fourteenth Amendment cases,
Justice Brennan's reliance on M'Culloch was echoed in other majority
opinions.
Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause became part of the majority's holding in the 1966 case of
Katzenbach v. Morgan.298  Morgan involved the constitutionality of a
particular section of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.29 In that case, the
Court first concluded that the Enforcement Clause granted Congress the
same broad regulatory authority as did the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 300  The Court then analyzed the questionable section of the
Voting Rights Act under a "rational basis" theory.3 10 Ultimately finding
that Congress had reasonably determined the New York statute to be
discriminatory, the Court deferred to Congress' judgment.30 2 Through
Morgan, the Court affirmed Congress' power under the Enforcement
Clause to enact prophylactic legislation for the purpose of preventing
Fourteenth Amendment violations. 30 3 This power was also affirmed in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach,3° which upheld other portions of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court expanded its holding in
Morgan regarding prophylactic legislation. In City of Boerne v.
Flores,305 the Court acknowledged Congress' authority under the
Enforcement Clause as one of "wide latitude." 3°6 The Court reaffirmed
that congressional legislation in furtherance of the Fourteenth
Amendment need not prohibit only that conduct which itself is
unconstitutional. 30 7 However, the Court also spoke to the limits on
congressional regulation of private conduct.30 8 Although prophylactic
298. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); see 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note
253, § 19.2, at 7 (discussing the Court's decision to construe the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as granting Congress the same breadth of authority expressed by the
Necessary and Proper Clause).
299. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 643. The section at issue, section 4(e), prohibited the denial of
voting rights to citizens who had attended Puerto Rican schools where instruction was not in
English, and therefore could not read or write English. See 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note
253, § 19.2, at 6.
300. See 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 253, § 19.2, at 7.
301. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651; 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 253, § 19.2, at 7.
302. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 657-58; 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 253, § 19.2, at 7.
303. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650-51.
304. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325-27 (1966) (asserting Congress' right to
use legislative power to stop discrimination in voting).
305. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
306. See id. at 519-20.
307. See id. at 518.
308. See id. at 524-25.
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legislation may be enacted to prevent violation of Fourteenth
Amendment rights, the Court declared that the means used must be
congruent and proportional with the ends to be achieved.30 9 Ultimately,
City of Boerne represents the Court's most recent opinion upholding the
breadth limitations of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.31°
Despite the breadth limitations of Section 1, the decisions in Guest
and Morgan have expanded the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment to
private conduct that constitutes state action. Where the deprivation of a
Fourteenth Amendment right was caused by a private individual, the
Court has developed various parameters to determine if there is a
sufficient nexus with state action to conclude that the deprivation falls
within Congress' authority.311 Deciding if the individual committing
the conduct is a state actor depends on whether he is performing a
traditional state function, as well as the degree to which he is reliant on
state assistance. 312  If, for example, the state has encouraged the
discriminatory conduct of a particular individual, he will be considered
a state actor. 313 The Court, itself, has admitted that the determination of
whether certain conduct is private, or constitutes state action, is not an
easy one. 3 14 No precise formula exists for making this determination,
and a conclusion can only be reached by weighing the facts on a case-
by-case basis. 315
309. See id. at 520.
310. The Court has been reticent to expand Enforcement Clause interpretation to encompass
regulation of purely private conduct. See 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 253, § 19.5, at 21.
There has yet to be a Supreme Court case explicitly sanctioning congressional regulation of
private conduct under the Enforcement Clause. See id. The reason for this is the potential for
creating a problem of conflicting constitutional rights. See id. Congressional prohibition of one
individual's discriminatory conduct may violate that individual's constitutional right, for
example, to freedom of speech. See id. at 22. Such an expansion of the Enforcement Clause's
reach would require the development of standards by which courts could determine which rights
have priority over other rights. See id.
311. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 14.4, at 526 (3d ed. 1999).
312. See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 800 (1998). For example, state enforcement
of private discriminatory policies will convert private conduct under those policies into state
action. See id. (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)).
313. See id.
314. See id. (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)). "While the principle
is easily stated, the question of whether particular discriminatory conduct is private, on the one
hand, or amounts to 'state action,' on the other hand, frequently admits of no easy answer."
Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 172.
315. See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 800 (1998) (citing Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974)).
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III. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Morrison was the
final link in a chain of four cases that began in 1995.316 The initial
complaint was filed by Christy Brzonkala, who sought redress under
section 13981 of the VAWA. 317 Her case was heard by the United
States District Court, as well as the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
twice, before Christy petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. 318
That appeal resulted in United States v. Morrison, which was marked by
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, as well as two strong
dissenting opinions filed by Justices Souter and Breyer. 319
A. Facts of the Case320 and Opinions of the Lower Courts
United States v. Morrison marked the end of five years of litigation
for Christy Brzonkala. 32' As a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University ("Virginia Tech"), Christy was allegedly gang
raped by two football players. 322 In the aftermath of her attack, the
university failed to provide Christy with the recourse it repeatedly
promised.323 Christy first filed suit under section 13981 in the Western
District of Virginia.324  On a motion to dismiss, the district court
determined that section 13981 lacked constitutional support under either
the Commerce Clause or the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 325  Christy appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which upheld the statute. 326 However, that opinion was
316. See infra Parts III.A.2-3 (tracing Christy Brzonkala's section 13981 claim through the
lower federal courts).
317. See infra Part III.A.1 (reviewing the circumstances that brought Christy to file a claim
under section 13981).
318. See infra Parts III.A.2-3 (reviewing the decisions of the lower federal courts regarding
the constitutionality of section 13981).
319. See infra Parts Il.B-C (analyzing the majority and dissenting opinions in United States v.
Morrison).
320. It should be noted that the information presented here as "facts" is derived from
numerous court documents and other sources, which have treated Christy's story both as fact and
allegation. Neither of the men accused of gang raping Christy were charged or convicted in
criminal court for their alleged conduct.
321. See infra Parts III.A.2-3 (reviewing each of the federal court's opinions regarding the
constitutionality of section 13981 ).
322. See infra Part HI.A. I (describing the events that precipitated Christy's federal lawsuit).
323. See infra Part III.A.I (recounting the actions taken by the university in response to
Christy's complaint against two male students).
324. See infra Part llI.A.2 (discussing the district court's opinion).
325. See infra Part III.A.2 (reviewing the holding of the district court).
326. See infra Part III.A.3.a (analyzing the Fourth Circuit's panel decision).
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vacated, and a re-hearing was held before the en banc court.327  Sitting
en banc, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court.328
Still seeking restitution, Christy petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari, which was granted in the fall of 1999.329
1. Gang Rape and Institutional Politics
In the fall of 1994, eighteen-year-old Christy Brzonkala enrolled as a
freshman at Virginia Tech. 330 She was a student athlete and a prospect
for the women's softball team.331 On the night of September 21, 1994,
Christy and another female student, Hope Handley, were in a third floor
room of the dormitory where Christy was living, along with two male
students whom the girls had met approximately thirty minutes before. 332
The two men were known to Christy and her friend only by first names
and their status as members of the football team.333  After
approximately fifteen minutes of conversation, Hope left with one of the
male students, James Crawford.334 By Christy's account, the remaining
male student, Antonio Morrison, suggested to Christy that the two have
sexual intercourse.335 Christy verbally refused, not once, but twice.336
As she got up to leave the room, Morrison pushed her onto a bed,
stripped off her clothes and, pinning her elbows with his hands, forced
her to engage in intercourse with him.337 Later that night, and into the
early morning hours, while in that same room, Christy was sexually
assaulted by James Crawford, the other male student she had only
recently met.338  According to Christy, Crawford had returned to the
room and exchanged places with Morrison, again pinning Christy's
arms and forcing her legs apart with his knees.339 The two assailants
later swapped places yet again, subjecting Christy for a third time to
327. See infra Part Ifl.A.3.b (reviewing the opinion of the Fourth Circuit en banc).
328. See infa Part III.A.3.b (setting forth the holding of the en banc court).
329. See infra Part III.A.3.b (recounting Christy's decision to appeal the en banc court's
ruling).
330. See Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 2.
331. See Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. 779, 781 (W.D. Va. 1996).
332. See id. at 781-82.
333. See id.
334. See Brzonkala 11, 132 F.3d 949, 953 (4th Cir. 1997); Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 782.
335. See Brzonkala 11, 132 F.3d at 953; Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 782.
336. See Brzonkala 11, 132 F.3d at 953; Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 782.
337. See Brzonkala 1H, 132 F.3d at 953; Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 782; Brzonkala Brief,
supra note 46, at 3.
338. See Brzonkala 11, 132 F.3d at 953; Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 781-82.
339. See Brzonkala 11, 132 F.3d at 953; Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 782.
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forced sexual intercourse. 340  Neither of Christy's attackers used a
condom, and after the attack, Morrison told Christy, "You better not
have any f******g diseases." 341  After finally releasing Christy,
Morrison continued to assault her, stalking her until she entered her own
room in the dormitory. 342 Following these events, but prior to Christy's
identification of her assailants, Morrison was heard to say in the
dormitory's dining room, "I like to get girls drunk and f*** the s*** out
of them."343  The trauma of that night effected severe changes in
Christy's life.3 "
Approximately five months after the sexual assault, Christy learned
the full names of her assailants. 345 Then, in April 1995, after speaking
with a counselor at the university's Women's Center, Christy filed a
complaint against Antonio Morrison and James Crawford under
Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. 346  The school conducted a
hearing in May 1995. 347 During that hearing, the two football players
produced a third teammate, who testified that he had been in the dorm
room for the duration of the alleged incident. 348 Morrison testified that
he had, indeed, had sexual intercourse with Christy, despite her twice
refusing to consent to the union. 349 The panel conducting the hearing,
having found insufficient evidence to punish James Crawford, let him
go; however, the panel suspended Antonio Morrison for a year.350
340. See Brzonkala 1H, 132 F.3d at 953; Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 782; Brzonkala Brief,
supra note 46, at 3.
341. Brzonkala 11, 132 F.3d at 953; Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 782; Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 2, United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29) [hereinafter
Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
342. See Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 3.
343. Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 782; see also Brzonkala 11, 132 F.3d at 953.
344. As a result of the gang rape, Christy ceased attending classes, wanting only to forget
about the horrifying experience. See The Open Campus Police Logs Act of 1995: Hearing on
H.R. 2416 Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education, Training and Life-Long Learning
of the House Comm. on Economic and Educational Opportunity, 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter
Open Campus Police Logs Act Hearing] (prepared testimony of Christy Brzonkala). She cut her
hair and began staying indoors all day, sleeping as a form of escape. See id. (prepared testimony
of Christy Brzonkala). In early October, only a few weeks after the gang rape, Christy attempted
suicide. See id. (prepared testimony of Christy Brzonkala); Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 4.
345. See Brzonkala 11, 132 F.3d at 953; Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 782.
346. See Brzonkala I, 132 F.3d at 953; Open Campus Police Logs Act Hearing, supra note
344 (prepared testimony of Christy Brzonkala).
347. See Brzonkala 11, 132 F.3d at 954; Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 4.
348. See Open Campus Police Logs Act Hearing, supra note 344 (prepared testimony of
Christy Brzonkala).
349. See Brzonkala 11, 132 F.3d at 954; Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 782; Brzonkala Brief,
supra note 46, at 4.
350. See Open Campus Police Logs Act Hearing, supra note 344 (prepared testimony of
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Morrison appealed immediately, but his suspension was upheld.351
According to the school's published rules, the decision of the dean in
such matters was final.352 Assuming that closure had been reached,
Christy began to focus on taking care of herself.
Following the hearing, Christy returned home to seek professional
help and prepare for her return to Virginia Tech in the fall, when she
would repeat her freshman year. 353  However, in July, two university
officials came to Christy's house to inform her that the May hearing had
been conducted under the wrong policy, and Antonio Morrison was
threatening to sue the school.35 4 Christy was presented with a choice:
drop her charges under the Sexual Assault Policy, or agree to go
through a new hearing under the correct policy. 355 After being assured
by the officials that they believed her story and that the new hearing
would merely be a formality, Christy chose the latter. 356  Despite the
assurances of the university officials, it quickly became clear that the
rehearing was not a mere formality.
In order to prepare for the re-hearing, Morrison was given advance
notice and unfettered access to the transcript and exhibits from the
original hearing, including tape recordings of the testimony. 357 Christy
was given two weeks to prepare and was denied access to those
materials from the first hearing. 358  This was significant, given that
Virginia Tech had determined that testimony provided during the initial
hearing would be inadmissible at the re-hearing, and any testimony that
either party wished to be considered required production of that witness
Christy Brzonkala); Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 4.
351. See Open Campus Police Logs Act Hearing, supra note 344 (prepared testimony of
Christy Brzonkala).
352. See Brzonkala 111, 169 F.3d 820, 907 (4th Cir. 1999) (Motz, J., dissenting); Brzonkala I!,
132 F.3d at 954.
353. See Open Campus Police Logs Act Hearing, supra note 344 (prepared testimony of
Christy Brzonkala).
354. See id. (prepared testimony of Christy Brzonkala); Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 4.
355. See Open Campus Police Logs Act Hearing, supra note 344 (prepared testimony of
Christy Brzonkala). Although in print at the time of the alleged rape, the university's sexual
abuse policy had not yet been widely distributed to students. See Brzonkala 1I, 132 F.3d at 953-
54. Therefore, Antonio Morrison had threatened to file suit against the school for violation of due
process, claiming the policy was ex post facto. See id. at 954. The "correct" policy was the
university's Abusive Conduct Policy, which had been well circulated at the time of the alleged
rape. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2000).
356. See Open Campus Police Logs Act Hearing, supra note 344 (prepared testimony of
Christy Brzonkala).
357. See Brzonkala I11, 169 F.3d at 908 (Motz, J., dissenting); Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46,
at 5.
358. See Brzonkala I11, 169 F.3d at 908 (Motz, J., dissenting); Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46,
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again, or of a sworn affidavit.359 At the re-hearing in late July, the panel
also instructed Christy to omit any testimony related to the participation
of James Crawford in her assault, due to the fact that charges against
Crawford had been dismissed during the original hearing.3 60 As a
result, she was forced to give a distorted account of the events of
September 21, 1994.361 Despite the unequal treatment and the need to
provide incomplete testimony in order to comply with the panel's
instructions, the result was the same as in the first hearing: Morrison
was found guilty and suspended for a year. 362 Again, Christy believed
that closure had been reached, and she began to prepare for her return to
Virginia Tech in the fall.
Christy's return was not to be. Unbeknownst to her, just a few days
before the start of the fall semester, the school informed the press that it
had decided to defer Morrison's punishment until after he graduated,
allowing him to return to Virginia Tech in August 1995, on a full
athletic scholarship. 363 Christy learned of the university's about-face by
reading The Washington Post, only days before she had planned to
return to the university for the start of classes. 364 Having overheard
threats against her safety, 365 coupled with Morrison's inevitable
presence on campus, Christy decided not to return to Virginia Tech that
fall and ultimately did not attend school anywhere that semester. 366 It
was not until November of 1995 that Christy learned the second hearing
had found Morrison guilty of nothing more than "use of abusive
language." 367 All of these factors led Christy to believe that the excuse
for holding the second hearing was nothing more than a sham. 368
Although she had waited too long to file criminal charges against the
359. See Brzonkala 11, 132 F.3d at 954-55.
360. See id. at 955; Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 5. Despite these instructions from the
Judicial Committee, James Crawford was present in an adjacent room during the re-hearing. See
Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 5.
361. See Brzonkala Ill, 169 F.3d at 908 (Motz, J., dissenting); Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46,
at 5.
362. See Open Campus Police Logs Act Hearing, supra note 344 (prepared testimony of
Christy Brzonkala).
363. See id.
364. See Brzonkala 11, 132 F.3d at 955; Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 6.
365. A friend of Christy's overheard a teammate of one of the accused say that the accused
player should have killed her. See Brzonkala II, 132 F.3d at 954; Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at
782; Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 3.
366. See Open Campus Police Logs Act Hearing, supra note 344 (prepared testimony of
Christy Brzonkala); Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 6.
367. See Open Campus Police Logs Act Hearing, supra note 344 (prepared testimony of
Christy Brzonkala).
368. See id.
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two athletes, Christy chose to seek restitution through a civil suit in
federal district court.
2. The First Step
Christy Brzonkala's suit was first filed in the District Court for the
Western District of Virginia on December 27, 1995.369 Her complaint
was amended in March 1996, to include a count for violation of the
VAWA civil rights provision. 370 During the district court proceedings,
the United States intervened as of right in order to defend the
constitutionality of the VAWA. 371  The district court reached its
decision in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State University
("Brzonkala r') 372 on a motion to dismiss on July 26, 1996.373
Invoking a previous articulation by the Supreme Court of its
expectations regarding judicial reliance on its decisions, the district
court chose to adopt the four-test framework of United States v. Lopez
for its Commerce Clause analysis. 374  Although the district court
acknowledged that violence against women significantly impacts the
national economy, more so than the possession of a firearm in a school
zone,375 its analysis found the differences between the GFSZA of Lopez
and the VAWA civil rights remedy to be insignificant, while the
similarities were significant. 376  Based on this comparison, the court
concluded that Congress had acted outside the scope of its Commerce
Clause authority in enacting the VAWA.3 77
The district court chose to follow its initial conclusion with a more
in-depth analysis of certain aspects of Commerce Clause interpretation.
The court highlighted one particular point made by Chief Justice
369. See Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 18.
370. See Brzonkala I, 935 F. Supp. at 781.
371. See Brzonkala II, 132 F.3d 949, 956 (4th Cir. 1997); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 341, at 2.
372. Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996).
373. Id. at 779, 801.
374. See id. at 793 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 596 (1996) (quoting
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66-67 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting))) ("[W]e
expect both ourselves and lower courts to adhere to the 'rationale upon which the Court based the
results of its earlier decisions."').
375. See id. at 790-91 (analyzing the proximity to economic activity existent in the GFSZA
and the VAWA civil rights remedy, ultimately concluding that the VAWA was one step closer to
affecting commerce than was the GFSZA); see also id. at 792 ("A reasonable inference from the
congressional findings is that violence against women has its major effect on the national
economy.").
376. See id. at 791.
377. See id. at 793. The court further stated that to conclude otherwise "would strain reason."
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Rehnquist in Lopez, namely, that to date, all Supreme Court case law
regarding Congress' reach into intrastate activities has only sustained
regulation of clearly economic activities. 378  The court concluded that
Lopez created a distinction between the analysis to be used for intrastate
activity of an economic nature and that for intrastate activity of a non-
economic nature. 379 Therefore, according to the district court, after
Lopez, case law involving economic intrastate activity would no longer
constitute precedent for cases involving non-economic intrastate
activity. 380  The district court concluded its Commerce Clause analysis
with a blanket application of this distinction to every case on which the
plaintiffs had relied.381  The court then turned its attention to the
Fourteenth Amendment argument.
Regarding Congress' assertion of Enforcement Clause support for
section 13981, the district court determined that providing a remedy for
the gender-based acts of private individuals was not a reasonable
response to the deficiencies in state law enforcement practices that
Congress had uncovered. 382 The court reasserted prior Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence holding that the Amendment only permits
378. See id. at 787 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995)); see also id. at
790 ("With statutes regulating intrastate activities, the primary concern is whether the activity is
economic.").
379. See id. at 787. Using the case of Wickard v. Filburn as an example, the court reiterated
Lopez' comparison between the non-economic nature of a statute prohibiting firearm possession
within a school zone and the economic nature of a statute penalizing a farmer for raising a crop of
wheat in excess of his quota. See id. The court conceded, however, that the Lopez language
might not have created a new rule, but might merely present a strong consideration for a court's
analysis of regulated activity that is not economic in nature. See id.
380. See id. This reading of Lopez was unique to courts in the Fourth Circuit. At the time of
the Brzonkala I decision, only one other challenge to the VAWA's constitutionality had been
decided. See id. at 791 (referencing Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996)). That
decision, Doe v. Doe, drew a comparison between section 13981 and Wickard. See id. The Doe
court analogized the Supreme Court's finding, that a trivial amount of home-grown wheat
substantially affected interstate commerce, to the withholding of women's participation in the
national economy in response to the threat of gender-motivated violence. See id. The Doe court
found the national response of women to gender-motivated violence to be on par with the
cumulative conduct of farmers like Roscoe Filburn. See id. The Brzonkala I court refuted this
analogy, focusing on Chief Justice Rehnquist's inference in Lopez that congressional regulation
of intrastate activity was only constitutional if that activity was economic in nature. See id.
381. See id. 791-92. The court distinguished Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., United States v. Perez, Katzenbach v. McClung, and Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, relying on the Lopez majority's categorization of the regulated
activity in these cases as economic in nature. See id.
382. See id. at 800-01. The court stated that the responsibility of providing a remedy for a
Fourteenth Amendment violation should be directed toward "the entity which causes the
violation" rather than against individuals "who did not contribute in any real sense to the unequal
treatment in the states' criminal justice systems." Id. at 800.
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regulation of state action. 383 Although the court acknowledged that
there are exceptions to this rule, it maintained that these exceptions are
limited to situations in which there is some state involvement, even if it
is only incidental or tangential. 384 The court invoked language from
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,385 in which the Supreme Court stated that,
to be reached under the Fourteenth Amendment, conduct that allegedly
denies federal rights must be "fairly attributable to the State." 386  The
court used this limitation to discredit the plaintiffs' reliance on language
from prior Supreme Court decisions. 387  The court also compared the
activity targeted by section 13981 with that of other federal statutes that
had survived Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny, as well as one that had
not.388 After distinguishing section 13981 from other statutes sustained
383. See id. at 793-94.
384. See id. (citing District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 n.8 (1973); United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762, 774-786 (1966)).
385. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
386. Id. at 937. Lugar provided two means by which the conduct in question could be
considered "fairly attributable to the State": 1) where the denial of federal rights is caused through
the exercise of some state-created right or privilege, or by a person for whom the state is
responsible, or 2) where the denial of federal rights is caused by a state actor. Id.
387. The court found fault with the appellants' reliance on Katzenbach v. Morgan because
Morgan involved infringement of Fourteenth Amendment rights through state action, specifically,
election laws in New York that made the ability to read and write English a precondition to
voting. See Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 794-95 (referencing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966)). The court distinguished Morgan from section 13981 because Morgan did not
involve congressional regulation of solely private action that was denying equal protection. See
id. at 795. The statute at issue in Morgan was upheld, through the Supremacy Clause, as
invalidating New York's voting requirements statute. See id.; supra notes 299-303 and
accompanying text (detailing the facts of Katzenbach v. Morgan).
388. See Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 798-99. The court first distinguished the VAWA from
the facts of United States v. Guest, as Guest involved a conspiracy between the state and private
individuals to discriminate against African Americans. See id. at 798; supra notes 284-97 and
accompanying text (containing more detailed discussion of United States v. Guest). The court
could find nothing in the record amassed by Congress in support of the VAWA to suggest any
complicity between state judicial systems and private individuals committing acts of gender-
motivated violence. See Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 798. The district court then distinguished
Shelley v. Kraemer on two grounds. First, the court explained that, in Shelley, state courts had
enforced discriminatory restrictive covenants, whereas the congressional findings in support of
the VAWA only pointed to the state courts' failure to take appropriate action against, not actively
participate in, gender-motivated violence. See id. at 799. Second, because the courts in Shelley
were enforcing the restrictive covenants, those seeking their enforcement would be unable to
pursue their scheme of denying federal rights to African Americans if the courts were not
assisting them. See id. According to the Brzonkala I court, no such but-for causation existed
with section 13981, as more appropriate action by state courts would not prohibit private
individuals from committing acts of gender-motivated violence. Id. Finally, the district court
distinguished Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, a case in which a woman's possessions were seized
under a state law creating warehouseman's liens. See id. (citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 154-55 (1978)). In Flagg Bros., the Supreme Court concluded that the mere tangential
involvement of the state in the actions of the warehouseman via the state-created law under which
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under the Fourteenth Amendment, and finding insufficient evidence that
the remedy was directed at state action, the court concluded that section
13981 did not provide a remedy for curing Fourteenth Amendment
violations committed by the states.389 Therefore, with no support under
either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, the district
court ruled that section 13981 was unconstitutional. 3 °
3. Two Opinions in the Fourth Circuit
Christy and the United States appealed the decision of the district
court. 391 The case was first heard by a three-judge panel of the Fourth
Circuit, which sustained section 13981.392 However, this decision was
vacated following a vote by the full court, and a re-hearing was held en
banc.393 The en banc court agreed with the district court's conclusions
and overturned section 13981.394
a. Panel Majority Recognizes Constitutionality
Following the district court's declaration of unconstitutionality,
Christy appealed to the Fourth Circuit. In December 1997, a three-
judge panel reversed the Western District of Virginia, finding, in a two-
to-one decision, that the civil rights remedy of the VAWA was a
legitimate exercise of Congress' commerce power.395 Writing for the
majority in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State
University ("Brzonkala Ir'),3 96 Judge Motz was able to distinguish the
he was acting was insufficient to support Fourteenth Amendment regulation. Flagg Bros., 436
U.S. at 157. Although the Brzonkala I court found a distinction between section 13981 and Flagg
Bros., in that section 13981 addressed the method of enforcement and the actual body of laws, the
court placed a greater emphasis on the similarities between the two situations. See Brzonkala I,
935 F. Supp. at 799. Both Flagg Bros. and section 13981 involved no obvious action on the part
of the state, and, as a result, the court argued that section 13981 should similarly be found not to
arise under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
389. See Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 800.
390. See id. at 801.
391. See infra Part III.A.3.a (reviewing the decision of the three-judge panel in the Fourth
Circuit).
392. See infra Part III.A.3.a (analyzing the first of two Fourth Circuit opinions on the
constitutionality of section 13981).
393. See infra Part III.A.3.b (explaining the decision of the Fourth Circuit to hear the motion
to dismiss en banc).
394. See infra Part III.A.3.b (discussing the opinion of the Fourth Circuit en banc court
regarding the constitutionality of section 13981).
395. See Brzonkala I1, 132 F.3d 949, 974 (4th Cir. 1997). "In following our '[s]trictly
confined' duty in this case, we must conclude that Congress has in no way 'exceeded limits
allowable in reason for the judgment which it has exercised."' Id. (quoting Polish Nat'l Alliance
v. National Labor Relations Bd., 322 U.S. 643, 650 (1944)).
396. Brzonkala 11, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997).
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panel's analysis of section 13981 from that of the Supreme Court in
Lopez.3 97 She explained that the distinction was possible because the
VAWA's legislative record enabled the panel to evaluate Congress'
legislative judgment regarding the effect of gender-motivated violence
on interstate commerce. 398 Judge Motz noted that the court's task was
to determine if Congress had a rational basis for its finding. 399  The
panel concluded that "Congress made an unequivocal and persuasive
finding that violence against women substantially affects interstate
commerce. ' °  Their task complete, the majority voted to uphold the
statute and reverse the district court's dismissal.4° 1
In reaching this decision, the panel focused on Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Lopez, in which he cautiously joined with the Court's
opinion, but acknowledged it as a "necessary though limited
holding."''4 2 The appellate court interpreted Lopez to maintain the
expanse of commerce power in effect since Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., concluding that the decision had neither overruled any previous
Commerce Clause precedent nor repudiated the "rational basis" test.
403
The panel directly addressed the true meaning of the Lopez intimation
that congressional regulation of intrastate activities can only pass
constitutional scrutiny when the regulated activity is economic in
397. See id. at 965-66.
398. See id. at 965. The lack of such a legislative record was a specific complaint of the Chief
Justice in his opinion in United States v. Lopez. See 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995).
399. See Brzonkala 1H, 132 F.3d at 967.
400. Id. at 968. The same differences between the VAWA and the GFSZA that the district
court had determined to be insignificant to its constitutional analysis, the Brzonkala I court found
to have great significance. See id. at 970-71. Among these "insignificant" differences were:
1) the fact that the GFSZA was a criminal statute, while section 13981 was a civil statute;
2) legislative findings were absent from the record in Lopez, while such findings were
voluminous in Brzonkala I; and 3) section 13981 required fewer steps of causation. See
Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. 779, 789 (W.D. Va. 1996). The panel noted that, as a result of the
legislative record built by Congress, the courts did not need to make any inferences to connect the
VAWA with interstate commerce, let alone "pile inference upon inference." See Brzonkala II,
132 F.3d at 970 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995)). The panel also
noted that the VAWA is not a criminal statute, and therefore neither supersedes any state criminal
law, nor affects how the states prosecute the underlying violent crimes. See id. The Fourth
Circuit stated that, "[in sum, VAWA acts to supplement, rather than supplant, state criminal,
civil, and family law controlling gender violence." Id. at 971. Instead, the VAWA provides a
civil rights remedy, which has traditionally been within federal legislative authority. See id.; see
also supra Part II.C (containing a discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment).
401. See Brzonkala 11, 132 F.3d at 974.
402. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
403. See Brzonkala II, 132 F.3d at 969. The Fourth Circuit cited case law from the Seventh
and Eleventh Circuits to support its interpretation. See id. (citing United States v. Wright, 117
F.3d 1265, 1269 (11 th Cir. 1997); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (7th Cir. 1995)).
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nature.4°4 Pointing to language from Wickard v. Filburn quoted by the
Lopez majority, the Brzonkala II court argued that such a limitation on
the breadth of the commerce power cannot be reconciled with prior case
law.405 The panel reaffirmed that the key inquiry for any court is
whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that the activity being
regulated substantially affects interstate commerce.4°6 This was the key
to the majority's decision in Lopez and was repeatedly cited as the key
to the panel's decision in Brzonkala 1.407  Because the court was
satisfied that section 13981 represented a valid exercise of Congress'
commerce power, no analysis was completed regarding the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 40
8
b. En Banc Court Reverses Panel Decision
The Brzonkala H opinion was vacated on February 5, 1998, after the
en banc court voted to rehear the case. 4' 9 In a seven-to-four decision in
March 1999, the en banc court reversed the decision of the three-judge
panel and declared section 13981 unconstitutional. 4 10  The majority
404. See id. at 972; Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. at 790 ("With statutes regulating intrastate
activities, the primary concern is whether the activity is economic.").
405. See Brzonkala IH, 132 F.3d at 972 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11, 125
(1942)); supra note 220 (detailing the passage from Wickard quoted by the Lopez majority).
406. See Brzonkala H, 132 F.3d at 971.
407. See id. at 965, 972-73.
408. See id. at 965. The sole dissenting judge on the Brzonkala 11 panel provided a brief, but
stinging, dissent. Arguing that the district court had followed a more meticulous analysis of the
VAWA's constitutionality under the Lopez analytical framework than the majority in Brzonkala
1H, Judge Luttig strongly criticized the majority for placing too great an emphasis on certain
passages in the VAWA's legislative history. See id. at 974 (Luttig, J., dissenting). Judge Luttig
believed the majority's reliance on the House of Representatives' finding that violence against
women substantially affects interstate commerce was misplaced, stating that similar key findings
were not to be found in any other legislative materials. See id. at 974-75 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
The brief and all-too-unimportant placement of this finding in the House Report was, to Judge
Luttig, of no more significance than if the sentence had not appeared at all. See id. at 976 (Luttig,
J., dissenting) ("It should go without saying that this one sentence is functionally no different
from a complete absence of express congressional findings."). It was certainly insufficient, in his
eyes, to support the majority's conclusion that Congress had a rational basis for finding that
regulation of gender-motivated violence substantially affected interstate commerce. See id. at
975-77 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
409. See Brzonkala Ill, 169 F.3d 820, 829 (4th Cir. 1999).
410. See id. at 889. The Fourth Circuit is considered by many to be the most conservative of
the thirteen federal appellate circuits. See Herman Schwartz, Opinion, Assault on Federalism
Swipes at Women, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2000, at M-1. This is due, in part, to the dominant
number of Reagan and Bush appointees still serving in the Fourth Circuit. See NOW LDEF -
Highlights, U.S. Supreme Court, Brzonkala v. Morrison, et al., (visited Apr. 7, 2000)
<http://www.nowldef.org/html/courts/brzon.htm> [hereinafter NOW LDEF - Highlights]. Of the
eighteen district courts to hear cases brought under the civil rights remedy of the VAWA,
seventeen have upheld the statute as constitutional. See id.; see, e.g., Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F.
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opinion in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State
University ("Brzonkala J,)41l was authored by the dissenting judge in
the panel decision, Judge Luttig, whose majority opinion was no less
passionate, though considerably more prolixic, than his dissent in
Brzonkala 11.412
Judge Luttig began his opinion by enumerating two primary reasons
for invalidating section 13981. First, section 13981 was claimed to be
supported by Congress' commerce power, yet punished non-
commercial intrastate violence; second, it was claimed to be supported
by Congress' enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment, yet
punished private conduct.413 As the basis for his Commerce Clause
analysis, Judge Luttig strongly defended the Supreme Court's opinion
in Lopez.4t 4 He accused the appellants of defending the VAWA's civil
rights remedy "on little more than wistful assertions that United States
v. Lopez is an aberration of no significance .... ",415  He further
criticized the appellants for arguing that the Court's holdings in the
Civil Rights Cases and United States v. Harris4 16 no longer reflected the
scope of Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment. 417 Judge
Luttig explained that accepting the appellants' arguments regarding the
status of these early Fourteenth Amendment cases would result in
extending Congress' reach beyond the scope contemplated by the
Supreme Court since the Amendment's ratification. 418  Having
summarized the foundation for his opinion, Judge Luttig proceeded to
analyze each of the two constitutional bases on which Congress had
relied.
The areas discussed in Judge Luttig's Commerce Clause analysis
paralleled the four areas discussed by Chief Justice Rehnquist in
Supp. 531 (N.D. I11. 1997); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996) (sustaining the
constitutionality of section 13981). The reasoning of the Fourth Circuit has been criticized by
several of those district courts. See NOW LDEF - Highlights, supra; see, e.g., Kuhn v. Kuhn, No.
98 C 2395, 1999 WL 519326 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 1999); Ericson v. Syracuse University, 45 F.
Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Culberson v. Doan, 65 F. Supp. 2d 701 (S.D. Ohio 1999)
(disagreeing with the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in overturning section 13981).
411. Brzonkala I11, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999).
412. See id. at 825.
413. See id. at 826.
414. See id.
415. Id.
416. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
417. See Brzonkala I11, 169 F.3d at 826.
418. See id. at 827. The flaw in this statement is that Congress is the body that drafted and
arranged for ratification of the Amendment; it is Congress that contemplated the breadth of the
Amendment, not the Supreme Court.
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Lopez. 419  According to Judge Luttig, the Lopez decision established
that determining whether an activity substantially affects interstate
commerce is a question of law to be answered by the courts. 420  In
clarifying this legal test, Judge Luttig read Lopez to permit two kinds of
regulations: those that regulate activities arising from or having a nexus
with commercial transactions, which, when aggregated, substantially
affect interstate commerce, and those that contain a jurisdictional
element to ensure that each occurrence of the regulated activity will
substantially affect commerce. 421  In reviewing section 13981 for its
regulation of intrastate activity, Judge Luttig placed a great deal of
emphasis on the Lopez observation that the regulation of intrastate
activity previously upheld by the Court all involved intrastate activity of
an economic nature. 422  To Judge Luttig, this statement constituted a
mandate that non-economic intrastate activity is beyond the reach of the
commerce power. 423 He harshly criticized the dissent for regarding this
portion of the Lopez opinion as merely an "unprecedented new rule of
law." 424  Instead, he argued that this mandate was the "law of the
419. See supra notes 219-28 and accompanying text (reviewing Chief Justice Rehnquist's
four-part analysis in Lopez).
420. See Brzonkala 111, 169 F.3d at 831 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2
(1995)).
421. See id. But see id. at 905 (Motz, J., dissenting). Judge Motz believed that Judge Luttig
had misinterpreted the Lopez decision to create a rule of law where none existed, thus
disregarding other Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 917 (Motz, J., dissenting). She argued
that the Lopez decision supported the rational basis test, continuing its analysis in Lopez beyond a
discussion of economic nature and jurisdictional provisions. See id. at 917-18 (Motz, J.,
dissenting). The Lopez Court did not overturn the GFSZA because it failed to have either of these
two elements; rather, it overturned the statute for lack of congressional findings establishing a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, and for supplanting the states' ability to regulate a
traditional area of state law. See id. at 918 (Motz, J., dissenting). To further her arguments
against the majority's Lopez interpretation, Judge Motz pointed to other cases to illustrate its
conflict with Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v.
Town of Harrison, the Court held that an activity regulated under the Commerce Clause need not
be commercial in nature. See id. at 920 (Motz, J., dissenting) (citing Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 574 (1997)). In Camps Newfound,
the Court determined that the issue was not whether the use of the camp constituted an economic
activity, but rather, whether the operation of the camp substantially affected interstate commerce.
Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 574 (holding that a state law adversely affecting a non-profit camp
violated the dormant Commerce Clause because the services provided by the camp to its
principally out-of-state campers had a clearly substantial effect on commerce).
422. See Brzonkala 111, 169 F.3d at 831, 855 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60). "[The Court]
also drew a clear distinction between regulations of economic and noneconomic activities ...
limiting to the former category the reach of the authority and reasoning of its most permissive
Commerce Clause cases." Id. at 855.
423. See id. at 831 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567); see also id. at 855-57 (maintaining that
Lopez created a new rule of law regarding regulation of intrastate activities).
424. Id. at 833; see also id. at 854, 856-57 (containing further criticism of the dissent's
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land. 425 Judge Luttig quickly dismissed any possible claim that the
activity regulated by section 13981 is economic in nature and also
opined that gender-motivated violence lacks a meaningful connection
with any particular commercial activity. 426  He further concluded that
section 13981 does not qualify as a requisite part of a larger regulatory
scheme, which might falter should the statute not remain in place.427
Turning to the second category of permitted regulation, Judge Luttig
determined that section 13981 fails to fall within the reach of the
commerce power because it is void of a jurisdictional element.428
Having concluded that section 13981 failed to meet either of the two
requisite tests, 429 Judge Luttig addressed the VAWA in terms of the
remaining areas analyzed in Lopez: practical impact of sustaining the
legislation and congressional findings.
The majority believed that section 13981 did not comply with
principles of federalism and, therefore, presented practical implications
similar to those of the GFSZA in Lopez.430  A frequent theme
interpretation of Lopez).
425. Id. at 833.
426. See id. at 834.
427. See id. This is because, despite the VAWA's status as anti-discrimination legislation, to
the majority, federal discrimination regulation is a patchwork of laws, and far from a cohesive
regulatory scheme. See id.
428. See id. at 836.
429. Judge Luttig completed a second analysis of section 13981 under the assumption that
these two tests expressed only the presumptive, not the absolute, limits of the commerce power's
reach. See id. at 837. Judge Luttig concluded that section 13981 would only qualify if the court
was willing to grant Congress a national police power. See id. at 838. He compared the
arguments presented by supporters of section 13981 with those of supporters of the GFSZA from
Lopez, based on a "costs of crime" rationale. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 6. Viewing the
two sets of arguments as identical, Judge Luttig felt compelled to reach the same conclusion
regarding constitutionality as the Supreme Court had in Lopez. See Brzonkala 111, 169 F.3d at
838. He found additional support for this conclusion in the appellants' argument regarding the
effect of gender-motivated violence on the economy, which he believed to be less viable than
comparable arguments made in Lopez. See id. at 839 n.8. Whereas the GFSZA could be directly
linked to a specific economic venture, education, section 13981 could not be shown to impact any
specific economic venture. See id.
430. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 6. But see Brzonkala 111, 169 F.3d at 905 (Motz, J.,
dissenting). Judge Motz asserted that the majority had based its opinion on an inaccurate
understanding of federalism. See id. at 925 (Motz, J., dissenting). According to Judge Motz, the
civil rights remedy regulated an area of traditional federal authority and was structured so as not
to supplant any state laws. See id. (Motz, J., dissenting). Additionally, Judge Motz cited to Lopez
and Garcia to demonstrate that limits on the reach of commerce authority should come from
Congress itself, as a representative body elected by and responsible to the populous, and not from
the federal judiciary. See id. at 926 (Motz, J., dissenting). In his concurrence in Lopez, Justice
Kennedy stated that Chief Justice Marshall's description in Gibbons of the breadth of the
commerce power was "understood now as an early and authoritative recognition that the
Commerce Clause grants Congress extensive power and ample discretion to determine its
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throughout the majority's opinion was the potential for all distinctions
between what is federal and what is state to be eradicated, and the
federal system to collapse, because legislation like section 13981 was
allowed to stand as a legitimate exercise of the Commerce Clause
authority.431 Judge Luttig suggested that Congress' creation of a federal
remedy for gender-motivated violence, where one already existed under
state law, would compel the states to modify allocation of state
resources and even enforcement of such laws. 432
With regard to congressional findings, Judge Luttig found them to be
inadequate to sustain the constitutionality of the VAWA civil rights
remedy.433 He clarified the level of importance that the Supreme Court
appropriate exercise." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). The Garcia Court explained, "[a]ny substantive restraint on the exercise of
Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic
limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political
process rather than to dictate a 'sacred province of state autonomy."' Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985), rev'g National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976) (quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,
236 (1983)).
431. See Brzonkala 11, 169 F.3d at 840, 843-44, 853, 859-60, 888. But see id. at 905 (Motz,
J., dissenting). In her dissent, Judge Motz responded to the majority's concerns that upholding
section 13981 would open Pandora's Box, creating a general federal police power over any and
all areas of traditional state authority. See id. at 928 (Motz, J., dissenting). She maintained that a
court must analyze the statute at issue under the circumstances before it, not on a series of
hypothetical extensions of that statute. See id. at 929 (Motz, J., dissenting). In Alabama State
Federation of Labor v. McAdory, the Court acknowledged its long practice of not addressing
abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions, or [of] decid[ing] any constitutional
question in advance of the necessity for its decision, or [of] formulat[ing] a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied, or [of] decid[ing] any constitutional question except with reference to the
particular facts to which it is to be applied.
325 U.S. 450, 461 (1954) (citations omitted).
432. See Brzonkala 1Il, 169 F.3d at 841. Judge Luttig's opinion contained two remarkable
arguments in light of Congress' reasons for enacting the VAWA. First, he criticized section
13981 for punishing conduct that the states might have otherwise left unpunished. See id. at 841-
42. Second, Judge Luttig argued that the VAWA impaired the states' ability to regulate family
issues, by creating a cause of action against an abusive spouse where a state has a spousal
immunity law, or by allowing a woman to sue her husband for rape where a state has no marital
rape statute. See id. at 843. He argued that such interference not only violates an area of
traditional state authority, but also frees any state that might have such statutes from
responsibility to those of its citizens who are dissatisfied with the statutes. See id.
433. See id. at 845. Judge Luttig condemned the dissent for its "prostrate deference" to
Congress' accumulated research. See id. at 847. But see dissenting opinion of Judge Motz, id. at
905. In her dissent, Judge Motz praised Congress for its thorough research into the area of
gender-motivated violence, explaining that the data gathered by Congress enabled the judiciary to
perform its analyses of the VAWA with the benefit of information that the various Lopez courts
did not have. See id. at 912 (Motz, J., dissenting). She related that the Supreme Court had never
overturned a federal statute that was accompanied by congressional findings showing the activity
in question to have the requisite effect on interstate commerce. See id. at 912-13 (Motz, J.,
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placed on legislative findings in Lopez, emphasizing that the Court only
noted their absence because their presence might have helped to reveal
an otherwise non-obvious effect on interstate commerce. 434  Judge
Luttig believed that such emphasis on legislative findings was never
meant by the Lopez Court to displace judicial inquiry into the
constitutionality of the legislation.435 Even when viewing Congress'
findings merely as one part of the full constitutional analysis, the
majority continued to hold that they were insufficient to satisfy the
"substantially affects" test.43 6  With this, the majority concluded its
dissenting). Judge Motz used this fact to illustrate the importance that the Court has historically
placed on deference to Congress' judgment. See id. (Motz, J., dissenting). Judge Motz further
emphasized Congress' conclusion that gender-motivated violence "substantially affected"
interstate commerce, at a time predating the Lopez decision's assertion that the correct test for
Commerce Clause analysis is "substantially affects" interstate commerce, and not merely
"affects." See id. at 915 (Motz, J., dissenting). This enhanced degree of impact demonstrates the
strength of the link that Congress found between gender-based violence and interstate commerce.
See id. (Motz, J., dissenting). Despite the accusations made by the majority, Judge Motz
acknowledged not only that the judiciary is the body authorized to apply the rational basis test,
but that a congressional conclusion of constitutionality, alone, is insufficient to create it. See id.
at 912 (Motz, J., dissenting). She emphasized that courts should defer to congressional opinion
only when they find that Congress had a rational basis for such a conclusion. See id. (Motz, J.,
dissenting).
434. See id. at 846 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995)). But see id. at
905 (Motz, J., dissenting). Judge Motz criticized the majority for misinterpreting the correct
standard for judicial review. See id. at 921 (Motz, J., dissenting). This misinterpretation caused
the majority to deny Congress the deference it is due, namely, a strong presumption that an act is
constitutional. See id. (Motz, J., dissenting). Judge Motz cited the Supreme Court's decision in
Flemming v. Nestor, "[b]ut to prevent this mighty judicial power from engulfing and ultimately
eliminating the legislative powers reserved to Congress, the Supreme Court has established that
acts of Congress are entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality." Id. at 921 (citing
Hemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)). Chief Justice Rehnquist has also acknowledged
this truth. See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319 (1985)
(quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142,
148 (1927))) ("Judging the constitutionality of an Act of Congress is properly considered 'the
gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called upon to perform,"' and constitutional
review begins with "deference" to the "duly enacted and carefully considered decision of a
coequal and representative branch of our Government."). Where Congress has based its judgment
on detailed, significant findings, Judge Motz maintained that deference is due, not only out of
respect for Congress' legislative power, but also for Congress as a coequal branch of government.
See Brzonkala 111, 169 F.3d at 923 (Motz, J., dissenting). Judge Motz reasserted the Court's
directive, reaffirmed in Lopez, that the only correct basis for rejecting congressional findings is if
they are found to lack a rational basis. See id. at 924-25 (Motz, J., dissenting). Part of her
conclusion that the Lopez Court did not reject the rational basis test was derived from the Lopez
majority's decision to cite Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission. See id. at 923 (Motz,
J., dissenting). Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission is a case in which the Supreme
Court explained that deference to Congress' judgment is appropriate where a rational basis can be
found in support of that judgment. See 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1989).
435. See Brzonkala 111, 169 F.3d at 848.
436. See id. at 849. The Brzonkala III court maintained that the appellants were only able to
cite two congressional findings in support of their claim that gender-motivated violence
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Commerce Clause analysis and began to analyze section 13981 under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
In response to the appellants' argument that section 13981 is
supported by the Fourteenth Amendment, the en banc court concluded
that the Amendment's enforcement clause was an insufficient basis for
congressional action.437  The court noted the language of the
Amendment, which is directed at the states, as well as the Amendment's
legislative history, to demonstrate that the Amendment was not intended
to regulate purely private conduct.438 Judge Luttig provided additional
support by reaffirming the status of the Court's earliest Fourteenth
Amendment cases, the Civil Rights Cases and Harris.439 The majority
determined that section 13981 was overly broad and not designed to
address specific state laws or specific state actions.440 Judge Luttig
substantially affects interstate commerce. See id. at 850. Specifically, Judge Luttig was
referencing a statement in House Conference Report 103-711 stating:
[C]rimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on
interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from
engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business, and
in places involved, in interstate commerce; crimes of violence motivated by gender
have a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, by diminishing national
productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the
demand for interstate products.
Id. The second finding Judge Luttig referenced was from Senate Report 103-138, providing:
"[g]ender-based violent crimes meet the modest threshold required by the Commerce Clause.
Gender-based crimes and the fear of gender-based crimes restricts movement, reduces
employment opportunities, increases health expenditures, and reduces consumer spending, all of
which affect interstate commerce and the national economy." Id. (emphasis added by court).
437. See id. at 862. Because she found sufficient support for section 13981 under the
Commerce Clause, Judge Motz did not address Fourteenth Amendment support in her dissent.
See id. at 911 n.1.
438. See id. at 862, 864; see also supra Part II.C. 1 (reviewing the historical background of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
439. See Brzonkala 111, 169 F.3d at 865, 868-69, 873. Judge Luttig reemphasized that the
Court's opinion in Guest lacks the authority to negate the holdings of the Civil Rights Cases and
Harris. See id. at 877-79; supra notes 284-97 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of
United States v. Guest on the Civil Rights Cases and United States v. Harris). Judge Luttig was
equally unswayed by the subsequent footnote in District of Columbia v. Carter. See Brzonkala
111, 169 F.3d at 879; supra note 286 (explaining the significance of the footnote in District of
Columbia v. Carter). He argued that language from City of Boerne v. Flores, cited by the
appellants to support their claim that these two cases are no longer good law, merely reflects that
the Court ultimately upheld legislation similar to that which was overturned in those two early
cases. See Brzonkala 111, 169 F.3d at 879 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 525
(1997)). The failure of the City of Boerne Court to cite to the Guest concurrences was sufficient
evidence for Judge Luttig that the Court did not intend to endorse the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment to private conduct espoused therein. See id. at 880. Thus, Judge Luttig dismissed
the appellants' argument that precedent exists for extending the Fourteenth Amendment to purely
private conduct. See id.
440. See Brzonkala II1, 169 F.3d at 870.
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further concluded that section 13981 does not represent a legitimate
exercise of Congress' authority to enact prophylactic legislation to
prohibit actions that do not themselves violate the Amendment.' 1
Judge Luttig concluded that extending the reach of that power to purely
private conduct would equal a return to the language of the Bingham
Amendment, which had not been well received due to its perceived
overreach." 2  Finally, relying on language from City of Boerne v.
Flores, Judge Luttig determined that section 13981 exceeded Congress'
power because it did not exhibit a congruence and proportionality
between the problem it sought to remedy and the manner in which it
was designed to do so.443  In support of this conclusion, he cited
provisions of the VAWA that allow a section 13981 claim to be filed
regardless of whether criminal charges have been brought, the fact that
section 13981 applies to all jurisdictions, not merely specific
jurisdictions known to have exhibited such discriminatory practices, as
well as the lack of a termination date for the statute.4" In sum, Judge
Luttig held that it would not be an overstatement to say that interpreting
the Fourteenth Amendment to support section 13981 would be
"'repugnant' to the Constitution." 445
Dissatisfied with the Fourth Circuit's en banc ruling, Christy and the
United States petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. The writ was
granted on September 28, 1999,446 and oral arguments were heard on
January 11, 2000.44' Approximately five months later, the Supreme
Court spoke to the constitutionality of section 13981.
B. The Supreme Court's Majority Opinion
On May 15, 2000, the United States Supreme Court decided United
States v. Morrison in a five-to-four decision. 448  Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, used the framework of his opinion
441. See id. at 873, 875.
442. See id. at 875.
443. See id. at 881-82 (relying on City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520, "[tlhere must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end").
444. See id. at 887. Judge Luttig also argued that the gender-neutral language of the statute,
which would allow men to sue for section 13981 violations, supported his position. See id.
445. See id. at 889 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 15 (1883))).
446. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999),
cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3021 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1999) (No. 99-5).
447. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, United States v. Morrison, 120 S.
Ct. 1740 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29), available at 2000 WL 41232.
448. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
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in United States v. Lopez to analyze section 13981 under the Commerce
Clause.449 Finding no Commerce Clause support for the Act, he further
reviewed section 13981 under Fourteenth Amendment precedent.450
The VAWA failed this analysis as well, and the Chief Justice declared
section 13981 unconstitutional.451
1. Commerce Clause Analysis i la Lopez
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion in United
States v. Morrison, which upheld both the Commerce Clause and
Fourteenth Amendment determinations of the Fourth Circuit's en banc
decision. 452 The Chief Justice began his opinion by acknowledging the
volatility of the Court's Commerce Clause interpretation throughout the
nation's history. Specifically, he noted that since its opinion in National
Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court had
given Congress an increasing amount of latitude to regulate activities
under the Commerce Clause.453  Reviewing the three broad areas that
the Court had previously determined to fall under Congress's commerce
power, Chief Justice Rehnquist quickly dismissed the first two as
inapplicable, concentrating his analysis on the third: "those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce." 454 Using the four-
part analysis of Lopez as a framework, Chief Justice Rehnquist
proceeded to analyze the VAWA's constitutionality. 455
449. See infra Part III.B.1 (detailing Chief Justice Rehnquist's Commerce Clause review of
section 13981 using the four-part analysis from Lopez).
450. See infra Part III.B.2 (reviewing Chief Justice Rehnquist's Fourteenth Amendment
analysis of section 13981).
451. See infra Part III.B.2 (summarizing the Chief Justice's findings regarding the
constitutionality of section 13981). Whereas Justices O'Connor and Kennedy had declared the
holding in Lopez to be limited, there were no such reservations to their support for the majority's
opinion in Morrison. See Jan Crawford Greenburg, High Court Ruling Further Clips the Role of
Congress, CHI. TRIB., May 16, 2000, § 1, at 16.
452. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1745.
453. See id. at 1748.
454. See id. at 1749 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995)). The other
two areas are: 1) the use of channels of interstate commerce; and 2) the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce. See United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971).
455. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1749-53. The first inquiry in Lopez was whether the
regulated conduct substantially affects interstate commerce. See id. at 1749-50. Chief Justice
Rehnquist identified this specific inquiry as a key aspect of the Lopez decision. See id. at 1750
("But a fair reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue
was central to our decision in that case."). Lopez next looked for an express jurisdictional
element in the statute that could be used to narrow the field of regulated activity to those specific
instances of conduct that have an explicit effect on interstate commerce. See id. at 1750-51. The
third consideration from Lopez was whether Congress had made any specific congressional
findings in the legislative history that would assist the Court in weighing Congress' legislative
judgment regarding the nexus between the regulated activity and interstate commerce,
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At the beginning of his inquiry into the effect of gender-motivated
violence on interstate commerce, Chief Justice Rehnquist quickly
concluded that such acts of violence cannot be viewed as any type of
economic activity.456 The Chief Justice noted that gender-motivated
violence is an intrastate activity, and the Court has yet to find that the
commerce power extends to intrastate activity that is non-economic in
nature.457  However, the Chief Justice stopped short of blanketly
denying Congress the power to regulate non-economic intrastate
activity. 458  Turning to the question of a jurisdictional element, the
Court could find no such provision in section 13981 to ensure a case-
by-case connection with interstate commerce. 459  Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that, on the contrary, Congress had chosen to
extend the remedy's reach to the broad category of intrastate gender-
motivated violence.46° With regard to congressional findings, the Chief
Justice noted that, unlike the record in Lopez, the legislative history of
the VAWA is replete with statistical and authoritative findings
regarding the impact that gender-based violence has on victims and
their families. 461 However, the Court was not convinced by these
findings. Instead, the Court reaffirmed its position as the final authority
in determining whether specific activities fall within the commerce
power. 462 In analyzing the practical implications of sustaining section
13981, the Chief Justice suggested that to recognize a link between
gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce would be to open
particularly in recognizing such a nexus where one might not otherwise be readily identified. See
id. at 1751. Finally, the Lopez Court looked at the practical implications of sustaining the
legislation. See id.; see also supra notes 219-28 and accompanying text (reviewing the four-part
Commerce Clause analysis used by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Lopez).
456. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751.
457. See id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560).
458. See id.
459. See id.
460. See id. at 1752.
461. See id.
462. See id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964))). Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized Congress' findings as
being grounded in the same reasoning rejected by the Court in Lopez. See id. at 1752-53. In
Lopez, the Court declared that following the reasoning relied on by the petitioners would open the
door to congressional regulation of virtually any activity. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564. The Chief
Justice further backed this position by citing Justice Cardozo in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, "'[t]here is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction between what
is national and what is local in the activities of commerce."' Id. at 567 (quoting A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935)). In sum, the Court clearly stated that
where the link between the regulated activity and interstate commerce required the piling of
"inference upon inference" to reach a rational relation, the activity would not fall within the
commerce power. See id.
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Pandora's Box, clearing the way for Congress to regulate all crimes, and
even all areas of family law, thus fulfilling the warning set forth in
Gibbons v. Ogden.463 In concluding that the nexus between gender-
motivated violence and interstate commerce was insufficient to pass
constitutional scrutiny, Chief Justice Rehnquist declared the Court to be
upholding the traditional means of regulating violence not directed at
the instrumentalities of commerce: regulation by the states. 464 Having
found no support for sustaining section 13981 under the Commerce
Clause, the majority turned to its analysis under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
2. Enforcement Clause Focus on State Actions
The Chief Justice concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment failed to
support section 13981 because the remedy was targeted at private acts
of gender-motivated violence. 465 Chief Justice Rehnquist first affirmed
that the Enforcement Clause is "'a positive grant of legislative power'
that includes authority to 'prohibit conduct which is not itself
unconstitutional and [to] intrud[e] into legislative spheres of autonomy
previously reserved to the States." '466  Having said this, the Chief
Justice next reviewed the limitations that prior case law has placed on
Congress' reach under the Fourteenth Amendment.467 Fundamental
among these limitations is the means by which Congress may legislate
against discriminatory conduct, a limitation designed to preserve the
balance of power between the federal and state governments. 468 The
Amendment accomplishes this balance, through its explicit language, by
limiting its applicability to the actions of states.469 The Chief Justice
relied on case law, as well as statutory language, to support his
conclusion that section 13981 fell outside Congress' enforcement
power.
Chief Justice Rehnquist summarized the Court's holdings in its first
two Fourteenth Amendment cases to reinforce the precedent that federal
463. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752-53; see also supra note 134 and accompanying text
(explaining the Gibbons Court's warning against removing the line between what is national and
what is local).
464. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1754. Chief Justice Rehnquist supported this aspect of the
Court's decision with a reminder that the Framers had chosen to deny the federal government a
national police power. See id.
465. See id. at 1758-59.
466. Id. at 1755 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (citations omitted)).
467. See id.
468. See id.
469. See id. at 1756.
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anti-discrimination legislation can only be directed at discriminatory
acts of states and state actors.470 Although the petitioners argued that
the decision of the Civil Rights Cases had been overruled by United
States v. Guest, thus allowing congressional regulation of purely private
conduct, the Chief Justice stood behind the Court's 1883 decision. 471
The petitioners further argued that section 13981 is distinguishable from
the facts of the Civil Rights Cases because, in that case, there was no
indication of state discriminatory action. 472  In response, the Chief
Justice contended that there was no significant distinction between the
connection to state action in the VAWA civil rights remedy and the
Civil Rights Act of 1875. 473 Having defended the Court's earliest
Fourteenth Amendment holdings, the Chief Justice furthered his
argument by analogizing section 13981 to more recent congressional
action.
The Chief Justice's primary concern was the target of the VAWA
civil rights remedy: individual actors who have committed acts of
gender-motivated violence. 474 The Chief Justice compared various acts
of Congress, each of which had been sustained by the Court in the face
of a claim of unconstitutionality, to the VAWA civil rights remedy. 475
470. See id. (discussing the Court's holdings in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883)
and the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)). The Chief Justice placed a great deal of weight
on the fact that every Supreme Court Justice serving at the time these two cases were decided had
been appointed between 1862 and 1882, and therefore had first-hand knowledge of the events that
prompted passage of the Amendment. See id. Every justice on the Civil Rights Cases and Harris
panels had been appointed by Presidents Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, or Arthur. See id.;
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 107, app. B at B-3, B-4 (listing all Supreme Court Justices,
their respective terms, and the President who made the appointment).
471. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1757 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 18). Chief
Justice Rehnquist dismissed Justice Clark's comments in Guest regarding the Civil Rights Cases
as mere dicta, which, even when combined with Justice Brennan's explanation for finding that the
Civil Rights Cases were wrongly decided, was insufficient to constitute an overruling of the prior
case law. See id. at 1756-57; see also supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the Court's opinions in the
Civil Rights Cases and United States v. Guest).
472. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1758.
473. See id. (finding that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was based on unequal enforcement of
state laws requiring equal treatment of all persons).
474. See id. The Court also made a passing reference to the breadth of the civil rights remedy,
which, unlike other substantiated acts of Congress, had no time or geographical limit. See id. at
1759. Specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed to the voting laws in Katzenbach v. Morgan
and South Carolina v. Katzenbach, which were restricted in their applicability to those states in
which Congress had determined discrimination was occurring. See id. Compare United States v.
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1759 (2000) with City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-33
(1997) (demonstrating that both the VAWA and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act extended
beyond those states where constitutional violations were known to occur).
475. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1758-59. Specifically, the Chief Justice looked at the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 in Katzenbach v. Morgan and South Carolina v. Katzenbach, and the 1875
Act regarding jury selection in Ex Parte Virginia. See id.; see also supra Part II.C.2 (discussing
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This comparison revealed that each such act had been directed at state
officials, not at private individuals. 476 As with his Commerce Clause
analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, there was insufficient support to sustain section 13981 as a
valid exercise of congressional power.477 Having found no support for
the VAWA civil rights remedy under either of the two constitutional
bases cited by Congress, Chief Justice Rehnquist declared section
13981 unconstitutional.478
C. The Dissenting Opinions
Dissenting opinions were filed by Justices Souter and Breyer.
Because both justices concluded that the Commerce Clause provided
sufficient support to sustain section 13981, neither undertook a detailed
review of the Act under the Fourteenth Amendment, although Justice
Breyer did briefly comment on this issue.479
1. Justice Souter's Dissent
The first dissent in United States v. Morrison was written by Justice
Souter.480 Justice Souter relied on Congress' findings during its lengthy
research into gender-motivated violence, as well as prior case law, to
support his conclusion that section 13981 was a valid exercise of
Congress' commerce power.
Justice Souter initially observed that the majority had overturned
section 13981, while at the same time claiming not to have changed
previous Commerce Clause jurisprudence, two actions he considered
irreconcilable. 481  He premised the rest of his dissent on the
"substantially affects" test articulated in Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.482  Concluding that the Court would have sustained the civil
the Court's opinions in Katzenbach v Morgan and South Carolina v. Katzenbach).
476. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1758-59.
477. See id. at 1759.
478. See id. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which he reiterated the position
taken in his Lopez concurrence. See supra note 243 (discussing Justice Thomas' concurrence in
United States v. Lopez).
479. See infra Parts III.C. 1-2 (analyzing the dissenting opinions of Justices Souter and Breyer
in United States v. Morrison).
480. Justice Souter was joined in his dissent by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1759 (Souter, J., dissenting).
481. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
482. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). The "substantially affects" test is the broad test for
constitutionality set forth in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. and clarified in Lopez. The rational
basis test from Heart of Atlanta is a feature of this broad test, as is the cumulative effects theory
from Wickard. See id. at 1764 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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rights remedy as having sufficient constitutional support prior to Lopez,
Justice Souter asserted that the majority was only nominally giving
effect to this test.4 83  Justice Souter believed that Congress, not the
courts, is better equipped to perform the "substantially affects" test, due
to its ability to gather evidence determinative of this requirement.484 He
stated that once Congress has performed such due diligence, its
enactment of a statute signifies that the statute has passed the test. 485 It
is then the courts' role to determine if Congress had a rational basis for
that finding.486  Justice Souter argued that the majority was attempting
to change the "substantially affects" standard in favor of a greater
emphasis on scrutiny by the courts, a change he believed was not
substantiated by existing Commerce Clause precedent. 487 Justice Souter
also asserted that it was the Framers' intent that the balance between
state and national power be handled by the legislature, not the
judiciary. 488  He directly contested the majority's emphasis on the
Court's role in protecting federalism.489  He then turned to the issue of
congressional findings.
Justice Souter acknowledged the great mass of data related to
violence against women that Congress had accumulated during its four
years of research.490 He noted the distinction between the legislative
history of the GFSZA in Lopez, which contained virtually no
congressional findings, and that of the VAWA.491 He further contrasted
483. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). "[I]t is clear that some congressional conclusions about
obviously substantial, cumulative effects on commerce are being assigned lesser values than the
once-stable doctrine would assign them." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
484. See id. at 1759-60 (Souter, J., dissenting).
485. See id. at 1760 (Souter, J., dissenting).
486. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
487. See id. at 1764 (Souter, J., dissenting).
488. See id. at 1770 (Souter, J., dissenting). In support of this argument, Justice Souter cited
commentary by James Madison in The Federalist Papers that advocates the important role
national politics plays in the protection of states' rights. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing
THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison)). This position was reaffirmed in Garcia, where the
Court stated, "[sitate sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural
safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on
federal power." Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985), rev'g
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Justice Souter also pointed to language
in both Gibbons and Wickard to further support this theory. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1770
(Souter, J., dissenting). The Court in Wickard made reference to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
in Gibbons v. Ogden, stating, "[hie made emphatic the embracing and penetrating nature of this
power by warning that effective restraints on its exercise must proceed from political rather than
judicial processes." Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
489. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1769 (Souter, J., dissenting).
490. See id. at 1760 (Souter, J., dissenting).
491. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the VAWA congressional findings with the modest record compiled by
Congress for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was upheld in the
companion cases of Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States and
Katzenbach v. McClung.492 After highlighting a number of Congress'
findings on gender-motivated violence, Justice Souter rhetorically
concluded that, in light of the data it had gathered, Congress had not
been irrational in its finding that such violence substantially affected
interstate commerce. 493  For Justice Souter, these findings were only
one of several indications that Congress had a rational basis for enacting
section 13981. He further supported this argument with precedent.
Justice Souter compared the intrastate activity targeted by the
VAWA, first to that regulated in Heart of Atlanta and McClung, and
later to that in Wickard v. Filburn.494  Regarding the Heart of
Atlanta/McClung comparison, he determined that both groups of
regulated activities restricted their targets from fully participating in the
national economy. 495 He also pointed out that the Court, in both Heart
of Atlanta and McClung, refused to create a distinction between
legislation that addressed notions of commerce and those that addressed
notions of social injustice.496  In comparing the activity regulated in
Wickard to that addressed by section 13981, Justice Souter concluded
that the effect on supply and demand, which the Wickard Court
determined to be of pivotal importance, applied equally to the
VAWA.4 97 These comparisons solidified Justice Souter's conclusion
that gender-motivated violence not only affects interstate commerce, but
does so substantially.498
Justice Souter criticized the majority for attempting to limit the reach
of the commerce power into specific categories of activity, namely,
492. See id. at 1763 (Souter, J., dissenting); supra Part II.B.3.b (discussing the Court's
opinions in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States and Katzenbach v. McClung).
493. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1763 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Congress thereby explicitly
stated the predicate for the exercise of its Commerce Clause power. Is its conclusion irrational in
view of the data amassed?"); supra Part II.A.I (enumerating many of the statistics supporting the
VAWA' s enactment).
494. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1763-64 (Souter, J., dissenting).
495. See id. at 1763 (Souter, J., dissenting). This restriction occurred through reduction of
traveling for purposes of employment, as well as minimization of consumption of products that
travel in interstate commerce. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
496. See id. at 1764 (Souter, J., dissenting).
497. See id. at 1763-64 (Souter, J., dissenting). As he explained, injury resulting from gender-
motivated violence results in a reduction of women in the work force and even in death of
victims. See id. at 1764 (Souter, J., dissenting). A decreased population will result in a decrease
in the purchase of interstate goods, as will a decrease in the income of potential consumers. See
id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
498. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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non-economic intrastate activities and those activities that have
traditionally been the realm of the states. 499  He suggested that the
majority's focus on federalism was an ulterior motive for its attempt to
create classifications of activity. 50 0  Justice Souter pointed to the well-
recognized tenet of interpretation that, in a document containing
enumerated powers, those not listed are deemed withheld.501 He argued
that, under this rationale, the grant of Commerce Clause authority can
only logically be read to require the regulated activity to have some
effect on commerce; it cannot support the majority's suggestion that
activity affecting commerce may be excluded from the Clause's reach if
it is non-economic in nature or falls within traditional areas of state
regulation. 502
In order to demonstrate that such exclusion had previously resulted in
"near tragedy," Justice Souter pointed to past judicial attempts to excise
categories of activity from the reach of the commerce power.50 3  He
explained that any attempt to distinguish between activities of a
commercial and a non-commercial nature conflicts with the Court's
statement in Wickard that such distinction has no bearing on the reach
of the commerce power.50 4  He also criticized any separation of
activities into those which are traditional subjects of state regulation and
those which are not, as having been rejected by the Court in United
States v. Darby and again in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, Inc.505 He concluded that the Court's advocacy of
499. See id. at 1765 (Souter, J., dissenting).
500. See id. at 1768 (Souter, J., dissenting). For commentary on the Court's federalism
initiative, see Steve France, Laying the Groundwork, A.B.A. J., May 2000, at 40.
501. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1765 (Souter, J., dissenting).
502. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
503. See id. at 1767 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter was referring to President Franklin
Roosevelt's court-packing plan of 1937, in which he asked Congress for authorization to appoint
one additional federal judge for every judge aged seventy or older who had also served on the
federal bench for at least ten years. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 98, § 2.7, at 110;
supra note 160 (explaining FDR's plan to pack the Court). Had Congress approved this plan, it
would have added six justices to the Supreme Court. See 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 98,
§ 2.7, at 110; supra note 160 (discussing the court-packing plan in more detail). The categories
about which Justice Souter was speaking include those distinctions made by the Court in the early
1800s between commerce and manufacturing. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Court's
various formalistic notions in Commerce Clause interpretation).
504. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1767 (Souter, J., dissenting).
505. See id. at 1768-69 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941), and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981)).
Justice Souter also explained that the Court had rejected this method of separation in Maryland v.
Wirtz, which was overruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, but ultimately vindicated
when Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority repudiated National League of
Cities. See id. at 1769 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Garcia Court held that "[i]f there are to be
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carving out certain activities from Commerce Clause regulation
conflicts with Chief Justice Marshall's definition of commerce in
Gibbons.5°6 He further advised that the Necessary and Proper Clause of
Article I, Section 8 negates the constitutionality of any attempt to excise
particular categories of activity. 5°7
In concluding, Justice Souter reiterated his belief that the majority's
holding was erroneous and further predicted that the opinion would not
stand the test of time. 508 By neither overruling precedent that advocates
application of the "substantially affects" test, nor reviving case law that
advocates division of activity into categories that can be regulated and
those that cannot, Justice Souter believed the Court was relegating the
future of Commerce Clause interpretation to ad hoc review. 5°9 Justice
Souter's dissent contained no analysis of the petitioners' Fourteenth
Amendment argument, as he stated that he would uphold section 13981
under the Commerce Clause.510
2. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer's dissent focused on the Court's intimation of a bright-
line rule for categorizing activities eligible for Commerce Clause
regulation, as well as its suggestion that sustaining section 13981 would
have far-reaching negative implications.511 Justice Breyer initially
expressed his agreement with Justice Souter's analysis of the historical
and precedential reasons why the majority's opinion is flawed.512 He
then began his own critique of the Court's decision.
Justice Breyer accused the majority of failing to clarify any set of
interpretive rules that courts could use in future Commerce Clause
analyses. 513 He noted that Supreme Court precedent had focused on the
limits on the Federal Government's power to interfere with state functions-as undoubtedly there
are-we must look elsewhere to find them." Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528, 547 (1985), rev'g National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
506. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1769 (Souter, J., dissenting).
507. See id. at 1766 (Souter, J., dissenting). It is the language of the Necessary and Proper
Clause that is embodied in the "rational basis" test. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). See supra
note 295 for the text of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
508. See id. at 1773 (Souter, J., dissenting).
509. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
510. See id. at 1759 n.l (Souter, J., dissenting).
511. Justice Breyer's dissent obtained the concurrence of only one other justice, Justice
Stevens, who did not join in Justice Breyer's brief Fourteenth Amendment commentary. See id.
at 1774 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
512. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
513. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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effect of the intrastate activity being regulated, not its nature. 514  He
stressed the difficulty inherent in applying the economic/non-economic
distinction intimated by the Chief Justice.515  Other Supreme Court
precedent, such as the Court's finding that non-economic activity of
businesses, if aggregated, can be regulated under the Commerce Clause,
further confuses this distinction. 516 Justice Breyer also noted that the
Lopez Court's suggestion, that those intrastate activities requiring
regulation to avoid undercutting a broader regulation of economic
activity fall within the commerce power, does not articulate a
requirement that such activities be economic in nature.5 17  In short,
Justice Breyer emphasized that the Constitution itself delineates no limit
on the nature of the activity that can be regulated, and he rejected
United States v. Lopez as an inaccurate statement of the law.
518
Justice Breyer also rejected the majority's argument that upholding
section 13981 would open a Pandora's Box, enabling Congress to
regulate virtually any activity. 519 He argued that in a modern economy,
nearly every activity is, in some way, tied to commerce. 520  This fact
makes it nearly impossible for courts to define discrete categories of
conduct that fall outside the commerce power, without somehow being
overly inclusive and excising from Congress' rightful control some
types of activity that truly belong within it.521  Justice Breyer
emphasized that because of this, Congress, not the courts, must be left
to rationally determine the boundaries between which regulation falls
under the Commerce Clause and which regulation interferes with state
autonomy. 522 Justice Breyer echoed a point made by Justice Souter:
514. See id. at 1775 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
515. See id. at 1774 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer questioned whether, had Congress
found that those committing gender-based violence were motivated not only by animus against
women, but also by a desire to achieve economic power, the majority would have upheld the
VAWA. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
516. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)). It is interesting to note that
Justice Breyer refers to the activity being regulated in these companion cases as non-economic,
while the Chief Justice, both in Morrison and Lopez, grouped this activity, along with that in
Wickard v. Filburn. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., and United
States v. Perez, under the heading of "economic activity." Id. at 1750; United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995).
517. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1774-75 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
518. See id. at 1775, 1777 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
519. See id. at 1776 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
520. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
521. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
522. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
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Congress is much better suited than the courts to gather information and
hear testimony on a particular activity.5 23 From this accumulated data,
Congress can make a more "educated" decision that will best reflect the
sovereignty concerns of the states.524 His belief in Congress' superior
ability to determine whether a particular statute will interfere with
states' rights, coupled with the problems inherent in the majority's
opinion, confirmed for Justice Breyer that the "rational basis" approach
is a sufficient test for judicial review of Commerce Clause regulation. 525
For these reasons, he concluded that the VAWA was a necessary and
proper exercise of Congress' commerce power.526 Justice Breyer then
turned briefly to the validity of the Enforcement Clause as constitutional
justification for the VAWA. 527
Justice Breyer grounded his comments in Fourteenth Amendment
precedent. He first pointed out that the Court, in both the Civil Rights
Cases and United States v. Harris, did not consider legislation that
addressed the states' failure to provide adequate remedies for those
citizens who were victims of crime.528 Because of this, he concluded
that the majority's use of these two cases, in support of its argument that
the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be used to substantiate section
13981, was flawed. 529 Justice Breyer also suggested that the Fourteenth
Amendment can be used to regulate purely private conduct, even though
that conduct does not violate the Constitution. 530  Citing language from
City of Boerne v. Flores suggesting that Congress is empowered to
enact legislation directed at conduct "which is not itself
unconstitutional," he argued that section 13981 leads by example,
U.S. 528, 552 (1985)). As Justice Stevens stated in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, "the
Framers designed important structural safeguards to ensure that when the National Government
enacted substantive law ... the normal operation of the legislative process itself would
adequately defend state interest from undue infringement." 120 S. Ct. 631, 651 (2000) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). In Justice Breyer's view, Congress is "motivated" to operate in the best interests
of the states, both because of the discrete state constituency that each member represents and
because of the formal procedures under which Congress operates. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at
1777 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
523. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1777 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
524. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). This Congress clearly did during the four years leading
up to the passage of the VAWA. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer noted that the
VAWA does not represent a case of state/federal conflict, "but of state/federal efforts to cooperate
in order to help solve a mutually acknowledged national problem." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
525. See id. at 1778 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
526. See id. at 1780 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
527. See id. at 1777 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
528. See id. at 1779 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
529. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
530. See id. (Breyer, I., dissenting).
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providing motivation for states to improve their criminal justice
systems. 531 Finally, Justice Breyer dismissed the majority's argument
that the VAWA civil rights remedy is overly broad, imposing a remedy
where one is not needed.532 Justice Breyer took exception to the
Court's suggestion that, in order for Congress to enact a national
solution, it must find that the target problem exists in each of the fifty
states. 533  However, despite these conclusions, Justice Breyer
maintained that the Commerce Clause provided sufficient grounds for
upholding the VAWA and reserved his detailed Fourteenth Amendment
analysis for a future opinion. 5
34
IV. ANALYSIS
The majority's opinion in United States v. Morrison conflicts in
numerous ways with established Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The
Chief Justice's continued intimation of a bright-line rule for
categorizing intrastate activity reachable under the commerce power
represents the first such conflict.535  Such a bright line rule is not
supported by precedent.536 The majority also chose to view section
13981 through its current notions of federalism, which not only conflict
with precedent, but in this case, also conflict with the wishes of the
states themselves.537 The majority's determination that section 13981
was not supported by the Fourteenth Amendment is more solidly
grounded in prior case law.538 The petitioners' arguments for viewing
private acts of gender-motivated violence as having a sufficient nexus
with the state to constitute state action under the Amendment are not as
strong as their arguments in favor of Commerce Clause support.539
531. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
532. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). The majority had offered, as proof that the civil rights
remedy is overly broad, the fact that it applies to all states, even those in which criminal justice
problems, such as those identified through Congress' research, do not exist. See id. at 1759.
533. See id. at 1779 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
534. See id. at 1780 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
535. See infra Parts IV.A-B (demonstrating how Commerce Clause precedent fails to support
the Chief Justice's intimation of a new rule of Commerce Clause interpretation).
536. See infra Parts IV.A-B (detailing how the Morrison majority failed to apply established
parameters of Commerce Clause analysis).
537. See infra Part IV.C (reviewing the impact of the Court's emphasis on federalism).
538. See infra Part IV.D (describing how arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment supports
Congress' decision to enact the VAWA, based on precedent, are not as valid as those regarding
Commerce Clause support).
539. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the shortcomings of arguments in favor of Fourteenth
Amendment grounds for sustaining section 13981).
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A. Bright Line Rules Conflict With Prior Precedent
The Supreme Court's use of United States v. Lopez as a model for its
Commerce Clause review of section 13981 is not surprising. Lopez was
the first case in almost sixty years to declare a federal statute
unconstitutional. 540 Although the Morrison majority opened by
asserting that any Commerce Clause analysis should begin with a
presumption of constitutionality, the decision that followed was flat and
almost rote.541 The opinion did not contain the give-and-take that
analysis under a presumption of constitutionality should have. 542  In
addition to its overall tone, there are several aspects in which the
Court's decision did not ring true with established parameters for
Commerce Clause analysis.
The most obvious conflict with established parameters is the Chief
Justice's classification of the intrastate activity in prior Supreme Court
Commerce Clause opinions as being exclusively economic in nature.
The lingering question from Lopez is the precise meaning of the Chief
Justice's statements that "we have upheld a wide variety of
congressional acts regulating intrastate economic activity where we
have concluded that the activity substantially affected interstate
commerce," and later in the same paragraph, "[t]hese examples are by
no means exhaustive, but the pattern is clear. Where economic activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that
activity will be sustained., 543 The Chief Justice relied on this concept
as one of four factors in his Commerce Clause analysis, first in Lopez,
and again in Morrison. 54  Some have interpreted this language to create
a new rule: that in order for Congress to reach intrastate activity under
the Commerce Clause, the activity must be economic in nature.545 Yet,
the plain language of Lopez contradicts such an interpretation,
suggesting an outer limit, or a safe zone, for constitutionality.546 The
Chief Justice's opinion in Morrison provided no further substantiation
540. See Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 534 (N.D. I11. 1997); GUNTHER & SULLIVAN,
supra note 107, at 141.
541. See supra Part III.B. 1 (discussing the Morrison majority's Commerce Clause analysis).
542. See supra Part III.B.1 (reviewing the Commerce Clause analysis of section 13981 written
by Chief Justice Rehnquist).
543. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995).
544. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1749-50 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-
61.
545. See, e.g., Brzonkala I11, 169 F.3d 820, 833 (4th Cir. 1999) (declaring the economic/non-
economic distinction of Lopez to be the "law of the land").
546. See United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the Lopez
majority intended to establish an "outer limit" to congressional authority).
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for this interpretation. Chief Justice Rehnquist stopped short of denying
Congress power to regulate non-economic intrastate activities across the
board.5 47 Therefore, despite his reliance on the nature of the regulated
intrastate activity as one of several tests, the Chief Justice's majority
opinion explicitly rejected a bright-line rule regarding intrastate activity.
The Chief Justice's rejection of this conclusion is only right, as there
would be no precedent for finding such a bright-line rule.5 4 8 In fact, in
Lopez, the Chief Justice quoted a passage from Wickard providing that
local activity need not be regarded as commerce to fall under
congressional authority; rather, it need only have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.549  The Court's past attempts to put regulated
activities into categories, such as manufacturing or production, direct or
indirect, traditional or untraditional, have failed, primarily due to the
fine line between what is economic and what is not.550  Further, the
evaluation of whether a particular activity is economic in nature does
not differ from the determination of whether a particular activity
"substantially affects interstate commerce." The Court has struggled
with the latter; clearly the former is equally as subjective and only
makes the analysis more difficult.551 Such artificial distinctions restrict
547. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751. "While we need not adopt a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of any non-economic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our
Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only
where that activity is economic in nature." Id.
548. In addition to those cases discussed in Part IV.B, several other Supreme Court cases
support this conclusion. In Camps of NewfoundlOwatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, the Court
held that whether the regulated activity is profit-driven is not determinative of the regulation
being constitutional under the Commerce Clause. 520 U.S. 564, 583-84 (1997). In Fry v. United
States, the Court stated, "[elven activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by
Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects
commerce among the States." 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975). Two earlier cases helped to cement this
conclusion by the Court, around the time that Wickard was decided. In United States v. Womens'
Sportswear Manufacturing Ass 'n, the Court declared, "[i]f it is interstate commerce that feels the
pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze." 336 U.S. 460, 464
(1949). Similarly, in United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., the Court articulated its position as,
"[iut is the effect upon interstate commerce.., not the source of the injury which is the criterion
of congressional power." 315 U.S. 110, 121 (1942).
549. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995); supra note 220 (detailing the
passage from Wickard quoted in the Lopez majority).
550. See Schwartz, supra note 410, at M-l; supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Commerce Clause
jurisprudence between 1787-1937).
551. For example, the legislation at issue in Heart of Atlanta and McClung is considered by
Chief Justice Rehnquist to be economic regulation, see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60, whereas Judge
Motz, in Brzonkala II, referred to that same activity as civil rights laws, not economic regulation,
132 F.3d 949, 972 (4th Cir. 1997). As Justice Breyer illustrated in his dissenting opinion in
Morrison, does the conduct of a downtown mugger who mugs for money constitute economic, or
non-economic, activity? See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1774 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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a court's ability to effectively evaluate whether Congress had a rational
basis for enacting legislation.55 2 In addition, once established, such
artificial distinctions cannot be quickly set aside by Congress or the
populous. 553 Bright line rules conflict with the practical conception of
the commerce power embraced by the Supreme Court since the early
twentieth century. 5
54
B. Supportive Precedent Avoided
In relying on this artificial distinction between those intrastate
activities that can be regulated and those that cannot, the Chief Justice
avoided addressing the four cases that most closely resemble the
situation in Morrison, thereby failing to give them the attention they
merit. 555 Instead, he was able to dismiss all four as supportive of his
view that the Court has tended to exclusively uphold regulation of
economic intrastate activities because all four, in his opinion, involved
intrastate activities of an economic nature. 556  Each, however, is
analogous to Morrison and demonstrates additional conflicts between
the Morrison majority and Supreme Court precedent.
First, the majority's analysis failed to give sufficient weight to
Wickard v. Filburn. Roscoe Filburn's small, homegrown, wheat crop is
analogous to a single instance of gender-motivated violence, in that
neither, alone, is likely to affect interstate commerce. 557 The key is the
cumulative effect of such conduct, which the Wickard Court determined
was sufficient to affect interstate commerce. 558  Certainly the
cumulative effect of absenteeism and welfare expenses, not to mention
the withdrawal from participation in the economy by one segment of the
population, all resulting from gender-motivated violence, bears a greater
impact on interstate commerce than does several hundred aggregated
acres of home-grown wheat.
552. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1775 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
553. See Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 40.
554. See id. Justice Cardozo warned judges to be wary of "times when the demon of
formalism tempts the intellect with the lure of scientific order." Reply Brief of Petitioner Christy
Brzonkala at 3 n.2, United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29)
[hereinafter Brzonkala Reply Brief] (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 90 (1921)).
555. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the Commerce Clause analysis of the Morrison
majority).
556. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1750.
557. See Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 614 (D. Conn. 1996).
558. See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
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Additionally, the Court bypassed any discussion of the companion
cases of Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States and Katzenbach v.
McClung. Both cases dealt with discriminatory practices against
African Americans in the 1960s. 559  The Court determined that the
refusal to rent rooms to African American travelers, and to serve
African American restaurant patrons, impacted the amount of traveling
done by such persons. The Court further noted the negative impact on
society, in general, because such discrimination discourages
professional persons and industry from settling in areas where these
types of discrimination are practiced. 560 The VAWA is an anti-
discrimination law, which, like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 at issue in
Heart of Atlanta and McClung, was designed to address specific acts of
discrimination against a defined group: women. 561 Just as the Court
concluded that African Americans were discouraged from traveling
interstate because of the discrimination they suffered at establishments
like the Heart of Atlanta Motel and Ollie's Barbecue, Congress learned
that the threat of gender-motivated violence impacts the degree to which
women are generally willing to participate in the nation's economy.562
Such connections to interstate commerce are neither attenuated, nor do
they require the piling of "inference upon inference." 563
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Court determined, in
Perez v. United States, that local loan sharking activities substantially
affected interstate commerce. 564  Perez is a fitting analogy, as some
have argued that section 13981, although a civil remedy, punishes
gender-based crimes.5 65 When presented with validating an exercise of
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, the court must
give deference to a congressional finding that the regulated activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, so long as there is any rational
basis for that finding. 566  Perez sustained congressional regulation of
559. See generally Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Commerce Clause aspects
of these two cases).
560. See McClung, 379 U.S. at 300 (taking note of congressional findings illustrating the
negative effect of discriminatory practices on industry).
561. See Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 19, 26.
562. See id. at 19.
563. This is a reference to language in Chief Justice Rehnquist's Lopez opinion. See supra
note 228 and accompanying text.
564. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1971) (affirming Title H of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act as a permissible exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause).
565. Contrary to this argument, section 13981 is a civil remedy, not a criminal statute. See
Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 14.
566. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276
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local criminal conduct because the Court accepted congressional
findings that local loan sharking activities were largely under the
control of organized crime and thus, when aggregated, substantially
affected interstate commerce. 567 The Perez decision also reflected that
issues too large for the states to adequately handle can be legislated by
Congress.56
8
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention recognized the need
to empower the federal government to address problems that the states
were unable to handle. 569  In addition to Perez, the Supreme Court's
support for this authority can most clearly be seen in its decisions
sustaining civil rights laws, like the VAWA.57 ° Primary examples
include Heart of Atlanta and McClung, where Congress determined that
discriminatory conduct had reached a point that a federal response was
necessary. 571  The uniformity of enforcement that can be achieved
through federal legislation is necessary to make civil rights laws
effective. 572  In overturning section 13981, the Court ignored
congressional findings derived, in part, from input provided by the
states themselves, that dealing with gender-motivated violence was too
large a problem for them to manage alone.573  It also ignored the
authority of Congress to address, on a national level, such sizable
(1981) (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964)).
567. Perez, 402 U.S. at 156-57.
568. In Perez, the Court acknowledged congressional findings that the problem of organized
crime, which received a large share of its revenues from loan sharking activities, was too large to
be solved by the states alone and needed the resources of the federal government. See id. at 150.
569. See Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 29. The Framers adopted a resolution, on July 17,
1787, clarifying the powers of Congress. See id. at 29. This resolution read, in part: "[t]hat the
Natil. Legislature ought to (possess) the Legislative Rights vested in Congs. by the
Confederation ... and moreover to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and
also in those to which the States are separately incompetent .. " Id. at 30 (quoting 2 RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 95 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)) (emphasis added). Each
of the various resolutions adopted during the Convention were delivered to the Committee of
Detail, whose job it was to integrate all of the resolutions into the document that ultimately
became the Constitution of 1787. See id. at 30 n.1 1.
570. Civil rights and anti-discrimination legislation are traditional functions of the federal
government dating back to the Civil War Amendments. See Brzonkala 11, 132 F.3d 949, 971 (4th
Cir. 1997); Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 35. "The power of Congress in this field is broad
and sweeping; where it keeps within its sphere and violates no express constitutional limitation it
has been the rule of this Court, going back almost to the founding days of the Republic, not to
interfere." Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964).
571. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 12.
572. See Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 17.
573. See Brzonkala II, 132 F.3d at 971 n.14; supra note 47 (setting forth a passage from the
letter written by the state attorneys general).
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problems.574 Finally, it ignored its own precedent of sustaining civil
rights legislation. 575
C. The Glare of Federalism
It has been widely publicized that the current majority in the Supreme
Court is focused on furthering its conception of federalism, determined
to reinvigorate state sovereignty. 576  The Court's current emphasis on
states' rights has often been viewed by the states themselves as
counterproductive.5 77 A majority of the states supported the passage of
the VAWA 578 and told the Court in an amicus brief that the problem of
gender-motivated violence is too large for them to adequately address
on their own. 579  In sharp contrast to past Commerce Clause and
federalism cases, United States v. Morrison saw a majority of the states
actually arguing on the side of the federal government in favor of
section 13981's constitutionality. 580 This is not to say that the mere
desire of the states that something be so justifies breaching the tenets of
the Constitution. However, the tenacity with which the Court has been
pursuing its goal of renewed state sovereignty is not in keeping with the
traditional balance between federal and state power inherent in the
concept of federalism. 581
The Chief Justice placed the greatest emphasis of his Commerce
Clause analysis on the abuses likely to be wrought by the Court's
validation of section 13981.582 However, this sort of wild speculation
574. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971).
575. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Court's decisions in Heart of Atlanta and McClung).
576. See France, supra note 500, at 40.
577. See Peter M. Shane, In Whose Best Interest? Not the States', WASH. POST, May 21,
2000, at B5.
578. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (detailing a passage from the letter provided by
state attorneys general as part of the four years of testimony heard by Congress).
579. See Amici Brief of the States, supra note 33, at 2, 15-16; Shane, supra note 577, at B5.
580. See Joan Biskupic, States' Role at Issue in Rape Suit, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2000, at
A17. The states have voluminous amounts of data that show rape victims alone accrue health
costs far greater than those accrued by victims of other acts of violence. See id. Unfortunately,
the states often bear the brunt of those costs through emergency, insurance, and welfare
payments. See id.
581. Justice Hugo Black defined this balance in Younger v. Harris as:
The concept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" any more than it means
centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government and its
courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a
system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and
National Governments, and in which the National Government... will not unduly
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
582. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1751-53 (2000) (noting that the GFSZA
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runs contrary to previous Court rulings.583 In Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court condemned the "parade of
horribles" argument suggested by the dissenting justices, claiming that
"the process of constitutional adjudication does not thrive on conjuring
up horrible possibilities that never happen in the real world and devising
doctrines sufficiently comprehensive in detail to cover the remotest
contingency. . . ."84 The Garcia Court maintained that the structure of
the federal government would provide safeguards against rampant
invasion of the states' sovereignty. 585  Each state has representation in
Congress, and the legislative process provides adequate protection
in Lopez was found to be outside of Congress' commerce power because to accept Congress'
arguments in support of the Act would enable Congress to regulate all violent crime, as well as all
activities that might lead to violent crime, no matter how loosely tied to interstate commerce
those activities might be). Interestingly, during the time that Congress was considering passage
of the VAWA, Chief Justice Rehnquist was one of several federal judges warning against
federalization of criminal law. See Editorial, A Federal Case, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1993, at
A 16. The Chief Justice specifically identified the VAWA as an example of Congress' increased
creation of federal crimes for, what he believed were, purely symbolic reasons. See Biskupic,
supra note 580, at A17. He warned against bringing issues of domestic violence into the federal
realm, stating that doing so would have a seriously detrimental effect on the nation's federalist
structure and, in return, would gain only minimal impact on the problem itself. See Editorial, A
Federal Case, supra, at A16. Chief Justice Rehnquist further expressed concerns that the Act
would overwhelm the federal court system with unfounded lawsuits. See Editorial, Wrong Way
to Attack Rape; THE ISSUE: Violence Against Women Act of 1993; OUR VIEW: The Problem Is
Real, the Proposed Solution is Wrongheaded, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 15, 1993, at 43a.
This concern, however, has proved to be unfounded. In the years since the enactment of the
VAWA in 1994, fewer than 100 federal cases seeking the remedy of section 13981 have been
reported, with an even smaller number of such cases filed in state courts. See Biden Brief, supra
note 19, at 17. In a speech to the National Conference on State-Federal Judicial Relationships,
the Chief Justice expressed his belief that harmony between federal and state courts is vital to the
judicial structure of this country. See William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National
Conference on State-Federal Judicial Relationships, 78 VA. L. REV. 1657 (1992). However, to
the extent that this concern influences his interpretation of constitutional language and prior
precedent, it does not differ from the concerns of other citizens about the far-reaching effects of
violence against women, and the manner in which they are likely to interpret the same language.
583. See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 569 (1947)
(providing that "constitutional issues affecting legislation will not be determined ... in advance
of the necessity of deciding them"); Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450,
461 (1945) (acknowledging the Court's tradition of refusing to decide "abstract, hypothetical, or
contingent questions, or to decide any constitutional question in advance of the necessity for its
decision, or to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts
to which it is to be applied").
584. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985), rev'g National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (quoting New York v. United States, 326 U.S.
572, 583 (1946)).
585. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552-53 (providing that "[sitate sovereign interests ... are more
properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by
judicially created limitations on federal power").
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against federal interference with state autonomy.586  That structure
remains unchanged from 1985 and will provide the same safeguards in
the new century as it has during this nation's first 224 years.
Unlike the judicial branch of the federal government, over which the
general population can exercise no control, or the executive branch,
over which the population can exercise a limited amount of control, the
legislative branch is controlled completely by the people. If Congress
oversteps its bounds, the people express their displeasure through their
votes. This is not to say that the courts are powerless to review the acts
of Congress. Marbury v. Madison587 clearly established that authority
early in our nation's history. 588 However, the Court has repeatedly held
that congressional findings are due a high degree of deference. 589 The
whole purpose of the "rational basis" test is to require courts to defer to
Congress on a case-by-case basis.59° This is because the legislature is
better equipped to gather statistics, hold hearings, and formulate
findings than is the judiciary.591 It is not the role of the courts to
determine whether particular legislation is necessary or could have been
drafted more effectively. 592  One has to wonder what has become of
judicial restraint and deference to Congress, particularly where
Congress spent, not days, not months, but years gathering data,
reviewing studies, hearing testimony, and refining language that would
address a problem of national scope. 593 The VAWA is not a statute that
586. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1777 (Breyer, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
587. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
588. See id. at 178.
589. See Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 27-28. The Court declared, in Walters v. National
Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, "[w]hen Congress makes findings on essentially factual issues...
those findings are of course entitled to a great deal of deference, inasmuch as Congress is an
institution better equipped to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing on such an
issue." 473 U.S. 305, 330 n.12 (1985). Congressional findings submitted concurrently with a
statute's enactment carry greater weight than arguments made by attorneys during a subsequent
constitutional challenge to the legislation. See Brzonkala 111, 169 F.3d 820, 924 (4th Cir. 1999)
(Motz, J., dissenting).
590. See Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 539 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (citing United States v.
Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 682 n.7 (7th Cir. 1995)). In response to one litigant's argument before the
Supreme Court that Congress lacked a rational basis for enacting a particular piece of legislation,
it is reported that Chief Justice Rehnquist asked, "[a]re you saying, Counsel, that the Senators
who voted for that bill belong in the looney bin?" Id. at 534 n.1 (quoting Violence Against
Women: Victims of the System: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.
103 (1991) (testimony of Professor Cass R. Sunstein)).
591. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1777 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
592. See Anisimov, 982 F. Supp. at 538.
593. See supra Part II.A.1 (detailing the breadth of congressional findings regarding the
pervasiveness of violence against women).
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was haphazardly thrown together during an all-night session; it was
carefully crafted to meet the needs of victims, to avoid interference with
the autonomy of the states, and to avoid imposing additional burdens on
the states.594 The judgment of the legislature should not be discounted
in a rush to protect states' rights.
595
The majority's emphasis on states' rights is not without its share of
popular support. In response to the argument of states' rights advocates
that giving an inch to Congress will only encourage it to take a mile,
opening the door for federal regulation of even such traditional areas as
criminal and family law, some perspective is important. The
Constitution empowers the President to grant reprieves and pardons for
offenses against the nation, without congressional or judicial review,
and yet, no President has taken liberties with that power. 596 Similarly,
the federal courts have unchecked power to adjudicate matters brought
before them by the executive branch, and yet they, too, have not abused
that power. 597 These two examples only add strength to the Court's past
observations regarding the "parade of horribles"; 598 clearly the Framers
did not dwell on remote possibilities. If they had, either the
Constitution would never have been completed, or it would be an
excessively long document. Further, it is clear from the actions of
Congress itself, by the amount of time and resources it expended during
the four years of the VAWA's formation, that it made every effort to
thoroughly understand the issue of gender-motivated violence.
599
Congress carefully worded its legislation to avoid interference with state
family and criminal law by limiting the application of the VAWA to
594. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the steps taken by Congress to ensure that section
13981 would not interfere with state laws).
595. As Justice Stevens concluded in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, "[tihe kind of
judicial activism manifested in [recent federalism cases] represents such a radical departure from
the proper role of this Court that it should be opposed whenever the opportunity arises." 120 S.
Ct. 631, 653-54 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). He later noted that it is not a function of the
federal judiciary to protect the interests of the states. See id. at 651-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Framers designed important structural safeguards to ensure that when the National
Government enacted substantive law (and provided for its enforcement), the normal operation of
the legislative process itself would adequately defend state interests from undue infringement.").
596. See Shane, supra note 577, at B5.
597. See id. There are both political and practical reasons that will keep Congress from
usurping power from the states. See Doe v. Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d 64, 69 (D. Mass. 1999)
(reasoning that merely because Congress has certain regulatory powers does not mean Congress
will inevitably take advantage of those powers).
598. See supra note 584 and accompanying text (discussing quote from New York v. United
States in Garcia).
599. See Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 539 (N.D. I11. 1997).
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felonies, and only to those in which a gender animus could be proven. 6W
These are not the actions of a branch of government raring to
commandeer all aspects of government, federal and state. It is clear
from the record amassed by Congress that it recognized its limitations
under the enumerated powers and made a conscientious attempt to stay
within those boundaries. 60
1
Supreme Court Commerce Clause precedent not only supports the
constitutionality of section 13981, but also militates against the
establishment of bright-line rules that sustain legislation based on the
category of activity it regulates. The majority in Morrison paid lip
service to the "rational basis" test, by allowing its devotion to
federalism to supersede the deference owed to congressional judgment.
In trying to prevent an upset of the balance of power between federal
and state governments, the Court managed to jostle the balance between
two federal branches.
D. Weak Link to State Action
The majority's opinion regarding Fourteenth Amendment support for
section 13981 is more firmly rooted in Supreme Court precedent than is
its Commerce Clause holding. It is clear from prior Supreme Court
cases that the Court has yet to extend congressional authority under the
Enforcement Clause to purely private conduct.60 2  Congress' authority
does extend, however, to the conduct of state actors.60 3 The petitioners
argued that it was the conduct of state actors that Congress chose to
600. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 15-16.
601. See Brzonkala II, 132 F.3d 949, 973 (4th Cir. 1997). The rational basis test is built on a
practical conception of the commerce power. This was articulated clearly in Polish National
Alliance v. National Labor Relations Board:
[Whether] the conduct of an enterprise affects commerce among the States is a matter
of practical judgment, not to be determined by abstract notions. The exercise of this
practical judgment the Constitution entrusts primarily and very largely to the Congress,
subject to the latter's control by the electorate. Great power was thus given to the
Congress: the power of legislation and thereby the power of passing judgment upon the
needs of a complex society. Strictly confined ihough far-reaching power was given to
this Court: that of determining whether the Congress has exceeded limits allowable in
reason for the judgment which it has exercised.
322 U.S. 643, 650 (1944). This concept was echoed by Justice Kennedy in his Lopez
concurrence, where he pointed to several examples of the Court's practical conception of the
Commerce Clause and declared that precedent undisturbed by the Lopez majority. United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 573-74 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
602. See supra Part II.C.2 (tracing the development of Fourteenth Amendment interpretation).
603. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the types of conduct that can be regulated under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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pursue under the VAWA.6°4 Both the Brzonkala I and III courts
condemned the remedy of section 13981 for compensating victims of
gender-motivated violence for the actions of private individuals, not for
the state's denial of equal protection.60 5 Yet, it can be argued that if the
states were not denying equal protection of the laws to a portion of their
respective populations, there would be no need for such a supplemental
remedy. 6°6 In essence, the states' preclusion of women from obtaining
redress for the injuries caused them by perpetrators of gender-based
violence is equivalent to encouraging such behavior among assailants.
This type of encouragement can be seen to make individual perpetrators
state actors under the Amendment. 6 7 However, the precedent against
such reasoning is currently more substantial than that supporting it.
Congress maintained that the degree of remedy offered by enactment
of section 13981 met the requirements set forth in City of Boerne v.
Flores, as it displayed "a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end."608  This proportionality and congruence was accomplished
through congressional limitation of section 13981 to felony crimes of
violence, giving the states concurrent jurisdiction and eliminating the
potential for issues of family law to be joined to section 13981
claims. 6°9 In choosing to act under its Enforcement Clause power,
Congress consciously drafted the civil rights remedy to avoid
supplanting state laws or otherwise burdening state governments. 610
Congress' intent was to give private individuals a right to recover for
violation of their rights, and by doing so, motivate states to improve
their efforts to enforce those rights. 611 Congress knew it would not be
able to eradicate the problem of gender-motivated violence; rather,
Congress' purpose was to send a message to the populous that gender-
based violence is unacceptable and put such discrimination on par with
604. See Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 47.
605. See Brzonkala 111, 169 F.3d 820, 885 (4th Cir. 1999); Brzonkala 1, 935 F. Supp. 779, 797
(W.D. Va. 1996).
606. See Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 539-40 (N.D. I11. 1997).
607. See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 800 (1998).
608. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 26 (citing City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520
(1997)).
609. See id. at 27.
610. See id. Section 13981 does not impose any obligations on the states or force them to
administer federal programs. See Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 33. Unlike the GFSZA in
Lopez, section 13981 does not prevent a state from enacting whatever additional laws or
programs it wishes to enact to combat gender-motivated crime. See id. at 34.
611. See Biden Brief, supra note 19, at 28 (citing City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561,
574 (1986)).
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racial and religious discrimination.612 Unfortunately, the lack of a more
direct link between the states' denial of equal protection and the conduct
of those private individuals committing acts of gender-motivated
violence caused section 13981 to fail the tests for constitutionality under
the Enforcement Clause.
V. IMPACT
It has been suggested that the cycle for Commerce Clause
jurisprudence is approximately sixty-five years.613 Noting that the last
significant change in this line of case law coincided with Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. in 1937, such a theory would place the year 2000
just inside a new cycle, poised for a corresponding interpretive shift.614
The most recent trend began to show signs of its appearance in 1991,
with the Court's decision in Gregory v. Ashcroft.615 This was followed
in 1995 by United States v. Lopez, when the Supreme Court overrruled
an act of Congress for the first time in almost sixty years. 616 Although
Lopez explicitly clarified one aspect of then-existing Commerce Clause
doctrine, 617 questions still remain as to the true meaning of some of its
other passages. 618 Unfortunately, United States v. Morrison did not
provide a clear answer to those questions. While in Lopez, Chief Justice
Rehnquist intimated a new standard for assessing whether federal
regulation of non-economic intrastate activity is constitutional, in
Morrison, he failed to build on his previous comments, addressing this
language from Lopez only in passing. In the wake of Lopez, several
circuits interpreted the opinion to express the outer limits of
congressional commerce power, not to restrict a half-century of
612. See Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 533 (N.D. Il1. 1997); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp.
608, 616 (D. Conn. 1996).
613. See Kolkey, supra note 110, at 495.
614. See id. at499-501.
615. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); see Kolkey, supra note 110, at 495. In
Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court held that a federal statute would not be applicable to the states
unless Congress' intent that it be so applied was plainly stated on its face. See 501 U.S. at 463-
64; 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 98, § 4.10, at 490. Interestingly, this shift loosely
corresponded with Justice Rehnquist's elevation to Chief Justice. Justice Rehnquist was elevated
to the position of Chief Justice in 1986. Some would argue that the shift began even earlier,
citing then-Justice Rehnquist's 1976 opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery as a
significant departure from almost six decades of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See Susan
Estrich, Losers In the Federalism Game, DENVER POST, May 21, 2000, at K-02.
616. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 107, at 141.
617. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing the new principle of Commerce
Clause interpretation established in Lopez).
618. See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text (discussing the Lopez majority's
distinction between economic and non-economic intrastate activity).
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Commerce Clause precedent. 619 However, one circuit interpreted the
language to mandate a new rule of law. 620 The ambiguity generated by
Lopez, and left unclarified in Morrison, has resulted in the absence of a
clear set of interpretive rules for lower courts to use in future Commerce
Clause analyses. 6
21
If, following Morrison, more circuits adopt the Fourth Circuit's view
that intrastate activity of a non-economic nature cannot be reached
under the Commerce Clause, Congress' power to deal with current
national issues could be impeded.622 One example is Congress' ability
to address civil rights through hate crime legislation.623 The object of
such legislation, under the findings of Morrison, "[is] not, in any sense
of the phrase, economic activity," 624 and clearly falls within the
authority of state law. Prior to the VAWA's enactment, fewer than
twelve states had hate crime laws that included crimes motivated by
gender bias. 625  Under the Fourth Circuit's interpretation, any private
discrimination that occurs through non-economic activity, if the states
fail to enact a remedy for it, or, as with gender-motivated violence, fail
to give it equal treatment in the judicial system, will be allowed to
continue. Per the Court's holding in New York v. United States,
Congress cannot force states to enact hate crime legislation. 626
619. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that the
Lopez court reaffirmed previous precedent).
620. This was the Fourth Circuit. See Brzonkala 111, 169 F.3d 820, 833 (4th Cir. 1999).
621. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1774 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(pointing out that the majority's analysis under the Commerce Clause illustrates the difficulty in
determining a workable set of interpretive rules). It may be argued that the Morrison decision is
merely a signal to Congress to return to the drawing board and revise section 13981 to be in
compliance with the parameters outlined by the Court. This is not as simple as it may sound.
Morrison does not provide a clear picture of what section 13981 needs to look like to pass the
present Court's constitutional scrutiny. The addition of a jurisdictional element might fix the
problem, but this would be impractical. See Doe v. Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d 64, 70 n.10 (D. Mass.
1999). Additionally, there is no Supreme Court precedent requiring a jurisdictional element. See
Wilson, 73 F.3d at 685 (The Seventh Circuit rejected an interpretation of Lopez that jurisdictional
elements are required for statutes to be found constitutional. The court declared that such
elements are not necessary "to fulfill a prerequisite of constitutionality."). The mention of such a
detail in both the Lopez and Morrison analyses merely suggests that its presence might enhance a
statute's effect on interstate commerce; it does not indicate that all statutes with such an element
would automatically pass constitutional scrutiny, nor does it indicate that the absence of such an
element makes a statute per se unconstitutional. See Kuhn v. Kuhn, No. 98 C 2395, 1999 WL
519326, at *8 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 1999).
622. See Schwartz, supra note 410, at M- 1.
623. See George F. Will, A Revival of Federalism?, NEWSWEEK, May 29, 2000, at 78.
624. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751.
625. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at48 (1993).
626. See Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 32. New York v. United States held that the
Constitution does not authorize Congress to require the states to enact specific regulation. 505
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Therefore, if Congress is prohibited from enacting hate crime laws
under the Commerce Clause, and the states refuse to enact their own
such legislation, there will be no protection against those forms of
discrimination. 6
2 7
A broad adoption of the Fourth Circuit's rigid interpretation could
also seriously inhibit Congress' ability to respond to future national
problems. Should the country be struck by some disaster that proves
too large for the states to address on their own, be it weather-related,
such as a drought, or health-related, such as an epidemic, the fact that
such disasters are not "economic in nature" may prohibit Congress from
taking the necessary action. 628 This limitation on Congress' Commerce
Clause reach threatens the ability of the federal legislature to fulfill the
responsibilities assigned to it by the Framers. 629  This rigid
interpretation will also tie Congress' hands where the states refuse to
address the problem themselves.
In analyzing the constitutionality of acts of Congress, the role of the
courts is not to determine whether Congress enacted the best solution to
the problem at hand, nor whether the statute is necessary. 630  The
answers to these questions are to come from Congress.631 Instead, the
courts are to determine if Congress had a rational basis for its judgment
and whether the means Congress chose are reasonably adapted to
accomplishing its goal.632 The concerns of the Morrison majority, as
well as the courts in Brzonkala I and III, regarding the potential for
Congress to abuse this plenary power unless the judiciary steps in to
U.S. 144, 178 (1992); see supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text (discussing New York v.
United States).
627. See Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 39. Morrison will also prevent enactment of hate
crime laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. Even though Congress is empowered to enact
prophylactic legislation to prevent violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights, such legislation can
only be directed at states or state actors. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing limitations on
Congress' reach under the Fourteenth Amendment). Until the Court issues a majority opinion
that adopts the independent comments from Guest, the Fourteenth Amendment will not provide
an alternate means of sustaining such legislation. It is much more likely that the Commerce
Clause will provide the means for this legislation than will the Fourteenth Amendment, for two
reasons. First, the Court has already sustained civil rights legislation under the Commerce
Clause, so precedent exists. See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text (reviewing Supreme
Court precedent in civil rights litigation). Second, the Fourteenth Amendment opens the door to
issues of conflicting individual rights. See supra note 310 (discussing the Court's reticence to
extend the Fourteenth Amendment to regulate purely private conduct).
628. See Brzonkala Reply Brief, supra note 554, at 5-6.
629. See Brzonkala Brief, supra note 46, at 39.
630. See Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 538 (N.D. I11. 1997).
631. See id.
632. See id.
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control it, apply equally in reverse. Just as the dividing line between
constitutionally valid and invalid action by Congress is narrow so, too,
is the line for judicial review. The Court experienced a troubling
incident in the late 1930s as a result of its perceived overreaching; such
a lesson will, hopefully, not ever be repeated. 633 Decisions concerning
the breadth of states' rights, particularly in the face of years of
congressional research, are more appropriately left to Congress, as the
representative of the populous. 634 The Court's disregard for, and lack of
deference to, congressional findings usurps the constitutional role
assigned to Congress and threatens the balance between the federal
branches of government. 635 There is a chance, however, that this trend
could be reversed fairly soon.
The potential exists for the next President to appoint three new
Supreme Court justices to replace Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Stevens, and Justice O'Connor, who have served on the Court since
1972, 1975, and 1981, respectively. 636 Those choices have the potential
to advance the federalist thinking of the five-justice majority in Lopez
and Morrison, or to reverse the trend by creating a new majority that
would view the reach of Congress' commerce power more broadly. 637
The implications for advancement of the current federalism campaign
are far-reaching. This campaign has the potential to sustain challenges
to numerous acts of Congress on the grounds that the regulated activity
requires a chain of inference to support Congress' findings that the
activity substantially affects interstate commerce. 638  In the case of
intrastate activity, such challenges could be sustained because the
regulated activity requires a similar inferential chain to qualify as
"economic in nature. ' 639  Of course, Senate confirmation of a
presidential appointment only occurs after a Senate confirmation
hearing, at which questions concerning the nominee's views on
federalism are likely to take center stage.64° This, combined with the
633. See supra note 160 (discussing Franklin D. Roosevelt's court-packing plan).
634. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1776-77 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
635. See Anisimov, 982 F. Supp. at 539. Congress is the governmental branch best suited to
performing the necessary research to generate those factual findings.
636. See Will, supra note 623, at 78. The youngest of these three justices, Sandra Day
O'Connor, will turn seventy this year. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 107, app. B at B-
6, B-7.
637. See Will, supra note 623, at 78.
638. See supra Parts III.A.2 & 3.b (discussing the Commerce Clause analyses of the district
court in Brzonkala I and the Fourth Circuit in Brzonkala Ill).
639. See supra Parts II.A.2 & 3.b (reviewing the use of the Lopez four-part analysis by both
the district and appellate courts).
640. See France, supra note 500, at 43.
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political balance in the Senate and the political leanings of the newly
elected President, will all contribute to the future direction of
constitutional interpretation. The next successful appointment to the
Supreme Court bench should indicate whether the shift toward states'
rights begun in 1991 will continue for a full sixty-five-year cycle, or be
quickly reversed to the post-New Deal direction.
64 1
VI. CONCLUSION
The full impact of the Morrison opinion, both socially and legally,
will not become evident for the next several years. On the social level,
it is important to remember that, despite the Court's invalidation of
section 13981, all the other provisions of the VAWA remain unaffected.
Anyone who has not personally been the target of gender-motivated
violence cannot fully appreciate the depth of emotional harm suffered
by its victims. For past and future victims of gender-motivated
violence, the Court's decision is surely a disappointment and represents
a backward step in preventing such conduct, possibly in advancing all
forms of civil rights. However, those provisions that remain contain the
mechanisms for numerous advancements, by funding capital
improvements in public security, by providing education to members of
the law enforcement community, and by mandating full faith and credit
for orders of protection. It is possible that these improvements may
accomplish one of the goals of section 13981: encouraging states to
improve their enforcement against gender-motivated violence through
leading by example. On the legal level, the Court's current dedication
to its own doctrines of federalism appears to have placed civil rights at
the bottom of its priorities and extended the Court's authority beyond its
constitutional limitations. Prior to the Morrison decision, only one
federal circuit had interpreted Lopez to divert Commerce Clause
analysis in a new direction. With the Morrison decision's mechanical
tracing of the Court's Lopez analysis, such an interpretation may gain
favor throughout the judiciary. Blind devotion to Lopez interpretations
similar to that of the Fourth Circuit threaten the ability of the federal
legislature to carry out the work that it is constitutionally charged to do.
Such an interpretation ties Congress' hands in situations where the state
governments are incapable, or refuse, to adequately address social
problems that impact commerce. Perhaps the early years of the new
century will bring a change in perspective to the members of the Court,
but, more likely, it will bring a change in membership. Until that
641. See Will, supra note 623, at 78.
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change occurs, it seems improbable that Congress could draft a
replacement for section 13981 that would survive the scrutiny of a
Court predisposed to disdain for any legislation perceived as a threat to
its notions of federalism, even if those notions conflict with the will of
the states.
